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 SUMMARY 
 
Electronic contracts in the new technological age and electronic commerce 
have brought about world-wide legal uncertainty. When compared to the 
traditional paper-based method of writing and signing, the question has 
arisen whether contracts concluded by electronic means should be 
recognised as valid and enforceable agreements in terms of the functional 
equivalence approach. 
 
This study will examine the law regulating e-commerce from a 
South African perspective in contrast to international trends and e-
commerce law from the perspective of the United States.  The research 
investigates various aspects of contract formation such as time and place, 
validity of electronic agreements, electronic signatures, attribution of 
electronic data messages and signatures, automated transaction as well as 
select aspects of e-jurisdiction from a South African and United States 
viewpoint.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
(a) Background to research problem 
 
In terms of the functional equivalence approach,
1
 the formation of electronic 
contracts in the new technological age and electronic commerce has brought 
with it world-wide legal uncertainty as to whether electronic contracts 
concluded by electronic means can be recognised as valid and enforceable 
agreements compared to the traditional paper-based method of writing and 
signing. It is a common perception that the law, and more particularly the 
law of contract, has been lagging behind in the development of solutions for 
the use of electronic communication in commerce. This has led to 
uncertainty which, in turn, creates an obstacle to trade at a national and 
international level.
2
 The purpose of this study is to give an excursus on the 
law regulating e-commerce from a South African perspective. 
  
  The absence of face-to-face negotiations in a number of significant 
electronic transactions (including click-wrap and web agreements for sale or 
licensing of software and other goods) means that the website terms and 
conditions are usually unilaterally imposed by the owner of the website in 
question and will not be negotiated and not physically signed by the other 
party.
3
 The original principles of contract law are out-dated and it is clear 
that at the time these principles were formulated the world was run on paper 
and ink. Certainly, the meeting of minds in cyberspace was never envisaged 
and the validity and effect of electronics in commercial communication was 
never contemplated.
4
 The use of electronic communications for the purposes 
                                                 
1
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, Part I, 
Resolution 51/162 adopted by 85th General Assembly at a plenary meeting (A/51/628) 
(December, 1996) available at www.uncitral.org/en-index.html.  
2
 S Eiselen ‘Principles of the UNECIC‘ in Sharing International Commercial Law across    
National Boundaries, (2008) at 106.   
3
 T Pistorius ‗Formation of internet contracts: Contractual and security issues‘ (1999) 11 SAMLJ 
at 286. 
4
 T Pistorius ‘From snail mail to e-mail - a South African perspective on the web of 
conflicting rules on the time e-contracting‘ (2006) 39 CILSA at 179. 
2 
of trade posed unexpected and complex legal problems and it was clear, as 
early as the early 1980s, that there was a need for legal redress of these 
issues on both local and international levels.
5
  
 
(b) Aim of the study  
The focus of this study is the extent to which the legal barriers to electronic 
contract formation and related e-commerce issues have been effectively 
addressed by legislative intervention in South Africa. This work also intends 
to address the effectiveness of the South African Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (hereafter referred to as the ECT 
Act)
 6
 in regulating e-commerce in comparison to the legal position in the 
United States of America (US). It will also try and answer whether South 
Africa can accede to the United Nations Conventions on the use of 
Electronic Communication in International Contracts 
7
 (hereafter UNECIC). 
Various aspects will be looked into with regard to contract formation such as 
time and place, validity of electronic contracts, electronic signatures, 
attribution of electronic data messages and signatures, automated 
transaction, as well as select aspects of e-jurisdiction. 
 
The legal issues will be examined from a South African standpoint and 
are reviewed on a comparative basis with international Model laws and 
Conventions and laws of the US. In carrying out the aims of this research it 
was decided that this study would only be limited to the legal issues as 
outlined above. To go further than these issues, would be beyond the scope 
of the guidelines as proposed by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
8
 and the UNECIC (2005)
9
. 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Act 25 of 2002.  
7
 UNCITRAL‗Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts‘. Resolution 60/21 adopted at the 60th session of the General Assembly 
(December 2005) available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.html (accessed on the 1st 
March 2015). 
8
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, Part I, 
Resolution 51/162 adopted by 85
th
 General Assembly at a plenary meeting (A/51/628) 
(December, 1996) available at www.uncitral.org/en-index.html. 
3 
The legal issues addressed in this dissertation have a direct bearing on 
commercial transacting on the internet and are of great importance. 
 
 
(c) Outline of the study  
  
Chapter II explains the technology that forms the basis for e-commerce. The 
topic is introduced by a discussion of the historical development of the 
internet. The technology used to generate the data messages and the 
transmission thereof as well as the creation of electronic signatures (digital 
signatures) will also be discussed. This technical background forms a basis 
to illustrate that legal challenges have been created by e-commerce and with 
it, legal uncertainties have materialised.  
 
Chapter III of the study examines international law instruments such 
as (a) the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-commerce which is based on the 
functional equivalence principle; and (b) the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures,
10
 which is, in turn, based on the ‗technological 
neutrality‘ principle and the party autonomy principle, which have helped 
forge the South African Electronic Communication and Transactions Act, 
(ECT Act), and (c) the UNECIC, which came into effect after the ECT Act  
and which has created a firm platform for further legal debate.  
 
Chapter IV deals with the common law principles of the law of 
contract and the legal position as it was prior to legislative reform. The 
requirements for contract formation (offer and acceptance) formalities, 
attribution and automated transactions are discussed. Many of the principles 
to be dealt with in this section are still applicable and were not amended by 
                                                                                                                                                    
9
 UNCITRAL‗Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts‘. Resolution 60/21 adopted at the 60th session of the General Assembly 
(December  2005) available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.html  , (accessed on the 1
st
 
March 2015).  
10
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures. Resolution 56/80 adopted by the 87
th
  
 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly (December, 2001) available at 
www.uncitralwww.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.   
4 
the ECT Act. The difficulties in applying common-law principles to 
electronic commerce are highlighted throughout the chapter. 
 
Chapter V addresses the legislative development and history in 
enacting the ECT Act in South Africa. The validity and enforceability of 
data messages, writing and signature requirements, and time and place of 
receipt of a data message are addressed. This section is concluded by brief 
comment on e-jurisdiction issues and the extent to which the ECT Act 
conforms to international law and practice as expounded in Chapter III.  
 
Chapter VI of this dissertation contains a comparative study of the 
position obtained in the US on electronic communications law and how it 
deals with the same legal problems addressed in this work. The chapter will 
commences with an overview of the sources of law that govern conduct 
within the US. The chapter  then deals with the law that regulates contracts 
in the offline environment and then further examines the different pieces of 
legislation, namely: the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act of 
2002 (UCITA)
11
; the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act of 1999 
(UETA)
12
; and the Electronic Signatures Act of 2005 (E-sign)13 that impact 
upon the current legal regime with specific emphasis on the online 
environment. It will conclude with a short discussion on online              e-
jurisdiction and how the US courts deal with this vexatious legal issue. 
 
In Chapter VII of this work, the South African legal position is 
summarised and critically analysed with reference to US law and the 
UNECIC. In this chapter a critical appraisal is made of the provisions of the 
ECT Act on contract formation. The South African position on electronic 
signatures and the attribution of data messages are also to be reviewed. This 
chapter also assesses whether South Africa is ready to accede to the 
UNECIC and proposed amendments to the ECT Act. This is followed by a 
                                                 
11
 Uniform Computer Information Transaction, 1999. 
12
 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 1999. 
13
 Electronic Signature in Global and National Commerce, 30 June 2000. 
5 
short discussion on the African Union (AU) African regional initiative to 
regulate e-commerce. 
 
Finally, Chapter VII concludes by recommending several amendments 
to the ECT Act for the effective regulation of e-contract formation in South 
Africa. 
6 
CHAPTER II: TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO LEGAL 
PROBLEM 
 
(a)What is the internet? 
 
Over the years different South African writers and jurists in the information 
technology field have attempted to formulate a universally acceptable 
definition of the internet. Smith defines the internet as: ‗[a] network of 
computer networks‘.14 This definition, although crisp, does not fully 
describe the internet as it fails to encompass both its physical and technical 
applications. 
 
The writers, Benzine and Garland, on the other hand, defined the 
internet as: ‗a worldwide network of networks that are connected to each 
other into one single logical network, all sharing a common addressing 
scheme‘.15  
 
This definition also does not escape serious criticism, as its second 
part is misleading. It falsely creates the impression that the internet uses one 
single platform of communication when, in fact, there are diverse computer 
networks that communicate on different platforms within the same context 
of the term.
16
   
 
The distinction between a computer platform and a network is that a 
platform is usually a format of communication whereas a network refers to 
the physical aspect of the infrastructure facilitating the communication of 
data messages. Schneider extended the definition and defined the internet         
as: ‗a large system of interconnected computer networks that spans the globe 
which can be used by people throughout the world by means of electronic 
                                                 
14
 G Smith Smith’s Guide to the Internet (1997) at 1. 
15
 Benzine & Garland Accessing and Using the Internet (1995) at 26. 
16
 S Snail  ‗Electronic Contracts in South Africa - A comparative analysis‘ (2008) 2 JILTL    
  at 1, available  at  http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2008_2/snail  (accessed 13 January 2009). 
7 
data communication‘.17 Such electronic data communication comprises of 
electronic mail, online versions of newspapers, magazines, academic 
journals, SMSs and e-books. 
 
The most legally comprehensive definition of the internet can be found 
in the first edition of Buys‘ work, namely: 
 
‗an integrated computer network, through which users, by means 
of communication devices, are connected to each other by means 
of TCP/IP (the development of the protocol can largely be 
attributed to Vint Cerf and Robert Khan who co-designed the 
TCP/IP, the process with which data moves around the internet) 
family Protocols.‘
18
  
 
         This is the most favourable definition as it encompasses every aspect 
of the internet - both its physical and technical attributes - and it seems 
consistent with the definition of ‗internet‘19 as found in Section 1 of the 
ECT Act. 
 
Telkom SA v Napa Maepe and two others
20
 was the first South African 
ruling where the internet was described and defined. Judge Du Plessis gave 
an apt ‗technological layman‘s‘ overview of the workings of the network by 
his definition of the internet as ‗a number of computers linked together to 
share information‘. 
 
The internet can also be defined as, ‗a collection of packet-switching 
computer networks that are glued together by software protocols such as the 
                                                 
17
 G Schneider ‗Electronic Commerce‘ (2006) at 55.  
18
 R Buys ‗Cyberlaw @ SA: The law of the Internet in South Africa‘ (2001) at 12.   
19
  ‘[An] interconnected system of networks that connect computers around the world using  
     TCP/IP and includes future version thereof.‘ 
20
 Telkom SA Limited v Napa Maepe, South Africa Telecommunications Regulatory  
   Authority and The Internet Service  Providers’ Association (TPD)  unreported case, case    
   number 258940/97. 
8 
Transmission Control Protocol and the Internet [P]rotocol, respectively 
known as TCP/IP‘.21   
 
(b) Historical overview of the development of the internet 
 
In the mid-1960s, the Department of Defense of the United States 
government decided to set up the Advanced Research Project Agency 
(ARPA). Its main objective was to test and experiment with a new 
technology called ‗packet switching‘ for a project that was initially aimed at 
the formation of a data network, to curb data losses that could occur in the 
case of a nuclear attack against the US.
22
 This would be done by using 
computer link-ups via the different types of communication available at the 
time. During the following two decades the evolving network was used 
primarily by academic institutions, scientists and the US government.
23
 
 
 
The appeal the network had to these bodies is obvious; it allowed 
disparate institutions to connect to each other‘s computing systems and 
databases as well as share data via e-mail and other communication 
platforms. In 1979, Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis (Duke University, Durham, 
NC), along with Steve Bellovin (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), 
set up a system for distributing electronic newsletters originally between 
Duke and the University of North Carolina using dial-up lines and the 
‗Unix-to-Unix Copy Program‘ (UUCP).24  
 
                                                 
21
 A Alhadeff & M Cohen ‗Functionality of Value-added Network Service and their   Liability‘ 
(2004) in R Buys(ed), Cyberlaw @ SA II at 232. 
22
 K Giridhar ‗Packet Switched Data Network and it Evolution‘ (2013) in UNESCO – 
available at http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c15/e1-25-01-02.pdf (accessed on the          
10 June 2014) as well as A Archbold Are Contracts Concluded on the Internet Valid and 
Enforceable?: An Analysis of the Law Applicable to Contracting on the Internet 
(Unpublished LLM thesis University of Cape Town 1999) at 5.  
23
 Ibid. 
24
 D A Wheeler ‗The Most Important Software Innovations‘ (2008), available at   
http://www.dwheeler.com/innovation/innovation.html. (accessed on 10 February 2009). 
9 
 
This was the beginning of the informal network (USENET) which 
supported online forums on a variety of topics, and it took off once Usenet 
was bridged with the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
(ARPANET).
25
 Usenet was to become the prototype for what is known 
today as the World Wide Web (WWW). Over the years, it was tested and 
improved. In 1989, two commercial e-mail services, namely MCI Inc and 
CompuServe became the first e-mail service providers to supply private 
persons and companies with e-mail services as we know them today - 
although in its simplest form.
26 
 
(c)Data transmission over the internet 
 
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
communication procedure, mentioned earlier, allows computers connected 
to networks to link with each other by transmitting data packets to one 
another to create a chain of communication. Once the sending device 
transmits a data message via the internet, the TCP breaks down the big data 
packet into small data transmission packets and puts them into digital 
envelopes in a particular sequence that state the sender‘s and recipient‘s 
addresses.  
 
    The IP then adds a header to the sequence in which it writes information 
about what routes to take to get to the recipient. This intertransmission of 
digital envelopes takes place on virtual high capacity information highways 
called ‗routers‘. The packets are then transmitted from one router to the 
other (the distance and time of a message is dependent on what routers it 
will have to take and the level of network activity) much the same way an 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Martin Campbell-Kelly ‗The History of the Interent‘ (2013) at 
http://www.palgravejournals.com /jit/journal/v28/n1/full/jit20134a.html (accessed on        
27 October 2015).  
10 
envelope which travels between postal sub-stations before reaching its 
recipient.
27
   
 
    On arrival at the recipient‘s server, the IP/TCP protocol reverses the 
process by assembling the small data packets to its full original size. The 
data package and the message is then fully restored and readily accessible.
28
  
 
The prevailing uncertainty regarding authenticity, integrity and 
accuracy of electronic messages resulted in the development of electronic 
signatures. Blyth defined an electronic signature as, ‗any letters, characters 
or symbols manifested by electronic or similar means and executed or 
adopted by a party with an intent to authenticate a writing‘, or ‗data in 
electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other 
electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication‘. 30 
 
 Several methods exist to electronically sign documents which vary 
from very simple methods, such as the insertion of a scanned signature, to 
very advanced methods using encryption technology called cryptography.  
For the purposes of this discussion, only cryptography, biometrics and 
digital signatures will be dealt with.  
 
Cryptography is the study and practice of hiding the contents of a 
message, used from ancient times to the present.
31
 Encryption on the other 
hand is the electronic process whereby the message (in this case an 
electronic data message) is converted by way of a mathematical calculation 
into a series of coded numbers and symbols that can successfully hide the 
contents of the original message and can only be restored to its original form 
                                                 
27
 K Giridhar op cit note 23 at 3. 
id.  
29
 Ibid. 
30 Blyth S E ‗Digital Signature Lawof the United Nations, European Union, United 
Kingdom and United States: Promotion of Growth in E-commerce with Enhanced Security‘ 
(2005) 11 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 2 at 1, available at                                                              
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v11i2/article6.pdf  (accessed on 18 March 2012). 
 
11 
once the decoding process has been completed with the relevant decoding 
code or key.29
30
  
 
For instance, the sentence, ‗She sells shells by the sea-shore‘ sent by e-
mail to a specific recipient could be encrypted to   
‗ET8494UDKDI797H85K23G‘ and the said encrypted message can only be 
read if the recipient of the message has the relevant key and relevant 
decoding software.  
 
There are two mathematical families that can disguise a data message 
in digital form, namely symmetric cryptography systems and asymmetric 
cryptography systems. Symmetric (secret key) cryptography has been in use 
for a thousand years and includes any form where the same key is used both 
to encrypt and to decrypt the text involved. One of the simplest forms, also 
known as the Caesar cipher, conceals messages by shifting the alphabet in so 
many places in one direction or another.
31
  
 
A variation of this system involves an arbitrary ordered alphabet of the 
same length as the one used for the plain message.
33
 In such an instance the 
key will be a long sequence of numbers such as 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12 . . . 
indicating the A would map to R, T to F, V to T, and so on, or a less 
ingenious scheme involving letters from a sentence of a particular novel or 
poem.
3429
  
 
The above scheme has proved to be ludicrously weak and modern 
schemes use complex computer-generated mathematical algorithms. Modern 
schemes based on difficult mathematical problems are very effective and 
reliable in concealing the encrypted message.   
                                                 
32
 Mason S ‗Electronic Signatures: The Technical and Legal Ramifications‘ (1999) 
Computer and Law at 37. 
 
33
 M Mactaggart ‗Introduction to Cryptography, Part 2: Symmetric Cryptography‘ (2001)             
at 1, available at www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/s-crypt02.html (accessed on the     
12 February 2010.)
 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Mason op cit note 32 at 26.
 
12 
 
The effectiveness of this system depends on the strength of the 
algorithm and the length of the key number. The longer the key number the 
better the strength of the security. For instance, it would take a super 
computer 2 885 years to decipher a 56-bit key.
35
  
 
Unlike asymmetric cryptography (which will be discussed later) where 
there is a public element to the process and where the private key is almost 
never shared, symmetric cryptography normally requires the key to be 
shared and simultaneously kept secret within a restricted group.
323633
   
 
So it is simply not possible for a person to view the encrypted data 
with a symmetric cipher without access to the original key. The 
disadvantage of this system is that when the key falls in the wrong hands, 
the entire message and security is compromised. This makes clients and e-
commerce providers reluctant to use symmetric cryptography because first, 
they would have to send out a huge number of keys and secondly, once the 
said keys have fallen into the wrong hands, the message‘s authenticity 
cannot be guaranteed.  
 
Thirdly, it places a huge burden on the e-commerce provider to 
maintain and keep a good and secure record system of keys given to 
clients.
34
 
3537
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
36
 Mactaggart op cit note 33. 
                                            37
 Mason op cit note 32 at 32. 
               
38  
Ibid 
  
35
 Mason op cit note 32 at 38. 
13 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Symmetric Key 
36
 
 
 
Asymmetric cryptography (public key) ( as per Figure 1 above ) , on 
the other hand, does not require the same secret for both encryption and 
decryption which, in the case of symmetric cryptography, can make its 
security-enabling feature vulnerable to unauthorized access.
37
 Mason 
distinguishes asymmetric cryptography between private public key and 
trusted third party technologies.
3835
  
 
The private public key asymmetric cryptography generally uses two 
mathematically related keys that are used to work together in such a way 
that a plain text encrypted with the one key can only be decrypted with the 
other. One of these keys, the private key, will be kept private by one 
individual and the second key, the so-called public key, needs to be made 
public as widely as possible. 
4037
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Key  
4141 
 
Symmetric cryptography unfortunately has its vulnerabilities. In 
contrast, it is important to mention that asymmetric cryptography has both 
strengths and weaknesses. The most important of these weaknesses being (a) 
impersonation
 
and (b) that the technology is much slower than symmetric 
cryptography.
4242 
Mactaggart also mentioned that both asymmetric and 
symmetric cryptography techniques, if used in conjunction with each other, 
can be very beneficial and complementary to give an elegant and efficient, 
extreme high-level security verification system. 
 
The next point to be discussed is the digital signature. Christianson 
and Mostert defined it as follows: ‗A digital signature is a data item which 
accompanies a digitally encoded message and which can be used to 
ascertain both the originator of the message and the fact that the message 
has not be alerted since it left the originator‘.4343 Digital signatures, as 
contemplated, involve the use of a private and public key pair that are issued 
by a Certification Authority (CA).
44
  
 
A CA is a third party which can be a private or public body that acts to 
certify the data flow between a person and their private key and who verifies 
the identity of the person requesting the key pair.
 
The private key, on the 
other hand, is distributed only to the key owner whereas the public key can 
                                                 
43 M Mactaggart ‗Introduction to cryptography, Part 3: Asymmetric cryptography‘ (2001) at 
1, available at www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/s-crypt03.html (accessed on 12 
February 2010). 
44
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be found by accessing a CA‘s public database. The trusted CA guarantees 
the authenticity of the public key.
 45
46
42
  
 
The CA issues an electronic authentication certificate that identifies 
the CA and the user of the certificate, it also contains the subscriber‘s public 
key and is digitally signed with the CA‘s private key. The information 
contained in the certificate may include the level of inquiry carried out 
before the certificate was issued.
 3
Another important aspect of the digital 
signature is that messages which are sent through insecure communication 
channels certify that the data sent and received by the recipient is that of the 
sender.
46
 
  
Digital signatures are the equivalent of the traditional handwritten 
signature and, if properly used, are even more difficult to forge than the 
traditional handwritten signature. They are also important to prove non-
repudiation of agreements as they may, in certain instances, even use a time 
stamp. The use of encryption technology to create ‗digital signatures‘ makes 
it possible to verify that: (a) persons exchanging documents electronically 
are who they say they are; (b) the message exchanged between them has not 
been altered; (c) the sending party cannot deny having sent them; and (d) 
that the messages were sent by the parties. Encryption therefore provides 
electronic communication with authentication, integrity, non-repudiation and 
confidentiality.
4746
  
 
The electronic document is run through an algorithm known as a 
hashing algorithm prior to it being sent as represented below in Figure 3. 
                                                 
 
45 J Coetzee ‗The Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002: Facilitating     
Electronic Commerce‘ (2004) 3 SLR at 513.   
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The hashing algorithm then produces a ‗message digest‘ which is a unique 
hexadecimal value.
48
 
47
 
51
  
 
The message digest is then encrypted using the sender‘s private key by 
creating an electronic file which will, at a later stage, be decrypted with the 
sender‘s public key. The resulting file is then referred to as the ‗digital 
signature‘.    The digital signature is then once again encrypted along with 
the original data message and the resulting encrypted file is sent with the 
sender‘s certificate in a normal data transmission.49 
 
Figure 3:  Hashing Algorithm  
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(d) Legal challenges created by the use of electronic data communication in 
contract negotiation 
  
The use of electronic data messages for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes has been on the steady increase over the years through 
the invention and evolution of various data communication devices. 
Electronic commerce is no longer a predication; it is an economically 
significant reality as the internet is the world‘s fastest growing commercial 
marketplace.
50
  
 
There are in principal four different ways of e-contracting but the first and 
most important method of internet contracting is similar to a negotiation of 
one or more infrequent transactions by exchange of letters and documents – 
known as e-mail contract formation.
51
 In this method the parties can 
exchange e-mail messages and even attachments setting out the terms and 
conditions of their contract in detail. This is quite similar to offer and 
acceptance between the parties by way of letter or faxes.
52
 The second 
method, similar to contract formation via a mail order, is known as 
contracting on the World Wide Web (www). In this method, one party 
maintains the website at which goods and services are advertised. The 
prospective buyer accesses the website and then completes an electronic 
form whereby goods or services are ordered from the seller.
53
   
 
The third method is where the parties trade under the framework of an 
Electronic Data Interchange agreement (EDI). The EDI can be defined as 
‗computer-to-computer transmission of data in a standardized format‘.54 
                                                 
   
50
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 Pistorius op cit note 3 at 286. 
54
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Such EDI enables businesses to exchange documents over either the internet 
or their private networks.
55
 Private EDI networks are used by large 
businesses when buying goods and are preferred by smaller businesses as it 
reduces costs.
56
  This is the primary electronic commerce medium; it is only 
applicable and valid between the contracting businesses that have assented 
to it.
57
  
 
The final and the fourth method of contracting electronically is when 
users, while chatting online in a virtual chat-room, make offers and accept 
offers that result in valid and binding contract formation.
58
 The question 
may be raised whether an electronic mail, SMS message or other form of 
data communication, which is a form of data message, could be sufficient to 
signify a party‘s intent to be contractually bound.  
 
The ECT Act, which has been guided by the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
has now entrenched the position in South Africa that digitally negotiated and 
electronically signed contracts are fully valid and enforceable.
59
 
 
It is clear that the complexity of the technological aspects of electronic 
contract formation is far from the traditional methods of contract formation 
as it has brought with it new forms and ways to communicate offers and 
acceptance. It has also created new methods of electronically signing 
documents which not only fulfil some of the traditional functions of a 
signature but have also raised the value of the signatures.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
55
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56
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The said new developments in technology have clearly created new 
legal issues that will be examined in closer detail in the following chapters.. 
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CHAPTER III: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO LEGAL 
PROBLEMS CREATED BY ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS 
 
(a) Introduction to international response 
The transnational nature of electronic commerce and its disregard for 
traditional jurisdictional borders, together with the lack of domestic laws 
dealing with electronic commerce, created legal uncertainty in most 
jurisdictions.
60
 Although businesses are adapting to the electronic 
environment, legal rules continue to stipulate that certain transactions or 
documents are to be in writing.
61
  This was seen as an impediment to the 
development of electronic commerce and it was soon realised by many 
countries that accommodation of the electronic medium as a legally 
acceptable medium would be essential in years to come.
62
  
 
     In response to this lacuna UNCITRAL and governments of various 
countries called for the drafting of internationally recognised uniform 
electronic transactions legislation.
63
 In 1985, UNCITRAL drafted and 
adopted the ‗Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records‘.64 
At the time of its drafting, it was seen as a document, but since the 
development of the Model Laws one would rather call it the ‗policy 
document‘ which laid the basis for the harmonization of electronic 
communications laws on an international level. 
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In 1996, the United Nations adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
E–Commerce65 to assist countries in drafting and enacting laws to give legal 
recognition to electronic contracts as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures
66
 in 2001. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce
67
 was adopted on 12 June, 1996 and aimed to create a more 
certain legal environment for what had become known as ‗electronic 
commerce‘ by providing a tool for states to enhance their legislation of 
paperless communication and storage of information.
68
 Its main purpose is 
to give effect to the Recommendation on the Value of Computer Records as 
adopted by the UNCITRAL in 1985.
69
 The purpose of the Model Law was 
to offer national legislators a set of internationally acceptable rules for the 
enhancement of legal certainty.
70
 The principles expressed in the Model Law 
were also intended to be of use to individual users of electronic commerce in 
drafting solutions for contracts that are concluded electronically.
71
 
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce provides a functional 
equivalent for terms like ‗writing‘, ‗signature‘ and ‗original‘ in electronic 
form. This was followed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures and the United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts
72
 which sought to harmonise the 
provisions of the two Model Laws to form an international law instrument 
regulating international electronic cross-border contracts. One must mention 
the interesting fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures as well as the United Nations 
Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in International 
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Contracts (UNECIC) are not legally binding upon South Africa although the 
first two instruments have been influential in the drafting of the ECT Act 
and have formed the legal basis for this Act. Scholars will note that there are 
remarkable consistencies with what is proposed in the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws and the ECT Act. The Model Laws have served both to educate 
lawmakers about the legal ramifications of electronic transactions and to 
provide a framework for any country wishing to draft electronic commerce 
legislation. 
 
A comparative study of electronic transactions legislation from 
different countries shows that there is a close similarity between them and 
the Model Laws as they are mostly based on the Model Laws.
73
 Although 
our South African courts are not bound to the provisions of the UNCITRAL 
Model Laws, by virtue of the Constitution,
74
 it gives a clear instruction to an 
adjudicator to interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent with 
international law
75
 such as the UNECIC.
76
 It is also interesting to note that 
the Constitution further provides for consideration of foreign law, which 
would include foreign case law.
77
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Malaysia enacted the Digital Signature Act in 1997; Singapore passed the Electronic 
transactions Act in 1998; India passed the Information Technology Act in 2000; the United 
Kingdom passed the Electronic Communications Act in 2000; the United States of America 
passed the UCITA and UETA. Also see Baker & McKenzie, ‗Singapore E-commerce 
Legislation and Regulations‘ Global E-Commerce Law, available at 
www.bmck.co/ecommerce/malysia.html (accessed on 1
st
 March 2014). 
74
The  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, s.231 (4) – ‗Any 
international agreement becomes  law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an  agreement that has been approved 
by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act 
of Parliament.‘ 
75
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  Act 108 of 1996 , s.233 – ‗When 
interpreting any legislation, every court  must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.‘ 
76
 UNCITRAL‗Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts‘ Resolution 60/21 adopted at the 60th session of the General Assembly (December  
2005) available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.html,(accessed on 1 March 2015) 
77
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996,  s.39.  
23 
 
(b) Recommendation on the legal value of computer records by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) 
 
In 1985, the eighteenth session of UNCITRAL had before it a report 
compiled by the secretariat entitled ‗Legal value of computer records‘.78 The 
report's main conclusions were that, on a global level, there were fewer 
problems than expected with the use of data stored on computers as evidence 
in criminal prosecutions.
79
 It was, however, noted that a more serious legal 
obstacle was posed by the use of computers and, in particular, computer-to-
computer communication in international trade. Most legal difficulties arose 
out of the legal requirements that documents had to be signed or be in paper 
form.
80
  
 
After discussion of the report, the Commission adopted a 
recommendation, which expresses some of the principles on which the 
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model laws are based and founded.
81
 These recommendations were 
accordingly endorsed by the General Assembly
82
 and read as follows: 
 
‗…. Calls upon Governments and international organizations to 
take action, where appropriate, in conformity with the 
Commission‘s recommendation so as to ensure legal security in the 
context of the widest possible use of automated data processing in 
international trade.‘. 
 
As it can be noted from the simple wording of the UNCITRAL‘S 
recommendation, it is clear that as early as 1985 many countries had already 
found that the use of electronic data as a form of communication in the 
commercial realm was very popular. The question regarding validity and 
enforceability of using such electronic communication for legally relevant 
acts also highlighted the problems it could create as these recommendations 
failed to address some of the critical legal aspects of electronic 
communication. 
 
This policy document was instrumental in the development of 
electronic commerce law. Notwithstanding, the UNCITRAL 
                                                 
81
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‗Considering at the same 
that there is no need for a  unification of the rules of evidence regarding the use of computer 
record in international trade, in view of the experience showing that substantial differences 
in the rules of evidence as they apply to the paper-based system of  documentation have 
caused so far noticeable harm to the development of international trade, 
 1. Recommends to Governments:  
…. (b) to review legal requirements that certain trade transactions or trade related 
documents be in writing whether the written form is a condition to the enforceability or to 
the validity of the transaction or document, with a view to  permitting, where appropriate, 
the use of electronic authentication; 
 (c) to review legal requirements of handwritten signature or other paper-based method of 
authentication on trade related documents with  view to permitting, where appropriate, the 
use of electronic means authentication; 
(d) to review legal requirements that documents for submission to governments be in 
writing and manually signed with a view to permitting, where appropriate, such documents 
to be submitted in computer-readable form to those administrative services which acquired 
and established the necessary procedures. 
 2. Recommends to international organizations elaborating legal text related to trade to take 
account of the present Recommendation in adopting such text and, where appropriate, to 
consider modifying existing legal texts in line with the present Recommendation‘ 
82
 UNCITRAL Resolution 40/71 op cit note 70, para 5(b) of 11 December 1985. 
25 
Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records was the first 
attempt by countries to fill the lacunae that were created by the advent of 
electronic communication in the twentieth century. 
 
It should be noted that the nature, type and magnitude of statutory 
obstacles to electronic commerce varied greatly in different legal systems. 
That diversity in itself called for a greater degree of flexibility in introducing 
the necessary amendments to existing laws.
83
 These considerations clearly 
spoke against the adoption of an international convention at that time; 
however, it would take another ten years, under pressure of the emerging 
commercial activity on the internet, for the same body to revisit the said 
recommendations and to adopt those of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce.
84
 
 
(c) The United Nations Commission on International Trade’s (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
 
 
(i) Objectives and sphere of application of the Model Law 
 
  
After the UNCITRAL had made its initial recommendations, it became clear 
that it would have to go the route of internationally harmonising electronic 
commerce principles. This was seen as the logical approach for dealing with 
the legal implications of technological developments as a result of ‗markets 
migrating from geographic space to cyberspace‘85 and the fast pace at which 
technological changes were occurring. Impetus to this movement was also 
given by the elevation of electronic commerce to a high position on the 
                                                 
83
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domestic policy agendas of many countries. A number of international 
organisations became concerned with trade facilitation in the online world 
and how commercial law could be harmonised or unified to deal with e-
commerce.
86
   
 
It is against this background of increasing legal uncertainty and the 
exponential increase in international e-trade that the UNCITRAL 
established a Working Group to draft legal rules on electronic commerce.
87
 
 
The other objectives of the Model Law were to facilitate, rather than 
regulate,
88
 the use of electronic communication and to provide equal 
treatment to users of paper-based documentation (also known as the 
functional equivalent approach) and also users of electronic-based 
documentation or alternative methods of communication to foster economic 
growth and efficiency of international trade.  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a basic legal framework 
for electronic commerce enablement and regulation. Its focus was to 
facilitate rather than regulate electronic commerce and it was needed at the 
time to help with the interpretation of existing international law, conventions 
and other instruments as far as they impeded on e-commerce at that time.
89
 
Through the application of the principle of functional equivalence, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law advocated, as a first step, the adaptation of existing 
legal principles to the electronic commerce environment. 
90
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27 
 
The decision to draft the Model Law not only intended to 
remedy the disadvantages posed by the lack of uniformity of domestic 
legislation of the different member states, but it also intended to remedy 
international trade and the interpretation of international legal instruments 
that enhanced the disparities of the modem communication techniques 
between first world and third world countries.
91
  It was also a response to the 
fact that much of the existing legislation governing the communication and 
storage of information did not contemplate the use of electronic commerce 
and imposed, or implied, restrictions on the use of modern means of 
communication by prescribing the use of ‗written‘, ‗signed‘ or ‗original 
document‘. 92  
 
In May 1997 the Guide to Enactment was published.
93
 The aim 
of publishing the Guide to Enactment (hereafter referred to as the Guide) 
was to summarise the consensus of the discussion by the commission and 
the working group and to provide explanatory notes to assist governments 
who wanted to follow the Model Law when enacting their own electronic 
communication legislation.
94
 The Guide was also vital to states that had a 
limited or no familiarity with the type of communications technique 
considered in the Model Law.
95
  
 
 In preparing and adopting the Model Law, the UNCITRAL was 
mindful of the fact that such a Guide would be necessary to deal with some 
of the aspects that could not be addressed adequately due to conflicting legal 
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rules of different states that could only be explained by means of a guide. 
Therefore, it is important to note that the Guide has been drafted from the 
‗travaux preparatoires‘ with the idea of being helpful to users of electronic 
communications as well as scholars in the field.
96
  
 
In the Guide, the Model Law is divided into two parts namely, 
Part 1 (one) that deals with the general ‗electronic commerce‘ provisions.97 
It is the most important part in relation to this treatment. Part 2 (two) briefly 
deals with ‗electronic commerce in specific areas‘ and it has an open-ended 
structure to allow for future additions.
98
 
 
The focus of the Model Law is on ‗paperless‘ or ‗electronic‘ 
means of communication and except for the extent expressly provided it is 
not intended to alter traditional rules for paper-based communications.
99
 
Instead, it is intended to provide essential procedures and principles for 
facilitating the use of modern techniques for recording and communicating 
information in various types of situations.
100
 The term ‗electronic 
contracting‘ has been used to refer to the formation of contracts by means of 
electronic communications (or ‗data messages‘)101 to use the terminology of 
the UNCITRAL.
102
 As such, electronic contracting is a ‗method for forming 
agreements, not a subset based upon any specialised subject matter‘ 103 of 
contract law. In fact, the legal principles are the same, the only difference 
being that the one is concluded on paper or orally, and the other is concluded 
in electronic form in cyberspace.  
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The Model Law adopts a ‗functional equivalence approach‘ in 
dealing with electronic commerce. This approach is based on analysing the 
purposes and functions of paper-based requirements and to determine how 
these purposes and functions can be fulfilled through electronic commerce 
techniques.
104
 
 
Article 3, in its interpretation clause, is intended to provide 
guidance for interpretation by courts and national legislative authorities 
when drafting and interpreting their own electronic communications law. 
Paragraph (1) makes it clear that the international origins of the Model Law 
must not be ignored. In giving effect to the provisions of the Model Law or 
when interpreting local law with reference to the Model Law, a court should 
interpret provisions in line with the uniform standards as proposed by the 
Model Law to enhance uniformity on an international level.
105
 
 
The Model Law lists five non-exhaustive main objectives. First, 
to facilitate electronic commerce among and within nations; secondly, to 
validate transactions that have been concluded by new means of technology; 
thirdly, to promote new technology and encourage the implementation of 
such technology in trade transactions by facilitating and enabling them; 
fourthly, to create and promote  uniformity and support electronic commerce 
practices;
106
 and  fifthly, Article 5 sets out the fundamental principle that 
electronic communications should not be discriminated against or denied 
legal effect simply because they are in electronic form.
107
 Article 6 sets the 
basic standard for an electronic document where it is a legal requirement that 
a document be in writing.
108
  
 
Article 7 of the Model Law acknowledges that a signature is 
used in the real world to indicate one‘s approval or verify the contents of the 
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document. The article also emphasises that this requirement will be met by 
an electronic signature if it is a reliable method used to identify the person. 
Article 7, therefore, gives an electronic signature the same legal effect as an 
ink signature even if it was not authenticated in a manner peculiar to a paper 
document.
109
 Article 7 also provides broad guidelines instead of specific 
prescriptions to avoid the risk of tying the legal framework of the Model 
Law to a given state of technological development.  
 
It is for that reason that the Model Law is called ‗technologically 
neutral‘.110 Article 6 and 7 are intended to take the focus off the mode of 
communication and place it on the fulfilment of traditional functions and 
therefore it is 'functionally' equivalent.
111 
Gregory supports this approach 
and states that it is of great significance that the Model Law recognises 
future developments and applications which are unforeseeable.
112
 
 
While facilitation and promotion of uniformity is a key objective 
it does not impose any duty on any party to either use, send or receive an 
electronic data communication.
113
 As a result of the ‗instrumental approach‘ 
114
 adopted by the drafters of the Model Law, important substantive issues 
such as jurisdiction, aspects of contract formation and performance were not 
addressed.
115
   
 
The Model Law, however, does not comprehensively address all 
legal problems created by e-commerce. Issues not addressed adequately 
were: (a) whether a contract formed between an automated process and a 
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natural person has any specific bearing on the rules of contract formation; 
(b) how the law must deal with data errors and data input errors; and (c) how 
the law must deal with mistakes and misrepresentations. The legal challenge 
of creating an internationally acceptable standard for e-commerce, it is 
submitted here, was in part overcome. This can be evaluated from the 
influence of the Model Law on laws adopted world-wide for e-commerce on 
legislation already adopted or being developed.
116
 
 
 
(ii) Key terms used in the Model Law 
 
Article 2 of the Model Law includes definitions of the key terms 
namely: ‗data message‘, ‗originator‘, ‗addressee‘, ‗intermediary‘, and 
‗information system‘. These definitions are explained in the Guide. 117 
 
The definition of a ‗data message‘ includes all types of messages 
that are generated, stored or communicated in an electronic, optical or digital 
form. It is notable that the notion of a data message is not limited to 
communication but is also intended to encompass computer-generated 
records that are not intended for communication.
118
 Therefore, the notion of 
a message includes a record. The definition of a record must, however, be 
read together with the term ‗writing‘ as prescribed by Article 6. The Model 
Law, is cognizant of the fact that there might be future developments in 
communication techniques, and went a step further in the definition of a data 
message by adding the words ‗or similar means‘.119  
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The ‗originator‘, sometimes called ‗sender‘, means the person 
from whom the data message has been sent and/or the creator thereof. The 
‗addressee‘ is the person or the intended recipient of the data message as 
opposed to the person who might coincidentally come into contact with the 
message or may unlawfully intercept data message in the course of the 
communication and re-route it to himself.
120
  
 
Pistorius argued that the ‗addressee‘ may in certain instances 
also be the ‗originator‘ of data message, for example where the intention 
was to store the message for future transmission or production or where the 
originator sent a message to himself for storage.
121
   
 
An ‗intermediary‘ on the other hand, is neither an ‗originator‘ 
nor an ‗addressee‘. It is important to note the limited role played by the 
‗intermediary‘ and to make a clear distinction between the originator, the 
addressee and other third parties.
122
 The ‗intermediary‘ can be a professional 
or non-professional party and the intermediaries‘ duties and relevance is 
limited to receiving, transmitting or storing data messages on behalf of 
another person.  
 
The definition of ‗information system‘ is intended to cover the 
entire data communication infrastructure used for sending, transmitting and 
receiving data messages. As to what the information system really is, is a 
factual question. The Model Law does not go in-depth into the matter but an 
information system may include an electronic mail box or even a 
telecopier.
123
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(iii) Formation and validity of electronic contracts 
 
 
Article 5 provides for the legal recognition of data messages 
with emphasis on the principles of non-discrimination of data or media 
neutrality.
124
 To put it differently, it embodies the fundamental principle of 
‗functional equivalence‘.125 Eiselen describes the functional equivalence 
approach  contained in the Model Law as: 
 
‗The law has been formed and developed from the point of view 
of paper-based applications. In order to afford electronic 
communications the same legal effect and protection as paper 
based communications, solutions that are functionally equivalent 
to paper need to be found without trying to imitate paper. This is 
of relevance especially in respect of formalities and specifically 
signature.‘126  
 
Article 5 clearly entrenches the principle that there should be no 
disparity between data messages and paper-based documents.
127
                      
It should, however, be noted that Article 5 is not intended to override any of 
the provisions of Articles 6 to 10. It merely indicates that the form in which 
certain information is presented or retained cannot be given as the only 
reason for information being denied legal effectiveness, validity or 
enforceability.
128
 The point of departure is that unless there are other 
legislative stumbling blocks, all electronic communications will be accorded 
their normal legal consequence depending on the intentions of the parties 
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making said communication.
129
 Therefore, if an offer is made with the 
necessary contractual intent, the offeree can rely on that offer even though it 
may only be in electronic form.
130
 
 
Article 11, is similar to an entrenchment clause contained in a 
country‘s constitution, which makes a clear statement on the value of 
electronic data messages and the fact that they can be used for valid contract 
formation.
131
 Article 11(1) of the Model Law confirms that unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be 
expressed by means of data messages. Where a data message is used in the 
formation of a contract, the contract shall not be denied validity or 
enforceability on the sole ground that a data message was used for that 
purpose.
132
 The Guide explains that Article 11 is not intended to interfere 
with national principles of contract formation but rather to promote 
international electronic trade by increasing the legal certainty provided for 
by data messages in Articles 6 to Article 10 and to give legal effect to data 
messages.
133
 
 
Article 11 goes a step further and also explains the form in 
which an electronic offer and acceptance may be executed.
134
 It allows for 
the making of an offer in paper-based form with subsequent acceptance in 
electronic format and vice versa. This is also applicable in instances where 
both the offer and acceptance are expressed electronically.
135
  
 
One may be of the view that Article 11 is a superfluous 
duplication of the provisions of Article 5, merely worded differently. 
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However, Pistorius
136
 is of the view that the said provision is relevant and 
necessary due to some remaining uncertainties in various countries 
regarding the validity and enforceability of expressing one‘s intent (animus) 
to be contractually bound by means of an electronic data message. This is 
mainly due to the fact that some offers are expressed and accepted by 
computers without human intervention, which could cause doubt as to the 
intent of the parties.
137
 
 
(iv) Electronic writing 
 
 
Article 6 is intended to define the basic standard to be met by a 
data message to comply with the statutory requirement that information is 
retained in writing. Article 6(1) of the Model Law provides that where a law 
requires information to be in writing, such requirement will be satisfied if it 
is contained in a data message which is accessible and usable data message 
for subsequent reference. The requirement that information is retained or 
presented ‗in writing‘ (or that the information is contained in a ‗document‘ 
or other paper-based instrument)
138
 may be a result of a statute, regulation or 
common law.   
 
As noted infra the Model Law relies on the functional-
equivalence approach which is based on an analysis of the purpose and 
functions of the traditional paper-based requirements to determine how those 
purposes or functions could be fulfilled through electronic commerce 
techniques.
139
 Pistorius correctly points out that as stated in Article 6(2), this 
provision is applicable whether the requirement therein is in the form of an 
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obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the 
information not being in writing.
140
  
 
In preparation of the Model Law, particular attention was paid to 
the functions traditionally performed by various kinds of ‗writing‘ in the 
traditional paper-based environment. Such functions indicate reasons as to 
why national law may require the use of ‗writing‘.141 The Guide gives a list, 
which does not form a ‗numerus clausus‘, to clarify the reasons why national 
law requires parties to reduce their actions in writing for legal efficacy.
142
 
 
There are important reasons why writing is required. First, it is 
mainly to ensure that there is tangible evidence of the existence and nature 
of the agreement; secondly, to identify the parties who have intent to bind 
themselves; and thirdly, to assist the parties to be aware of the consequences 
of entering into a contract. Other reasons are to provide a legible document 
for all parties involved and to ensure that a document remains unaltered over 
time and provides a permanent record of a transaction. A further valid 
reason is to allow for the reproduction of a document so that each party can 
retain a copy of the same data. Since it is in digital form, it is important that 
it can allow authentication of the data by means of a signature. The Guide 
also notes that in certain instances, acceptability of the document by public 
authorities and courts would be important to: (a) record the intent of the 
author by means of ‗writing‘; (b) provide a record of that intent, and; (c) 
bring legal rights and obligations into existence in instances where ‗writing‘ 
was required for validity purposes.
143
 
 
However, in the preparation of the Model Law, it was found that 
it would be inappropriate to emphasise the writing requirement alone as 
many national laws also require parties to ‗sign‘ a document and in some 
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instances also retain and/or produce original documents.
144
 Thus, the 
requirement that data be presented in written form (which can be described 
as a ‗threshold requirement‘) should thus not be confused with the more 
stringent requirements such as signature and originality.
145
 
 
While a number of functions are traditionally performed by 
‗writing‘, the Model Law focuses on the notion that information should be 
capable of being reproduced and read. Both notions are expressed in Article 
6 in an objective test that information be ‗accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference‘.146 The purpose of Articles 6 is to primarily focus on 
the reproduction and readability of a data message. Pistorius
147
 is of the view 
that this is an objective criterion, namely, that the information in the data 
messages must be accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. 
This is confirmed in paragraph 50 of the Guide.
148
  
 
With regard to the term ‗usable‘, the Model Law states that data 
messages should not only be limited to human usability and accessibility but 
should also include computer use as software might be necessary to render 
such electronic data in a readable form. It was found that the phrase 
‗subsequent use‘ is preferred to ‗durability‘ or ‗non-alterability‘ as these 
requirements would have been too harsh a standard and the requirements of 
‗readability‘ or ‗intelligibility‘ might be too subjective.149 
 
In terms of Article 6(3) a member state may exclude certain 
matters or legally relevant Acts if it deems fit. The writing requirement may 
not be applicable to certain kinds of information, for example, where the 
legal requirements include the warnings or legal risks that may be embodied 
in the conclusion of an electronic contract. The purpose of Article 6(3) is not 
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to create a blanket exception to the legal recognition of data messages being 
equivalent to a paper-based document. Rather, member states are 
encouraged to incorporate the objectives of the Model Law to try and 
achieve some form of legal uniformity for electronic data messages to 
gradually overcome the obstacles created by electronic data 
communication.
150
 
 
(v) Electronic signatures 
 
 
The Electronic signature issue gave rise to lengthy discussions in 
the working group during the preparation of the Model Law. While 
traditional signatures perform many functions, all legal systems recognise 
that a signature serves, at the very least, to: (a) identify a person, (b) provide 
certainty of that person‘s signature and (c) to associate that person with the 
content of a document. The Model Law concentrates on these functions.
151
 
To explain the proposition that the electronic signature has its origins in the 
paper-based methods of signing, it is important to look again at the Guide 
which is substantial based on the ‗travaux préparatoires‘ of the Model Law.  
 
The Guide notes that in addition to the above factors, a signature 
may attest to: (a) the intent of a party to be bound by the contents of a signed 
document; (b) a person‘s intent to endorse authorship of a text; (c) the intent 
to associate oneself with a document written by another person; and (d) the 
time and place that a document was signed or that a person was at a 
particular place.
152
 In some countries a signature has the purpose of fulfilling 
an ‗ex lege‘ formality in the conclusion of certain contracts and failure to 
adhere to such formality may render a contract void and/or voidable. A 
traditional signature can also become subject to additional security 
procedures such as verification by a witness or a notary.
153
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The drafters of the Model Law were of the view that they had to 
develop various functional equivalents for the different types of signatures 
and levels that exist for traditional signatures. This was done to ensure that 
various means of electronic authentication could be used in electronic 
commerce practices as a substitute to create legal certainty.
154
  Therefore, 
Article 7 adopts a comprehensive and flexible approach which leaves the 
question open as to which technologies should be used for such purpose.
155
 
Article 7 of the Model Law considers the form of an electronic signature and 
whether it is appropriate in the circumstances.
156
  
 
It establishes the general conditions under which data messages 
would be regarded as authenticated, sufficiently credible and enforceable in 
the face of signature requirements which currently present barriers to 
electronic commerce.
157
 Such trust and confidence is indeed a prerequisite to 
encourage e-commerce for business and consumers. By implication, this 
means that it will be necessary to deploy secure technologies such as digital 
signatures, digital certificates and secure electronic payment systems.
158
   
 
 Pistorius, affirms that a signature, be it in electronic or hand-
written form, fulfils a dual function.
159
 On the one hand, it identifies the 
signatory to a specific agreement or legally relevant act; and on the other, 
the intention to be contractually bound. Pistorius
160
 adds that an additional 
function of the signature may be to acknowledge the true content of the 
agreement.
161
 It is submitted here, that the correctness of an agreement could 
also be added to this list, which in legal terms would be extremely close to 
the true content.   
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Article 7 is based on the recognition of the functions of 
signatures in paper-based environments. It is stated that legal requirements 
for signatures are met in a digital environment if a method is used to identify 
the signatory in the data message to indicate reliable and appropriate 
approval of the data‘s purpose for being generated or communicated.162 
Article 7 of the Model Law states the requirements for the recognition of a 
valid electronic signature are primarily based on the functions that a 
signature has in the paper-based environment. Article 7(1) states that:  
 
‗Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement 
is met in relation to a data message if: (a) a method is used to 
identify that person and to indicate that person‘s approval of the 
information contained in the data message and (b) that method is 
as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data 
message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the 
circumstances, including any relevant agreement.‘ 
 
Article 7, thus further focuses on the two basic functions of a 
signature, namely to identify the author of a document and to confirm that 
the author approved the content of the document.
163
  The Guide suggests that 
a flexible approach is applied to achieve the level of security by the method 
of identification used in paragraph 7(1)(a).
164
 In addition, the method used 
under paragraph (7)(1)(b) should be reliable and appropriate for the purpose 
which the data message is generated or communicated.
165
  
 
In other words, a particular standard and/or minimum subset of 
requirements for a particular transaction may or may not be satisfactory in 
establishing the authenticity of one signature over another. However, the 
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article relies on the reasonableness of the parties and the need to strike a 
balance between the method used and the purpose for which it was used and 
leaves it in the hands of judicial interpretation.
166
 As this definition (being 
technologically neutral) does not mention any particular kind of signature, it 
should be understood that as long as an electronic signature meets the test of 
identification, authenticity and reliability, it is a valid signature.
167
 
 
Mason
168
 stated that the elements of an electronic signature can 
create difficulties for the international acceptance of a particular form of a 
signature. He used Article 7(1)(a) as an example which provides for methods 
used to identify a person, and to indicate their approval of the  message‘s 
information. He suggested that although these elements do not preclude any 
form of electronic signature, the said definition presupposes that only a 
digital signature will suffice. Furthermore, Mason goes on to say that this is 
further reinforced by Article 7(1)(b) which discusses issues of reliability and 
whether the form of a signature used is appropriate in the circumstances.
169
  
 
The Guide goes on to explain the differences that may be 
apparent in an array of legally relevant acts and it suggests legal, technical 
and commercial factors that may be taken into account in recognising and or 
accepting the value of an electronic signature. This particular interpretation 
should be seen in the light of all the circumstances of a particular legally 
relevant Act. Some of the important factors used in determining the 
appropriateness of an electronic signature are: (a) the sophistication of the 
equipment used by each of the parties; (b) the nature of their trade activity; 
(c) the kind and size of the transaction; (d) compliance with authentication 
procedures set forth by intermediaries; (e) the range of authentication 
procedures made available by any intermediary; (f) the function of signature 
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requirements in a given statutory and regulatory environment; and (g) any 
other relevant factor.
170
 
 
Article 7(1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the 
form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for 
the absence of a signature.
171
 Article 7(3) gives each state that intends to 
adopt the provisions of Article 7 the discretion to decide which types of 
transactions or legally relevant Acts should be expressly excluded from legal 
recognition in the online environment.
172
 
 
Pistorius confirms
173
 that the Model Law in Article 7 does not 
place any particular duty on any party or state to recognise a particular set of 
rules or standards regarding electronic signatures, but it rather provides 
guidance as to what might constitute an appropriate substitute for a signature 
if the parties used electronic communication in the context of an electronic 
contract.
174
  
 
The nature, type and magnitude of statutory obstacles and the 
necessity to apply the authentication of e-commerce transactions in different 
legal systems placed so much pressure on nations and the international 
community as a whole
175
 that the Model Law was followed by another 
Model Law in 2001 dealing specifically with issues related to electronic 
signatures. The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures is dealt with in 
detail in this dissertation further on . 
                                                 
170
 Such as the frequency at which commercial transactions take place between the parties; 
the capability of communication systems; compliance with trade customs and practice; the 
existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against unauthorized messages; the 
importance and the value of the information contained in the data message; the      
availability of alternative methods of identification and the cost of implementation; the 
degree of acceptance or non- acceptance of the method of identification in the relevant 
industry or field both at the time the method was agreed upon and the time when the data 
message was communicated. 
171
 Article 7 (2). 
172
 Article 7 (3) reads: ‗The provisions of this article do not apply to the following: [...]‘. 
173
 Pistorius op cit note 69  at 15.   
174
 Guide op cit note 8 para 59 at 40. 
175
 Faria op cit note 117 at 530. 
43 
 
(vi) Attribution of data messages 
 
In the faceless and quite different regions of cyberspace, one of 
the most significant issues that need to be resolved is that of attribution.
176
 
Article 13 has its origins in Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Credit Transfers, which defines the obligations of the sender of 
a payment order.
177
 Article 13 of the Model Law comes closest to 
establishing a rule of liability. The intention is to give maximum legal 
weight to the authentication procedures created by the parties.
178
  
 
    The purpose of Article 13(1) and 13(2) is to demystify 
whether a data message has really been sent by the person cited as the 
originator of the data message, and to create a simple rule to determine when 
a message may be deemed to be that of the purported sender.
179
  
     In a paper-based environment, the issue of attribution would 
arise due to a forged signature of the originator. In the electronic 
environment, it would be due to sending a data message by way of the 
unauthorized access to the originator‘s informations system, notwithstanding 
the fact that the originator's code, encryption or the like would be accurate. 
180
  
 
Article 13(1) entrenches the rebuttable presumption that an 
originator is bound to a data message if the said message has been 
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effectively sent.
181
 Paragraph (2) deals with the scenario where the message 
is sent by person other than the originator who had express and/or implied 
authority to act on behalf of the originator. Article 13(2)(a) creates a rule 
that an e-mail will be deemed to be that of the sender even if an agent was 
the effective sender of the message and the agent purports to have had the 
authorization to do so. Article 13(2)(b) creates a rule that the recipient of a 
data message sent by an ‗electronic third party agent‘ programmed by the 
sender would also be deemed to be that of the sender.
182
  
 
However, the Guide affirms that the Model Law specifically 
states that the said provision is not intended to alter or to impose any 
obligations on an enacting state to change its domestic laws of agency. The 
appropriate domestic laws will determine whether the person in question 
acted within the scope of their authority or ‗ultra vires‘.183  
  
Article 13(3)
184
 deals with two different types of scenarios where 
an addressee may presume that a data message is that of the originator.  In 
the first scenario as per Article 13(3)(a), the addressee may still hold the 
originator liable or responsible in the case where the addressee followed the 
authentication procedures as previously agreed to with the  originator.
185
 The 
second scenario as per Article 13(3)(b),  is a form of ‗estoppel‘ in that the 
originator is ‗estopped‘ from relying on the fact that he did not send the data 
message due to the relationship he had with the sender of the data 
                                                 
181
 See Phang & Seng op cit note 116 at 110 who confirm that a rebuttable presumption is 
created by Article 13 (1). Also see the Guide para 84 at 49.  
182
 Phang & Seng op cit note 116 at 110.  
183
 Ibid.  
184
 ‗(3) As between the originator and the addressee, an addressee is entitled to regard a data 
message as being that of the originator, and to act on that assumption, if: 
(a) in order to ascertain whether the data message was that of the originator, the addressee 
properly applied a procedure previously agreed to by the originator for that purpose; or (b) 
the data message as received by the addressee resulted from the actions of a person whose 
relationship with the originator or with any agent of the originator enabled that person to 
gain access to a method used by the originator to identify data messages as its own.‘ 
185
 Phang & Seng op cit note 116  at 110.  
45 
message.
186
Article 13(4) 
187
 sets out the exceptions to the rebuttable 
presumption created by paragraph (3). 
 
Article 13(5)
188
 deals with the preclusion that the addressee is 
entitled to regard the data message as being what the originator intended to 
send and to act on this assumption unless the addressee knows or should 
have known that errors have been made in a sent data message. Article 
13(6)
189
 deals with the practical problem of having erroneously sent 
duplication of data messages well as the standard of care that should be 
observed in distinguishing an erroneously duplicated message from a 
separate data  message. The addressee can regard each separate message as 
valid unless he knew otherwise or whether he ought to have known. 
190
 
 
In the early draft stages of Article 13 the drafters wanted to add a 
paragraph dealing with the attribution of authorships of a data message. This 
paragraph was not added and it was agreed that mention thereof should be 
made in the Guide.
191
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used any agreed procedure, that the data message was a duplicate.‘ 
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(vii)  Time, place of dispatch and receipt of data message 
 
In the instance where contracting parties are not in each other‘s 
presence, it becomes imperative to establish the time and place or when and 
where the contract was formed.
192
 The time and place of contract conclusion 
is crucial to determine when the parties are bound to an agreement and will 
have bearing on legal actions should a dispute arise. The method of 
acceptance has legal consequences which are more complex to determine in 
the electronic environment.
193
  Rules on contract formation often distinguish 
between ‗instantaneous‘ and ‗non-instantaneous‘ methods of communicating 
offers and acceptances. A distinction is also drawn between communications 
exchanged among parties present at the same place at the same time (‗inter 
praesents‘) and communications exchanged at a distance (‗inter absents‘).194 
In the ordinary course of business, parties agree on contracts ‗inter 
praesents‘ or during face-to-face negotiations, leaving aside the possibility 
of contract formation through performance or other forms of implied 
acceptance.
195
  
 
Faria states, that there are mainly four theories for determining 
the moment at which an acceptance becomes effective under general 
contract law, although they are rarely applied in pure form for all situations.  
First, in terms of the ‗declaration theory‘196 a contract is formed when the 
offeree produces some external manifestation of his intention to be 
contractually bound notwithstanding the fact that the offeror may not be 
fully aware of the offeree‘s acceptance.197  Secondly, in terms of the 
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‗information theory‘ a contract only becomes effective once the offeror 
becomes aware of the acceptance. This is usually the default rule and also 
applies to most forms of communication such as telephone communication 
and fax.
198
  
 
Thirdly, according to the ‗mail box rule‘ also known as the 
‗postal, dispatch or expedition theory‘, the communication of the acceptance 
is effective once it has been posted or sent by the offeree (e.g., by placing 
the letter in a mail box). It is usually used in the case of indirect 
communications and has its origins in the issue of revocability of offers.
199
  
 
Fourthly, the ‗reception theory‘ which determines that a 
communication of an acceptance only becomes effective on receipt, or when 
it is possible to access it or when the offeror is made aware of it. In terms of 
the this so-called ‗Zugangsthoerie’,200 the deciding moment is dependent 
upon the communication being available to the relevant recipient in the 
sense that it is placed at his/her disposal at a place where he/she in the 
ordinary course of business would be reasonably expected to receive it. 
Eiselen notes that objectively speaking, this theory would be most suitable 
for indirect forms of communication such as the internet, EDI and e-mail. 
201
 
 
Article 15 (1) of the Model Law defines the time of dispatch of a 
data message
202
 as the time when the data message enters an information 
system placed outside the control of the originator.
203
 Information system 
must be interpreted broadly and would therefore include the communication 
link between the sender and, for instance, the service provider.
204
 Thus, it is 
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suggested that under the Model Law, offer and acceptance are dispatched 
when the enter button on the sender‘s computer is pressed.205  
 
Ahmad notes that Article 15(1) attempts to change the 
substantive law relating to the communication of offer and acceptance where 
electronic means have been used.
206
 Abhilash disagrees with this view and 
emphatically states that this is unfounded as Article 15 only explains and 
clarifies, inter alia, when dispatch and receipt of records take place, which is 
important purely for time of dispatch and receipt.
207
  In terms of the concept 
of having dispatched a message, a message should not be deemed dispatched 
if it merely reaches the information system of the addressee but fails to enter 
it.
208
 
 
 For the time of receipt, Article 15(2)
209
 distinguishes between a 
few factual situations: (a) where the addressee designates a specific 
information system, which may or may not be his own, for the receipt of a 
message, the data message is deemed to have been received when it enters 
the designated system; (b) if the data message is sent to an information of 
the addressee that is not the designated system, receipt occurs when the data 
message is retrieved by the addressee; and (c) if the addressee has not 
designated an information system, receipt  occurs when the data message 
enters an information system of the addressee.
210
  
 
                                                 
205
 Glatt op cit note 69 at 59. 
206
 Ahmad. op cit note 131 at 139. 
207
 Abhilash op cit note 168 at 274. 
208
 Guide op cit note 8 para 104 at 56. 
209
 ‗(2) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the time of 
receipt of a data message is determined as follows: 
     (a) if the addressee has designated an information system for the purpose of receiving 
data messages, receipt occurs: 
    (i) at the time when the data message enters the designated information system; or 
    (ii) if the data message is sent to an information system of the addressee that is not the 
designated  information system, at the time when the data message is retrieved by the 
addressee; 
    (b) if the addressee has not designated an information system, receipt occurs when the 
data message enters an information system of the addressee. 
210
 J Faria op cit note 115 at 547. Also see the views of C Glatt op cit note 69 at 60.  
49 
Article 15(3) emphasises that paragraph (2) applies 
notwithstanding that the place where the information system is located may 
be different from the place where the data message is deemed to be received 
under paragraph (4). 
 
Glatt aptly illustrates the complexity of the problems with the 
following illustration.
211
 A Scottish company accepts an offer from a US 
company situated in State X. Both use a service provider for internet 
access.
212
 The Scottish company has a German service provider; the US 
company‘s service provider has its place of business in State Y. If in this 
situation the postal rule applies, the contract would be formed in Germany, 
where the message will be received for transmission to the US. Depending 
on the further circumstances of the case, the contract might therefore be 
subject to German law.
213
 It is not uncommon, that users of electronic 
communications link with each other on a cross-border platform without 
being aware of it. Therefore, the Article 15 attempts to negate the location 
issue and emphasises a more objective criterion, namely, the place of 
business.
214
 This consequence is avoided by the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce in Article 15(4).
215
  
 
The Model Law reflects the fact that the location of information 
systems is irrelevant and sets forth a more objective criterion, namely, the 
place of business of the parties. However, Article 15 is not intended to 
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establish a conflict-of-laws rule.
216
 Paragraph 78 of the Guide consciously 
avoids providing a solution to the said conflict of laws. 
217
 
 
Article 15(4) provides that a data message is deemed to be 
dispatched at the place of the originator‘s place of business, and is deemed 
to be received at the addressee‘s place of business. In the instance where the 
parties have multiple places of business the place closest to the underlying 
transaction relationship will be deemed the place of business.
218
 Where the 
there is no underlying transaction, the deemed place will be where the 
parties have their place of business. Where the parties do not have a 
principle place of business, their habitual place of business will be deemed 
to be their place of receipt.
219
  Thus, Article 15 (4) introduces a distinction 
between the deemed place of receipt and place actually reached by a data 
message at the time of its receipt under Article 15 (2).  
 
(viii) Acknowledgement of receipt 
 
The use of the principle of ‗functional acknowledgement‘ is a 
business decision that can be made by users of electronic commerce. Article 
14 establishes a system of acknowledgment of receipt. It focuses upon 
whether or not a data message was received, but not on whether it has been 
read.
220
 The provision of acknowledgement of receipt does not intend to 
impose any duty on any user to apply such procedure; however, the 
commercial world values such a system as highly important and the practice 
                                                 
216
 S Eiselen op cit 127 at 308. 
217
 ‗As to the time and place of formation of contracts in cases where an offer or the 
acceptance of an offer is expressed by means of a data message, no specific rule has been 
included in the Model Law in order not to interfere with national law applicable to contract 
formation. It was felt that such a provision might exceed the aim of the Model Law, which 
should be limited to providing that electronic communications would achieve the same 
degree of legal certainty as paper-based communications. The combination of existing rules 
on the formation of contracts with the provisions contained in Article 15 is designed to 
dispel uncertainty as to the time and place of formation of contracts in cases where the offer 
or the acceptance are exchanged electronically.‘ 
218
 Pistorius op cit 67 at 19.  
219
 Ibid. 
220
 Hermann op cit note 87 at 7.  
51 
is commonly used and applied.
221
 Therefore Article 14 (1) specifically states 
that the provisions of Article 14(2) – (4) are used at the discretion of the 
contracting parties where an acknowledgment of receipt has been 
requested.
222
 
 
The purpose of Article 14 (2)
223
 is to validate acknowledgement 
where the originator has not expressly agreed with the addressee as to the 
method to be used to validate acknowledgement.
224
Article 14(3) deals with 
the situation where the originator has declared that the data message is 
subject to acknowledgement of receipt
225
 without specifying a specific time 
in which the said acknowledgement of receipt should be received.
226
 
 
Article 14(4),
227
 on the other hand, deals with the factual and 
more common situation where an acknowledgment of receipt is requested by 
the originator without adding the condition that failure to acknowledge 
receipt may result in the data message being deemed not to have been sent. 
The purpose of this provision is to establish whether the sender of the 
message would be relieved from any legal consequences due to the failure of 
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the addressee to acknowledge receipt.
228
 On the other hand, for the 
originator to rely on this provision he/she must:  (a) send another message 
notifying the other party of its default; (b) specify a reasonable time by 
which such acknowledgment must be received; and (c) specify the effect of 
such default before relying on the consequences of this provision.
229
 
 
Article 14(5) creates a rebuttable presumption that when the 
addressee sends an acknowledgment of receipt that he has actually received 
the message sent by the addressee.
 230
 The second part of Paragraph (5) 
echoes paragraph (5) of Article 13, which states where there is a conflict 
between the text sent and the text received, the received text prevails.
231
 
 
(ix) Automated transactions 
 
According to Pistorius, the UNCITRAL Model Law indirectly 
addresses automated transactions.
232
 Article 11 provides that, unless agreed 
otherwise, ‗a contract may be formed by an offer and the acceptance of an 
offer by means of data messages‘. The Guide notes that the provision was 
deemed necessary in view of remaining uncertainties in many countries as to 
the validity of electronic contract formation where data messages expressing 
the offer and acceptance are generated by computers without immediate 
human intervention.
233
 It is submitted that this is the correct approach as the 
wording of Article 11 was structured to encompass all forms of e-commerce 
at the time. 
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(x)  The impact of the Model Law 
 
        Notwithstanding the fact that many countries widely accepted the 
principles contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, it 
could not simply be assumed that its principles achieved the goal of world-
wide harmonization.
234
 The fact that technology is rapidly changing poses 
several challenges to the framework of the Model Law. It became evident 
that electronic signatures would definitely be a problem owing to the 
different signing techniques that were being developed. The provisions of 
the Model Law soon proved inadequate to deal with all the issues raised by 
the creation and use of electronic signatures.
235
 The pioneering work of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law has recently
236
 led to the adoption of a treaty on 
Electronic Contractors. It has also formed the basis for most universal e-
commerce domestic legislation around the world namely e-commerce 
legislation 
 
(d) United Nations Commission on International Trade  
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
 
(i) Objectives and scope  
  
Adopted by UNCITRAL on 5 July 2001, the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures creates a legal framework for electronic signatures. 
Building on the flexible principle contained in Article 7 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on E-Commerce, it establishes criteria of technical reliability for 
the equivalence between electronic and hand-written signatures.
237
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    The Model Law follows a technology-neutral approach, which 
avoids favouring the use of any specific technical process or technology.
238
 
To place the matter in context before examining : (a) the provision relating 
to the meaning of electronic signatures; (b) the treatment of signature 
technologies; and (c) the compliance with requirements for electronic 
signatures, this research would like to refer to the Resolution
239
 adopted by 
the UNCITRAL General Assembly.  
 
UNCITRAL, in drafting the new Model Law had to give further 
effect to the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the 
Commission at its 29
th
 session, in 1996 as complemented by the additional 
Article 5 adopted by the Commission at its 31
st
 session in 1998. This was in 
addition to paragraph 2 of General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 
December 1996 in which the Assembly recommended that all states should 
give favourable consideration to the Model Law when enacting or revising 
their laws. 
240
   
 
The Model Law on E-Signatures provides a link between 
technical reliability and legal effectiveness of an electronic signature by 
adopting an approach according to which the legal effectiveness of an 
electronic signature is predetermined.
241
  It sets out the presumption that 
where e-signatures meet certain criteria of technical reliability, they should 
be treated as equivalent to hand-written signatures. In establishing that 
presumption, the Model Law on E-Signatures follows a ‗technologically 
neutral approach‘.242 
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 In addition, the Model Law on E-Signatures establishes basic 
rules of conduct that may serve as guidelines for assessing the 
responsibilities and liabilities of the various parties involved in the 
signatures process. These are: (a) the signatory; (b) the relying party ; and  
(c) the trusted third party (where applicable).
243
 The instrument was 
conceived as an addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, 
which should be dealt with on an equal footing and share the legal nature of 
its forerunner.
244
  
 
The drafters of the Model Law on E-Signatures took the view 
that if they wanted to draft a law that advocated ‗media-neutrality‘ and the 
‗technology-neutral‘ rules, it would be nonsensical to exclude or limit the 
scope of application of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures to any 
specific form or medium of electronic signature.
245
 In addition, the 
Electronic Signature Model seeks to establish both a national and an 
international standard for electronic signatures.  
 
The non-standardisation of local and international e-signature 
laws may also create a duality of regimes, so creating a serious obstacle in 
the uniform standard as sought by the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures.
246
 It is important to note that the provisions of the E-Signatures 
Model Law are to be interpreted with ‗regard to its international origin and 
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith.‘247 Questions concerning matters governed by the Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures, which are not expressly settled in it, are to be settled 
in conformity with the general principles on which it is based.
248
 Article 2, 
defines an ‗electronic signature‘ as: 
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‗data in electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated 
with, a data message, which may be used to identify the signatory in 
relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory‘s approval of 
the information contained in the data message.‘ 
 
This again confirms the functions of the signature in accordance 
with the traditional purpose that it has. It adds that the e-signatures may have 
other functional uses in the electronic world. Eiselen explains that Article 2 
deals specifically with issues of identification, attribution and assent and that 
it aims to create a functional equivalent for an electronic signature without 
trying to mimic the physical attributes of a paper-based signature.
249
 Once 
again, the principle of ‗functional equivalence‘ appears in the E-Signatures 
Model Law.  
 
In addition, a new standard of flexibility has been achieved in 
the definition of an electronic signature that is embodied in the 
‗technological neutrality‘ principle. It is also important to give the definition 
of a ‗certificate‘, which is defined as ‗a data message or other record 
confirming the link between a signatory and signature creation data‘.250 
 
(ii) Equal treatment of signatures  
 
Wang explains that there are three different approaches when 
dealing with the various electronic signature legislations that have been 
enacted world-wide, namely the ‗minimalist approach‘, the ‗prescriptive 
approach‘ (also known as the technology-specific approach) and the ‗two-
tiered approach‘.251 Some jurisdictions that follow a technological neutrality 
approach recognise all technologies for electronic signatures. This approach 
is called the minimalist approach as it is non-prescriptive.  
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The Technological approach is seen as a light approach as it 
recognizes all forms of electronic signatures as functional equivalent of 
handwritten signatures provided that they fulfil certain specified functions 
and meet the technology-neutral reliability requirement.
252
  
 
When applying the prescriptive approach, legislators looked at 
the highest level of security offered by existing technology to avoid 
unauthorized access and to promote data security. However, by favouring 
particular signatures types, this approach is seen as inhibiting the 
development of new signature techniques as it excludes a number of  
futuristic electronic signatures.  
 
On the other hand, the two-tier approach recognizes: (a) self-
regulation; (b) limited government involvement ; and (c) government-led 
processes in achieving its goal.
253
 The two-tiered approach is also known as 
the two-pronged legislative approach. The first tier of regulation sets very 
low thresholds of requirements for electronic authentication methods to 
receive a certain minimum legal status. The second tier of regulation assigns 
a greater legal effect to certain authentication methods known as secure, 
advanced, or enhanced electronic signatures.
254
   
 
Article 3 of the Model Law on E-Signatures contains the 
fundamental principle that all digital signature methods, irrespective of the 
technology used, should be treated equally and should be given legal 
recognition as explained in Article 6.
255
 This, however, should not be 
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construed as overriding the provisions of Article 5
256
 that allow freedom of 
contracting between contracting parties using inter alia whatever digital 
signature method has been agreed to by the parties.
257
 This is in line with the 
minimalist approach supported by Wang, which does not accord preferable 
assumptions to any particular technology. The parties can choose their 
preferred e-signature at their own discretion.
258
 
 
 (iii) Compliance with a requirement for a signature 
 
Article 6, is one of the core provisions of Model Law.
259
            
Article 6 deals with the liability and recognition of electronic signatures and 
states: 
 
‗1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that 
requirement is met in relation to a data message if an electronic signature 
is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the 
data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the 
circumstances, including any relevant agreement. 
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether the requirement referred to 
therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides 
consequences for the absence of a signature.‘ 
 
 
As stated above, the idea underlying Article 6 is to build upon 
the principle as laid down in Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-
Commerce. Article 6 also gives guidance to the fulfilment of the test of 
reliability as Article 7(1)(b). During preparation of the Model Law on E-
Signatures, the view was expressed that one should rather refer to an 
‗enhanced electronic signature‘ as this would have a dual function: (a) legal 
consequences would arise from signature techniques that would be deemed 
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reliable, and (b) no legal consequence would arise from the use of a less 
reliable signature.
260
 Another reason for this new e-signature standard was to 
do away with the ex post facto necessity, as per Article 7 of the Model Law 
of analysing as to whether a signature is recognised or not.
261
 According to 
the Guide, states are free to insert this provision into their law, either as a 
substantive rule, or as a legal presumption pertaining to reliability of an 
electronic signature as dealt with by the insertion of Article 6(3).
262
 
 
The main focus of this provision is to ensure that where a 
reliable e-signature has been used it should have legal consequence.
263
 It 
must also be noted that the meaning of identification as contained in the 
Model Law on E-Signatures is intended to have a broader meaning than that 
of just identifying names, but it may also refer to their position or authority 
in combination with the said name.
264
  
 
Subparagraphs (a) – (d) are intended to express the objective 
criteria of the technical reliability of an electronic signature. In subparagraph 
(b) there is reference to the signatory‘s control over the signature creation 
data of an e-signature, and it is submitted that an authorized person has used 
it. In the case of a ‗split-key‘ the signature will be attributed to the person 
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using the said key.
265
 In terms of principles of subparagraph (a) and (b) there 
may be no agency or transmissibility of an e-signature. Regarding the 
integrity of the e-signature, subparagraph (c) deals with the criterion to be 
applied when establishing the reliability of an electronic signature. 
Subparagraph (d) makes it clear that the said provision would apply only to 
those countries where no distinction could be made between the signature‘s 
integrity and the integrity of the information.
266
 Subparagraph (d) also 
eliminates the notion that an e-signature may not be separated from the 
entire data message. Paragraph 4
267
 and 5
268
 has also been included to deal 
with a few outstanding issues.  
 
Paragraph 4(a) is intended to provide a legal basis for 
contracting parties in commercial practice. Paragraph 4(b) also re-affirms 
that the presumptions made in paragraph 3 may be rebutted.
269
 This is also 
not to specifically exclude any certain acts or transactions. Paragraph 5 has 
been inserted to allow a flexible inclusion of the provisions of Article 6 so 
that they can find general acceptance by contracting states, and in some 
instances, may increase the criteria as required by Article 6 or, in 
exceptional cases, even reduce the standard as required.
270
 
 
 
 
                                                 
265
 Ibid para at 55. 
266
 Ibid paras 124-125 at 55 - 56. 
267
  Paragrpaph (4) provides: ‗Para 3 does not limit the ability of any person: 
     (a) To establish in any other way, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred 
to in paragraph 1,  the reliability of an electronic signature; or 
     (b) To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic signature.‘ 
268
 Paragraph (5) provides:‘The provisions of this article do not apply to the following: [...]‘. 
269
 Guide op cit note 8 para 128 -129 at 56. 
270
 Guide op cit note 8 para 131 at 57. 
61 
iv) Recognition of foreign certificates and e-signatures 
 
Article 12
271
 deals with recognition of foreign e-signatures and 
certificates between two contracting parties in two different states.              
Article 12 endeavours to solve the problem. The purpose of paragraph 1 is to 
introduce the general rule of ‗non-discrimination‘ between foreign 
signatures and certificates on the basis of their origin.
272
 The fact that a 
signature is from a particular jurisdiction should have no bearing on the 
effectiveness and legal recognition of that electronic signature.
273
 Instead, 
the adequate test in establishing the recognition of a foreign signature should 
be that of reliability and not origin. Article 12(2)
274
 lays down the general 
criterion to be applied in establishing ‗technical equivalence‘ known as the 
‗substantial equivalence reliability test.‘275  
 
    The test as stated does not require a signature to be the exact 
equivalent but substantial equivalence is required.
276
 This means that the 
similarity test must be satisfied and that the differences in reliability must be 
minimal (if any). It must be noted that the test as applied for e-signatures is 
the same for certificates as per sub-paragraph  12(3).
277
  
 
Paragraph 4 deals with any other factors that may be relevant in 
establishing the substantial equivalence of the two foreign signatures and 
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certificates.
278
  Further, when carrying out such analyses, the parties must 
also take cognizance of the recognised international standards. Paragraph 
5
279
 re-iterates the principle of party autonomy but discourages steering 
away from the substantial equivalence test as suggested by paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4.
280
 The Model Law on E-Signatures does not require or promote a 
reciprocity arrangement for the recognition of foreign electronic signatures 
between countries as it steers away from any geographical factors for legal 
effectiveness. It aims, instead, to enhance a multinational acceptance of 
different nations‘ e-signatures.281  
 
In short, the Model Law on E-Signatures has gone a long way to 
re-entrench the principle as established by the Model Law of E-Commerce 
and has clarified some key aspects that either were not adequately addressed 
in the latter, or were issues of contention. Eiselen stated that the creation of 
the ‗technology neutrality‘ principle has gone a long way towards embracing 
different authentication methods, such as digital certificates and 
biometrics.
282
 
 
It is submitted here that although there is very little case law that 
deals with the ability of an e-signature to meet the legal signature 
requirement, the Model Law on E-Signatures has nevertheless influenced the 
courts of various countries (in particular in the United States and Germany) 
to start recognising them.
283
 Therefore, the Model Law of E-Signatures has 
fulfilled its purpose and will apparently continue to do so in the future. This 
is definitely a step in the right direction.  
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(e) United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts (UNECIC)            
 
 
(i) Objectives and scope of the treaty 
 
 
After the creation of the two Model Laws on E-commerce and                 
E-signatures it became apparent that issues relating to the formation of 
international contracts required further redress. Faria divides them into two 
broad categories: (a) general issues of contract formation as provided for in 
contract law (which will be of interest in this dissertation); and ;(b) issues 
specific to contracting by electronic means, or those that may be rendered 
particularly conspicuous by the use of modern-day technology.
284
  
 
The issues raised in the first category deal with the central 
question of whether traditional notions, such as offer and acceptance and the 
time of receipt and dispatch of offer and acceptance may be transposed into 
an electronic environment.
285
 The legal uncertainty of the issues raised 
above, especially their application to international contracts, led to the 
drafting of the UNECIC (2005).
286
  
 
The Convention entered into force on 1 March 2013, after the 
minimum number of member states ratified it.
287
 It is an interpretive legal 
instrument with minimum substantive provisions. The UNECIC promotes 
the use of electronic communication in international contracting by 
providing for the functional equivalence of e-communications whilst 
preserving and observing the principle of technological neutrality.
288
 Taking 
the form of a Convention is a landmark legal instrument that promises to 
harmonise basic electronic commerce legislations amongst contracting 
member states. 
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The Convention builds upon both UNCITRAL‘s Model Laws on 
E-Commerce and E-Signatures but its provisions have been improved and 
updated to take into account technological development since 1996 – most 
notably the growth of the internet.
289
 The two Model Laws were aimed at 
standardising and facilitating the response of domestic legal systems to the 
challenges of e-commerce. They have subsequently been used in drafting the 
domestic legislation of a fairly large number of countries.
290
  
 
The UNECIC, in turn, aims at establishing legal certainty in 
international trade by providing solutions and harmonising rules on e-
communication for international transactions
291
 and also to offer practical 
solutions for issues related to the use of e-communication in international 
contracts.
292
 In addition, it introduces two ancillary principles that were not 
contained in the previously mentioned UNCITRAL Model Laws, namely: 
(a) freedom of form and ;(b) the principle of combined technological 
neutrality with the functional equivalence approach.
293
 
 
The UNECIC is not intended to establish uniform rules for 
substantive contractual issues. Instead, it is argued that the enabling 
provisions in the UNECIC are dealt with in a completely different manner 
than its Model Law predecessors. While the Model Law on  E-Commerce 
contains a number of separate articles for creating electronic equivalents for 
the requirements of ‗writing‘, ‗signature‘, ‗original‘, and ‗retention of 
electronic messages‘, all enabling provisions in the UNECIC are in the same 
article.
294
 The UNECIC does not cover ‗record retention‘ as it was felt that 
this deals more with evidential issues than contract formation. Connolly and 
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Ravindra have levelled the same argument against the article dealing with 
electronic signatures in the UNECIC.
295
 Pistorius, however, disagrees and 
states the writing and signatures provisions are central to contract formation. 
 
However, the convention contains a few substantive rules that do 
not just reiterate the principal of functional equivalence but actually put into 
place some new substantive rules necessary to ensure effectiveness in e- 
communications. Article 1 of UNECIC deals with the scope of the 
application of the convention
296
 and provides the UNECIC applies to e-
contracts entered into by parties who have their places of business in 
different states.
297
  
 
The UNECIC does not specifically prescribe that both parties 
must have their business in a contracting state and thus does not have a 
narrow application, such as the Convention on Contracts for International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) 
298
, which requires that before the convention may 
apply, it must have been adopted by the state in which protection is being 
claimed.
299
 However, as the UNECIC does not apply automatically to all 
international transactions. It will not apply automatically as public 
international law, but only according to the rules of international law - if the 
transaction is made subject to a legal system where the UNECIC applies.
300
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The convention will also apply to the agreement if formed and 
executed in the same state but where the two contracting parties have their 
places of business in different jurisdictions at the time the agreement was 
concluded.
301
 Notwithstanding the fact that there is no need for the parties to 
have their place of business in the contracting state, it is nevertheless 
important that the law of a contracting state apply to the parties‘ dealings. In 
the instance where the parties have not agreed on a particular law to govern 
the relationship, the law will be determined in terms of the rules of private 
international law of the forum state, that is, the law will apply as the 
domestic governing law of the agreement.
302
  
 
Article 4 deals with definitions as presented in the text of the 
Convention. It is worth mentioning that most of the definitions are based on 
the definition in the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce.
303
 The 
UNECIC defines a ‗communication‘ as ‗any statement, declaration, demand, 
notice or request, including an offer and the acceptance of an offer that the 
parties are required to make or choose to make in connection with the 
formation or performance of a contract‘. The definition of ‗electronic 
communication‘ has been kept broad enough to be defined as ‗any 
communication that the parties make by means of data messages‘. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the definition of ‗message‘ has been 
extended from the Model Law definition of data message, including 
previously excluded formats, and is now defined as:  
 
‗….information generated, sent, received or stored by 
electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means, including, but not limited 
to, electronic data interchange, electronic mail, telegram, telex or 
telecopy…‘  
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Article 4(h) has also extended the meaning of the ‗place of 
business‘ which has now also been given a more liberal and realistic 
approach to e-commerce and is defined as:  
 
‗ [A]ny place where a party maintains a non-transitory 
establishment to pursue an economic activity other than the temporary 
provision of goods or services out of a specific location.‘ 
 
Eiselen
304
 illustrated the application of the Convention in the 
following manner. Trader A, which has its place of business in Senegal, has 
concluded a transaction with trader B, who has its place in business in South 
Africa. For the purposes of illustration, Eiselen suggested that Senegal has 
adopted the UNECIC and that South Africa has not. The first question to ask 
is: Should there be any dispute regarding the validity and formation of the 
agreement, which law will apply?  
 
Eiselen suggests that this can be resolved by using the rules of 
private international law of the ‗lex fori‘, that is, the court adjudicating over 
the dispute. In other words, if the rules of private law should determine that 
Senegalese law should be applied then, the UNECIC will be applicable, if 
not and South Africa is determined to be the governing law, then the 
UNECIC will not have application.
305
 However, an agreement would not be 
regarded as international unless the parties were both aware of this fact 
before the time of the conclusion of the agreement.
306
 If a government, a 
parastatal or similar body should make use of electronic communication in 
dealing with a party in another state, the Convention will apply. 
 
This seemingly straightforward position is equally complicated 
by Article 19 and Article 20 which deal with the exclusion of the application 
of the Convention in instances where a state makes certain declarations. 
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Article 2 provides for the exclusion of the UNECIC‘s scope of 
application.
307
 The UNECIC is aimed solely at commercial contracts and 
consumer contracts are specifically excluded in Article 2(a). Article 2(1) and 
Article 2(2) also list excluded transactions that do not fall within the scope 
of the convention, such as contracts concluded for personal, family or 
household purposes,
308
 foreign exchange transactions, negotiable 
instruments and interbank payment systems.
309
  
 
The scope of application may also be restricted by means of 
declarations made in terms of Article 19. The effect and procedures for 
making such declarations are stated in Article 20 of the UNECIC. Article 19 
provides states with two choices as to how they would like to make 
declarations in terms of the UNECIC.
310
  
 
In the first instance, the Convention may apply only if both 
parties have their place of business in a contracting state, but on the other 
hand, the parties can agree that the Convention will apply where and if the 
parties have expressly agreed to do so.
311
 Connolly and Ravindra state that 
the non-binding character of these instruments gives states a method to 
choose provisions to implement into domestic law and how to implement 
them. However, this approach has the same shortcomings of the 
UNICTRAL Model Laws in that: (a) international uniformity is reduced; (b) 
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there is less legal certainty; and (c) harmonization of the domestic laws 
cannot be achieved.
312
 
 
Article 3 embraces the ‗party autonomy‘ principle and provides 
that it may vary from their domestic laws, principles of international law and 
the UNECIC.
313
 Article 3 of the Convention allows parties to exclude the 
application of the Convention or derogate from or vary the effect of any of 
its provisions, which means that unless ‗opted out‘, the Convention will 
govern any international contract that meets its jurisdictional requirement.
314
  
 
Article 19(2) authorises a state to exclude any matter it may 
specify in terms of an Article 20 declaration. Coetzee is of the view that 
where the provisions of the UNECIC do not apply by virtue of the 
Convention being applicable, the parties may still agree to be bound by the 
provisions of the Convention. In such instances the Convention will be dealt 
with as if it were a contractual term of the agreement.
315
 
 
(ii) Location of parties  
 
 
The purpose of Article 6is to offer elements that allow the 
parties to ascertain the location of the parties‘ place of business,316 thus 
assisting in the determination of, amongst other relevant factors, the 
international or domestic character of a transaction and the place of contract 
                                                 
312
 Connolly & Ravindra op cit note 295 at 32. 
313
 Coetzee op cit note 299 at 253.  
314
 Kuczerawy & Killian op cit note 304 at 10. 
315
 J Coetzee op cit note 299 at 254. 
316
 Article 6 (1) states that: ‗For the purposes of this Convention, a party‘s place of business 
is presumed to be the location indicated by that party, unless another party demonstrates 
that the party making the indication does not have a place of business at that location. 
     Article 6(2) states that: ‗If a party has not indicated a place of business and has more 
than one place of business, then the place of business  for the purposes of this Convention is 
that which has the closest relationship to the relevant contract, having regard to the 
circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time before or at the 
conclusion of the contract.‘ 
70 
formation.
317
 Article 6(1) creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of a 
party‘s indication of its place of business accompanied by the condition that 
such indication may be rebutted if the other party can show that the party 
claiming its ‗place of business‘ in a specific location is, in fact, not giving 
the correct information. 
 
Article 6(2) will come into play in the instance such as where no 
place of business has been specified
318
 and it provides that if a party has not 
indicated a place of business, and has more than one place of business, the 
place of business for the purpose of the contract is that which has the closest 
relationship to the relevant contract, with regard to the circumstances known 
to or contemplated by the parties at or before the conclusion of the contract. 
If there is no indication by a party to the contract of the exact place of 
business and it only has one place of business, that sole place of business 
falling within the definition in terms of Article 4(h) of the UNECIC would 
be the place of business for the purposes of the contract.
319
 
 
The provision allowing a party the opportunity to prove that its 
place of business at another location is important in that a party may want to 
deceptively indicate a place of business where no assets are located and thus 
may not be subject to some form of legal restraint. The innocent party is 
then given the option to choose as to where the place of business should be, 
and that alone can be crucial for purposes of jurisdiction and legal 
proceedings.
320
  
 
Article 6(3) to Article 6(5) deal with other factual situations such 
as in the case of a naturalised person who claims to have a place of business 
and the situation where a party may want to rely on the presence of its 
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domain in another state.
 321
 Where a party has no place of business, his/her 
habitual place of residence will be deemed to be his place of business. It is 
also important to note that the location of a server is not indicative of a 
business‘s place of business. This also relates to the use of foreign domain 
names instead of the domain names within one‘s jurisdiction.322  
 
While Article 6(4) and Article 6(5) seek to clarify that certain 
presumptions should not be made based on the location of any supporting 
technology or virtual address, this does not preclude a court or an arbitrator, 
from taking these matters into consideration when determining the location 
of a party, where deemed appropriate.
323
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(iii) Treatment of electronic communications and legal recognition of 
electronic contracts 
 
This Article has its origins in Article 8 of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on E-Commerce and embodies the principle of party autonomy. 
Article 8 of the UNECIC confers validity and enforceability on e-
communications. As Eiselen correctly pointed out, Article 8 aims at 
establishing technological neutrality as far as the form or method of business 
communication are concerned.    
 
  Article 8(1) stipulates that e-communications will be given 
legal effect on par with other traditional paper-based forms as required by 
the functional equivalence approach. The mere fact that a statement is sent 
as a data message cannot serve as grounds for its non-recognition.
324
 Article 
8 (1) of the UNECIC provides that:,  
 
‗[A] communication or a contract shall not be denied legal 
validity and enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of 
an electronic communication. ‗ 
 
Furthermore Article 8(2) provides that:   
‗[N]othing in this Convention requires a party to use or 
accept electronic communications, but a party‘s agreement to do so may 
be inferred from the party‘s conduct. ‗ 
 
Article 8(2) embodies the principle of part autonomy and 
clarifies that the Convention does not require a party to use or accept 
electronic communications.
325
 Article 11 states that e-communications that 
are not addressed to a specific party but are accessible by a number of 
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parties using an information system are to be considered an invitation to 
offer (or invitation to treat) unless a contrary intention is clearly 
expressed.
326
 Article 12 goes further and states that a contract is not invalid 
simply because one or both parties use automated message services (such as 
websites or software programmes) to communicate on their behalf, without 
human attention at the time of the contract.
327
 
 
Mindful of Conventions such as the CISG, the UNCITRAL 
working group decided not to include rules determining place and time of 
the formation of contracts.
328
 The combination of existing rules on the 
formation of contracts is designed to dispel uncertainty as to the time and 
place of formation of contracts in cases where the offer or acceptances are 
exchanged electronically.
329
 Mazotta supports this view
330
 which this writer 
submits is the correct one as the UNECIC never intended to change any 
preceding Conventions but was designed to enhance and take further what 
the Model Laws had begun.  
 
 
(iv) Form  
 
Like the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce, the UNECIC 
also continues in the spirit of functional equivalence with the view of 
fulfilling the requirement of issuing paper-based documents in electronic 
form.
331
 Although the principles of functional equivalence and technological 
neutrality may be relatively easy to state, their actual application is easier 
said than done. Article 9(1) makes it clear that the UNECIC does not require 
a communication or a contract to be made or evidenced in any particular 
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form (which also includes electronic form) thereby confirming the principle 
of freedom of form.
332
  
 
Articles 9(2) to Article 9(4) contain a number of default 
minimum standards for enabling the recognition of electronic equivalents to 
traditional paper-based form requirements.
333
 As to how the issues of 
technological neutrality and functional equivalence can be tackled 
effectively with regard to ‗writing‘, ‗signature‘ and ‗originality‘ is 
comprehensively dealt with in Article 9(2)
334
 to Article 9 (5)
335
 as mentioned 
below. Therefore, the UNECIC focuses on the minimum requirement that 
information must be capable of being reproduced and read, rather than a 
standard to determine whether an electronic communication has fulfilled the 
requirement of a paper-based document as contained in Article 9(2).
336
  
 
     In drafting Article 9(3)
 
the working group took cognizance of 
the value and functions of both paper-based and electronic signatures
337
 as 
previously discussed in this treatment. Article 9(3), deals with the value of 
electronic signatures, and concerns itself more with the authenticity 
requirement by adding additional measures in evaluating the validity of an 
electronic signature.
338
 Significantly, Article 9(3) of the Convention contains 
a new rule for the electronic functional equivalent of handwritten 
signatures.
339
 Article 9(3)(a) provides a definition of functional equivalent 
electronic signature as: 
 
‗Where the law requires that a communication or a contract 
should be in writing, or provides consequences for the absence of a writing, 
that requirement is met by an electronic communication if the information 
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contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. 
[Two methods can be] used to identify the party and to indicate that party‘s 
intention in respect of the information contained in the electronic 
communication; and the method used is either: 
(i) as reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the 
electronic communication was generated or communicated, in the light of 
all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement; or  
(ii) proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions described in 
subparagraph [9(3)(a)] above, by itself or together with further evidence.‘ 
 
Chong and Chao state that a legal requirement for a signature 
will be met if Article 9(3)(a) and Article 9(3)(b)(i) (which they term ‗the 
reliability in theory‘) or Article 9(3)(b)(ii) (‗the reliability in fact‘) is 
proven.
340
 The ‗reliability in theory‘ also called ‗reliability in principle‘ 
involves a more theoretical determination of reliability. The circumstances 
surrounding the use of the electronic signature, including any relevant 
agreement, is also to be considered in determining reliability.
341
 The 
‗reliability in fact‘ allows evidence to be adduced to prove the signature used 
fulfilled the function described in Article 9(3)(a).
342
 
 
Article 9(4) deals with the requirements for the 
integrity and reliability of an electronic communication. Article 
9(5) states that: 
 
‗Where the law requires that a communication or a contract 
should be made available or retained in its original form or provides 
consequences for the absence of an original, that requirement is met in 
relation to an electronic communication if: 
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(a) there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the 
information it contains from the time when it was first generated in its 
final form, as an electronic communication or otherwise; and 
(b) where it is required that the information it contains be 
made available, that information is capable of being displayed to the 
person to whom it is to be made available.‘ 
 
It states that where domestic law requires a document to be 
retained in its original form, that requirement is deemed met if a reliable 
assurance exists as to the integrity of the information as first generated in its 
final form. 
 
 Article 9(5) sets out the material requirements for judging the 
integrity of such information by emphasising that the information has to 
remain complete and unaltered.
343
 Article 9(5) contains further provisions on 
assessing the integrity of a communication namely, Article 9(5)(a) which 
states that the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information 
has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the additions of any 
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of 
communication, storage and display.
344
 Article 9(5)(b) also states that the 
standard of reliability shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which 
the information was generated and in light of all relevant circumstances. 
 
The manner in which electronic information is handled within 
any business will depend on the nature and importance of such information. 
Eiselen suggests that to fulfil the above requirements and to satisfy the 
various standards of authentication and integrity, companies must develop 
protocols that deal with the information in a way that is compliant with the 
UNECIC. 
345
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344
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345
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(v) Time and place of dispatch and receipt of communication 
 
Article 10 of the Convention contains the rules on the time and 
place of dispatch of electronic communications. Significantly, both these 
rules are different from the equivalent rules in the UNCITRAL Model law 
on E-Commerce.
346
 Article 10 of the UNECIC which deals with the 
determination of the determination of the time and place of communications 
is important for a number of reasons, including the time that an acceptance 
becomes effective, or some other time limit such as when a performance was 
rendered.
347
 Article 10 reads as follows: 
 
‗The time of dispatch of an electronic communication is the 
time when it leaves an information system under the control of 
the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf of the 
originator or, if the electronic communication has not left an 
information system under the control of the originator or of the 
party who sent it on behalf of the originator, the time when the 
electronic communication is received.‘ 
 
In terms of Article 10(1), a message is deemed to have been         
sent (dispatched)
348
 if it leaves the information system used by the 
originator, that is, when the message is beyond the control of the originator. 
In the instance where the originator and addressee are in the same 
information system, the message is deemed to have been sent when it is 
received by the addressee.
349
 Article 10(2) states the following on the issue 
of ‗receipt‘: 
 
                                                 
346
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347
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348  
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348
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‗The time of receipt of an electronic communication is the 
time when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee at an electronic address designated by the 
addressee. The time of receipt of an electronic 
communication at another electronic address of the 
addressee is the time when it becomes capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee at that address and the addressee 
becomes aware that the electronic communication has been 
sent to that address. An electronic communication is 
presumed to be capable of being retrieved by the addressee 
when it reaches the addressee‘s electronic address.‘ 
 
             During the drafting of this article, the UNCITRAL noted that it was 
of the view that that the test for the capability of retrieval is not intended to 
be subjective but objective.
350
 The ‗receipt‘ is linked to the time when the e-
communication becomes capable of being retrieved, which is presumed to 
be at the time when it has reached the addressee‘s designated electronic 
address
 
and is capable of being retrieved. Conversely in terms of Article 
10(2), an e-communication is deemed to be received when the addressee 
becomes aware of the fact that the massage has been sent to the address as 
designated by the addressee
351
 and such e-communication must be capable 
of being retrieved at electronic address of the addressee.  
 
Article 10(2) seeks to distinguish between a designated and a 
non-designated electronic address to create a fair allocation of risks for the 
originator and addressee. The issue becomes even more complex when a 
party has multiple e-mail addresses, which might not be checked on as 
frequently as the primary address. 
 
The notion that a party ‗ought to have known‘ that an e-mail 
could be sent to a different e-mail address is dispensed with and a party is 
                                                 
350
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351
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79 
not penalised for not having checked another business e-mail address.
352
 The 
issue of awareness seems to be a factual issue and could be proved by means 
of showing that, for example, a message was indeed received because it was 
opened on the addressee‘s computer. The UNECIC, therefore, applies an 
objective test.
353
  
 
Article 10(3) and Article 10(4) address the situation where the 
place of receipt of electronic communications is in another location than that 
of the addressee. The principal reason for including these rules is to address 
a characteristic of e-commerce that may not be treated adequately under 
existing law in that the information system of the addressee where the e- 
communication is received, or from which the e-communication is retrieved, 
is located in a jurisdiction other than that in which the addressee itself is 
located.
354
  
 
Article 10(3) contains a firm rule and not merely a presumption. 
Consistent with its objective of avoiding a duality of regimes for online and 
offline transactions, it specifically places its focus on the actual place of 
business of the party. Article 10(3) reads as follows: 
 
‗An electronic communication is deemed to be dispatched at 
the place where the originator has its place of business and is deemed to 
be received at the place where the addressee has its place of business, as 
determined in accordance with Article 6.‘ 
 
The phrase ‗deemed to be‘ has been chosen deliberately to avoid 
attaching legal significance to the use of a server in a particular jurisdiction 
other than the jurisdiction where the place of business is located simply 
because that was the place where an electronic communication had reached 
the information system where the addressee‘s electronic address is 
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353
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354
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located.
355
 Article 10(4), once again re-confirms the position that the 
location of the information system (server) receiving the information is 
irrelevant and that the jurisdiction of the relevant place of business or 
habitual place of business will prevail:  
 
‗Paragraph 2 of this article applies notwithstanding that the 
place where the information system supporting an electronic address is 
located may be different from the place where the electronic 
communication is deemed to be received under paragraph 3 of this 
article.‘ 
 
The location of the information system supporting the electronic 
address of the addressee is not relevant provided that there is a reasonable 
connection between the originator and the information system and therefore 
it may be different from the place where the e-communication was deemed 
to have been received.
356
 
 
(vi) Invitations, advertisements and offer 
 
Whether a website, by offering goods or services for sale 
constitutes an offer, is a question not restricted to e-communication, but is a 
much older problem. The reason is that most jurisdictions (such as South 
Africa,
357
 Germany
358
 and Scotland
359
 do not regard an advertisement as an 
offer but merely an offer to do business (also called ‘invitatio ad 
offerendum’).360 Most jurisdictions require that the offer must be a firm 
statement addressed to the offeror that can allow the offeree to make a firm 
‗I accept‘ or ‗I do not accept‘ statement and form the intent to be bound 
contractually.  
 
                                                 
355
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The use of the internet has taken this problem a step further as 
individuals are able to interactively purchase goods or services 
instantaneously.
361
 This general principle that goods or services offered that 
are accessible to an unlimited number of persons are not binding applies 
even where the offer is supported by an interactive application.
362
 The only 
remedy here is by way of using the autonomy principle to provide for a term 
or terms to which the parties will be bound notwithstanding the fact that 
such offer was not directly sent to him or her. Article 11
363
 of the UNECIC 
deals with the issue of whether an advertisement is an offer in a traditional 
manner by reaffirming the general norm that an advertisement is merely an 
invitation to bargain or to do business.  
 
Article 11 states that electronic communications that are not 
addressed to a specific party but are accessible by a number of parties using 
an information system are to be considered an invitation to offer (or 
invitation to treat) unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed.
364
 It is 
submitted that the wording of the website is important to distinguish 
between an offer and on invitation to do business. The wording will usually 
be of assistance in establishing the intent of the parties and could indicate a 
contrary intention. 
 
 
 
(vii) Automated transactions 
 
 
In so far as traditional contracts negotiated and entered into by 
natural persons have been examined, it is clear with reference to the 
previously mentioned Model Laws, that the UNECIC has adapted specific 
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problem-solving provisions.
365
 In fact, in the light of technological neutrality 
and the functional equivalence principles, no discrimination should be made 
because the means of communication used to enter into the agreement was 
in an automated form.
366
 Article 12 confirms the use of electronic agents for 
the purposes of automated transactions.
367
  
 
Article 12 of the UNECIC removes the legal uncertainty of 
automated transactions unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law on                          
E-Commerce which, by implication, simply includes it in Article 11. 
However, the specifically created Article 12 in the UNECIC expressly deals 
with automated transactions and, in essence, attributes the actions of the 
automated system to the party making use of such automated system and 
seeks reliance on an agreement concluded in such a manner.
368
  
 
Article 12 states that:  
 
‗a contract is not invalid simply because one or both 
parties use automated message services such as websites or 
software programs) to communicate on their behalf, without 
human attention at the time of the contract‘. 369 
 
(f) African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal 
Framework for Cyber Security in Africa 
370
 
 
(i) Objectives and scope of convention  
The Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a 
Credible Legal Framework for Cyber Security in Africa (AUCLCS) is an 
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African legal framework that has been created following the 14
th
 AU 2010 
summit which explored the theme ‗Information and communication 
technologies in Africa : Challenges and Prospect for Development‘371 and 
this was subsequently confirmed by the ‗Abuja Declaration‘.372. 
   
     The AUCLCS gives effect to a Resolution of the last session 
of the Assembly of Heads of State of Governments of the African Union, 
and seeks to harmonise African cyber legislations on e-commerce personal 
data protection, cyber-security promotion and cyber-crime control. 
373
 It is, 
however, clear that its focus is more on cyber-security and cyber-crimes than 
provisions on enablement and regulation of e-commerce in Africa. 
 
Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law for E-Commerce, Article I-1 
of the AUCLCS has interestingly omitted definitions such as ‗data‘, ‘data 
messages‘ , ‘writing‘, ‗electronic signature‘ and ‗original‘ but includes wide 
definitions for the terms such as ‗electronic commerce‘,374 ‗electronic 
mail‘375 and ‗information‘.376 Although Article I–2 re-states that, ‗electronic 
commerce is an economic activity by which a person offers or provides 
goods and services by electronic means‘ such as in Article I-1(4), it goes on 
to define the ‗field of electronic commerce‘ as also comprising:  
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374
 Article I-1(4) states that: ‗Electronic commerce means all economic activity by which a 
person offers or provides goods and services remotely or by electronic means‘. 
375
 Article I-1(7) states that: ‗Electronic mail means any message in the form of text, voice, 
sound or picture sent by a public communication network, and stored in a server of the 
network or in a terminal facility belonging to the addressee until it is retrieved‘. 
376
 Article I-1(9) states that: ‘Information refers to any element of knowledge likely to be 
represented with the aid of devices and to be used, conserved, processed or communicated. 
Information may be expressed in written, visual, audio, digital and other forms‘. 
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‗[S]ervices such as those providing information on-line, 
commercial communications, research tools, access, data 
retrieval and access to communication or information 
hosting network, even where such services are not 
remunerated by the recipients.‘ 
 
Murungi argues that the said definition only includes the seller‘s  
economic activity by which a person offers or provides goods and services 
by electronic means. He states that, ‗a better attempt at such provision would 
have been to use words such as ―person who offer or receives offers by 
electronic means‖‘.377  
 
Article I-3 states that the activities, as stated in Article I-2, be 
freely exercised in the African Union space, except for gambling (even in 
legal authorized betting and lotteries), in legal representation and assistance 
activities and activities of a notary.  
 
(ii) Contracts in Electronic Form  
 
Article I–16 entrenches the ‗functional equivalence approach‘ by 
giving legal validity to electronic communication(s) in contract formation 
and states that: 
 
‗Electronic means may be used to disseminate contractual 
conditions or information goods or services.‘  
 
Furthermore, Article I–17 seems to follow the ‗party autonomy 
principle‘ giving the parties the right to decide as to whether they want to 
use electronic communication in their transacting in that it states:  
                                                 
377
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‗The information requested for the purpose of concluding a 
contract or available during contract execution may be transmitted by 
electronic means addressee of such information has agreed to the use of the 
said means. ‗ 
 
In addition, Article I-18 further states that information,  
 
‗meant for a professional may be addressed to him/her by 
electronic mail provided she/he has communicated his/her 
personal address. ‗ 
 
Article I-23 confirms the ‗party autonomy‘ principle in that it 
states that, ‗no person shall be compelled to take a legal action by electronic 
means‘ as well as the right not to choose technology.378 Article I-24 
furthermore confirms that, ‗where a written matter is required to validate a 
legal act such may be established and conserved in electronic form‘ under 
the conditions of the said domestic law applicable.  
 
Article I-25 excludes the following acts from being performed 
electronically in terms of the AUCLCS, namely, the signature of a private 
individual relating to family law or law of succession and acts of a civil or 
commercial nature under the signature of a private individual relating to real 
security or personal security. 
 
                                                 
378
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(iii) Electronic Signatures 
 
The convention also guarantees the validity of electronic 
signatures and gives the definition for electronic signatures in Article I–32 
as: 
 
‗data in electronic form attached to or logically subjoined to a 
data message and which can be used to identify the data 
message signatory and indicate consent for the information 
contained in the said message.‘ 
 
The above provision seems to be in line with the spirit and 
purpose of the UNICTRAL Model Law on E-commerce as well as the 
UNICTRAL Model Law on E-Signatures. Furthermore Article I–36 states 
that:  
 
‗A copy or any other reproduction of acts undertaken by 
electronic means shall have the same weight as the act itself, 
where the said copy has been certified as a true copy of the 
said act by bodies duly accredited by a State authority. The 
certification shall culminate in the issuance of an 
authenticity certificate, where necessary.‘ 
 
In addition to the above Article I – 37 states that: 
 
‗An electronic signature on an electronic written matter shall be 
admissible on the same terms as a signature in manuscript 
written on paper based matter.  
 
The signature shall use such reliable identification procedure as 
guarantees its linkage with the act to which it relates. Such 
87 
procedure shall be presumed to be reliable until proved 
otherwise, where the electronic signature has been created by a 
security signature device, and where the procedure guarantees 
the integrity of the act and the signature thereof has been 
identified.‘ 
 
As stated above, it appears as if Article I-37 follows the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce. The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
E-signatures is also reflected with regard to the requirements of an e-
signature. It is unfortunate that the rest of the AUCLCS, which seems to be 
in contrast to generally accepted international best practices and guidelines. 
 
 
(iv) Conclusion on AUCLCS 
 
Although the AUCLCS is an African legal framework designed 
to streamline African cyber security in the 21st Century, it has yet to be seen 
if this will become another idealistic legal framework that will not get off 
the ground. As noted above the AUCLCS also has to overcome the fact that 
it is not consistent with international consensus on the application and use of 
the UNCITRAL Model Laws.  
 
The AUCLCS also seems to focus on other aspects of 
communication regulation such as security and electronic crimes, but it fails 
to cover core legal issues related to and affected by electronic commerce. It 
is also no secret that different regional developments have also superseded 
the effort of the African Union in codifying African cyber law.
379
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(g) Concluding Remarks 
 
        In conclusion, it is important to note that the international 
community has widely, through international responses, dealt with and 
attempted to resolve the legal problems created by e-commerce both 
domestically and on an international level. The Model Law deals with the 
recognition of data messages for purposes of contract formation, e-
signatures, the issue of attribution of messages and also created new rules 
regarding the time and place of the dispatch and receipt of data messages.  
 
    This chapter also addresses the value and standards to be 
applied when using e-signatures which has now been clarified in great detail 
in the Model Law on E-Signatures with reference to the standard that must 
be applied in recognising e-signatures both in national and cross-border 
scenarios.  
 
The issue of a contract formation where either partly or wholly 
by the actions of electronic agents has not been directly addressed in the 
Model Law.  
 
   The UNECIC now seeks to create uniformity regarding the 
principles laid down by the Model Laws and demystifies some of the issues 
regarding the time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic 
communications. Although the AUCLCS is a step in the right direction to 
establish a legal African framework with a uniform approach to e-contract 
formation it has not achieved all it was intended to do. 
 
The UNECIC also provides clarity and provisions on the issue of 
website offers as well as the value of automated transactions - a topic which 
previously was only mentioned in the Model Law by implication . 
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CHAPTER IV: THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW ON 
CONTRACT FORMATION 
 
(a) Consensus (meeting of minds) 
 
As individuals and businesses interact they may enter into contracts in  
which rights and obligations are created. In certain instances contracts are 
breached and a party may want to claim specific performance or cancel the  
agreement and claim damages. To establish whether a legally binding 
agreement or a contract exists one looks first for the agreement by consent 
of the two or more parties involved.
380
 A contract is defined as an agreement 
(arising from either true assent [consensus] or quasi-mutual assent) which is, 
or is intended to be enforceable at law
381
 as a result of a valid offer and 
acceptance.
382
 South African case law suggests that consent is the 
foundation or basis of a contract.
383
  
 
The South African law of contract requires that the following elements 
of a contract be present for there to be a legally binding agreement between 
any parties: (a) capacity to act,
384
 (b) consensus,
385
 (c) lawfulness,
386
 and (d) 
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physical possibility.
387
 Formalities may be included but are not 
mandatory.
388
 
 
Accordingly, if any electronic communication between two or more 
parties (e.g. e-mail or SMS) can be interpreted as having complied with the 
formal constitutive requirements of a contract, as stated above at common 
law, it could be inferred without any reference that a valid contract has been 
concluded.
389
 If any of the said requirements is not present, or doubt exists 
as to the genesis thereof, it may be declared void or voidable by a court of 
law. 
  
(i) The valid offer 
  The first question that one needs to ask when examining the validity of 
an electronic contract is whether the contents of a website can constitute a 
valid offer at common law.
390
 A person is said to make an offer when he 
puts forward a proposal with the intention that, by its mere acceptance and 
without more, a contract should be formed.
391
 The offer must embody or 
contain sufficient information to enable the person to whom it is addressed 
to form a clear idea of exactly what the offeror has in mind.
392
 In other 
words, the offer must set out the exact essential and material terms of the 
agreement to be unequivocally accepted by the offeree. The South African 
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courts have been extremely reluctant in declaring agreements that are either 
vague or incomplete as valid and enforceable contracts .
393
 
 
  The offer must be a firm offer which means that the offeror has 
addressed a specific person or group of persons with the intent to be 
contractually bound. A tentative statement with a possible agreement in 
mind is not sufficient.
394
 It should also be noted that an advertisement does 
not generally constitute an offer, it merely amounts to an invitation to do 
business.
395
 It should be noted, however, that an advertisement may, 
depending on its wording, qualify as an offer.
396
 This might be a grey area 
especially when dealing with website-based advertisements and 
advertisements by e-mail. Such interactive applications might be regarded as 
an offer ‗open for acceptance, while stocks last‘, as opposed to an ‗invitation 
to treat‘.397 
 
In Bloom v American Swiss,
398
 the court stated and made it clear that 
an offeree can only accept an offer that he had knowledge of. A person 
cannot accept an offer made by an offeror if he/she does not understand the 
terms of and/or the circumstances of the offer, as this would lack the 
necessary ‗animus contrahedi’ (intention to be contractually bound).399 
 
Offers once received by the offeree can only lapse in the following 
circumstances: (a) expiry or lapse of prescribed time
400
;(b) in the case of a 
contract where time is of essence; (c) after a reasonable time;
401
 (d) upon the 
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death of either of the parties;(e) upon being rejected ; and ;(f) upon 
revocation.
402
 
 
(ii) The acceptance 
  
  A binding contract is created when there is an acceptance of                             
an offer.
403
 The acceptance must be manifested or be indicated by some 
form of an unequivocal act from which the inference of acceptance can 
logically be drawn.
404
 It stands to reason that consent is possible only where 
the whole offer and nothing more or less is accepted.
405
 When the 
acceptance is coupled with reservation, it is no acceptance but is in fact a 
counter-offer, which the offeror may accept or reject. 
406
  
 
  In a nutshell, the requirements for valid acceptance are that: (a) the 
acceptance must be unconditional/unequivocal
407
;(b) the offer must be 
accepted by the person to whom it was addressed;
408
;(c) acceptance must be 
in response to an offer and ;(d) acceptance must comply with formalities.
409
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  (b) Formalities for a valid agreement 
 
There is no specific requirement that an agreement must be in 
writing, however, the legislator has created laws to ensure that certain 
agreements, once concluded, will be ‗prima facie‘ evidence of the 
agreement between the parties. In the matter of Goldblatt v Freemantle,
410
 
the court clearly stated that: ‗Subject to certain exceptions, mainly 
statutory,
411
 any contract may be verbally entered into; writing is not 
essential to contractual liability‘.  
 
There are no specific reported cases that specifically deal with the 
formation of a contract via the interchange of electronic mail. However, the 
case of Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen
412
 gave an 
indication of how the South African courts viewed the then relatively new 
technology by stating that an electronic Local Area Network (LAN) 
message sent to a superior indicating one‘s intent to resign constituted a 
valid letter of resignation in the context of a written and signed document.
413
 
 
Section 3 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 states that: 
 
‗In every law expression relating to writing shall, unless the 
contrary intention appears, be construed as including also 
references to typewriting, lithography, photography and all 
other modes of representing or reproducing words in visible 
form.‘ 
 
                                                 
410
 Goldblatt op cit note 389 at 128. 
411
 Author‘s note: In other words there are common law rules that require writing. 
412
 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 17 ILJ 18 (AD). 
413
 Ibid. 
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  It is submitted that that a signature amongst other descriptions 
thereof could be by ‗a mark‘. It is submitted that this would also include an 
electronic mark and therefore an electronic signature as well. 
 
 It could be deduced from the wording of the above provision that, ‗all 
other modes of representing or reproducing words in visible form’,414 would 
also include the reproduction of the e-mail; be it in reduced material form 
(printed) or electronically visible (on an electronic display device) – since 
there is no ‗numerus clausus‘ (closed number of possibilities) on the various 
methods anticipated by this particular wording of Section 3 of the 
Interpretation Act 
415
  
 
South African courts have, in the past, followed a similar approach as 
that suggested by the Interpretation Act, for example, in the case of the 
alienation of land that was supposed to be reduced in writing, in the case of 
Balzan v O’Hara and Others,416 where the parties used the antiquated 
method of sending a telegram. Judge J Coleman held that a telegram 
constituted written and signed authority within the meaning of written and 
signed, as contemplated in the Land Alienation Act.
417
 The learned judge 
went on to say that:  
 
‗[T]he fact that the telegram was not personally written, nor 
signed by the sender, was not sufficient to disqualify the 
document as being non-compliant with the provision. The 
sender had obviously written the telegram in his own words 
by hand and signed the form which authorised the post 
office to send the telegram himself.‘418 
 
                                                 
414
 Papadopolous and Snail op cit note 390 at 44-46.  
415
 Ibid. 
416
 Balzan v O’Hara and Others 1964 (3) SA (T). 
417
 Act 68 of 1957. 
418
 Balzan op cit note 417. 
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Therefore, the court could only come to the logical conclusion that 
compliance had been rendered sufficiently. The court also confirmed in the 
decision of Yates v Dalton
419
 that an offer and acceptance may be made by 
telegraph. One could argue that these cases are not persuasive authority as to 
whether an e-mail may constitute a valid offer. However, it is important to 
know that in both the Balzan and Yates cases, a more mechanical device was 
used called a telegram. The said device encodes the sender‘s initially written 
message into an electronic frequency message that is sent via a telephone 
line and decoded on the receiving side and results in a typed document - the 
telegram. 
 
The reasoning was that a telegram may meet the requirements of a 
written and signed document should apply as readily to e-mail messages. E-
mail messages are transmitted over long telephone lines and satellite links 
where the user enters a data massage by pressing his fingers on the keys of 
the keyboard. Furthermore, such messages can be reduced to tangible form 
by means of a compact disc, stiffy disc or other reliable form of stored 
format that can be viewed on a screen display or in the form of printout.
420
 
 
(iv) Time and place that the contract enters into effect 
 
Normally, no difficulties arise when establishing the time and place 
that acceptance of an offer takes place and the contract becomes effective as 
the offeree usually makes his acceptance known in the presence of the 
offeror.
 
Van Aswegen states that the South African law takes cognizance of 
four possible jurisprudential contract theories:
421
 The declaration theory, the 
expedition theory, the reception theory and the information theory.
422
 For 
                                                 
419
 Yates v Dalton 1938 EDL 177. 
 
420
 S Edelstein  ‗Litigation in Cyberspace: Contracts on the internet‘ (1996)  Commercial 
Litigation. Retrieved from University of  Pretoria  (Legal Track,Trial, Vol32 No10 at              
16 (7)). 
421
 Van Aswegen op cit note 407 at 30. 
422
 For a discussion of these theories see Christie op cit note 381 at 75 - 85; Cape Explosives 
Works v SA Oil and Fat Industries 1921 CPD 244; Kergeulen Sealing & Whaling v CIR 
1939 D 487; Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA).  
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the purposes of this discussion it is important to look at the information and 
expedition theories.
423
  
 
In accordance with the information theory, the expression of 
acceptance and its communication to the offeror occur simultaneously and 
the agreement is accordingly concluded at that time and place. According to 
the information theory (which applies to all contracts concluded in the 
presence of both parties) which seems to be a widely applied theory, 
contract formation and rights and duties related thereto begin when both 
parties consciously agree upon the terms of the contract.
424
  
 
Although the information theory rests on the principle that the primary 
basis for contractual liability is the actual and conscious agreement between 
the contractors, there are exceptions. The general rule is that an agreement is 
formed only when the acceptance is communicated to the offeror.
425
 The 
implication of this legal rule is that a legal bond will only be created when 
the offeror is informed of the acceptance for there to be consensus ‗ad 
idem’. Difficulties do arise, however, when there is an interval between the 
expression of the acceptance and its communication to the offeror; as in the 
case of contracts concluded by post. A distinction is therefore made between 
direct (instantaneous) communication methods and indirect communication 
methods (non-instantaneous).
426
  
 
The court decided in the case of Cape Explosives Works v Lever 
Brothers SA (Ltd.)
427
 that in the matter referring to previous English 
decisions such as Adams v Lindsell
428
 and Henthorn v Fraser
429
 which stated 
in its judgment that, ‘agreements entered into by letter arise at the place and 
                                                 
423
 Eiselen op cit note 291 at 3-49. 
424
 Van Aswegen op cit note 407 at 28.  
425
 Rex v Nel 1921 AD 339. 
426
 Papadopoulus & Snail op cit 390 at 52. 
427
 1921 CPD 244. 
428
 Adams v Lindsell [1818] EWHC KB J59.   
429
 Henthorn v Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27. 
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at the moment when the letter of acceptance is mailed‘.430 This is known as 
the expedition theory. One must note that this will only apply in instances 
where the offer was also mailed. It will not apply where the offer was 
effected in another form to that of post 
431
 or where the offeror indicated this 
form of acceptance in his offer 
432
 as then the postal rule will apply. 
 
The distinction between direct (instantaneous) communication 
methods and indirect communication methods is aptly demonstrated in the 
English court‘s decision on the issue of where a contract is concluded when 
parties communicate by telephone, telex or telex transmission. In the often 
quoted case of Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation Ltd
433
 the court 
held that a telex is a ‗virtually instantaneous‘ method of communication.434 
The court applied the ‗information theory‘ as the ‗instantaneous 
communication rule‘ when it held that a telephone conversation is the same 
as two people communicating ‗inter-partes‘ (between parties). Accordingly, 
the contract is concluded at the time and place at which the offeror is made 
aware of the offeree‘s acceptance.435 
 
This position was also later confirmed in the case of Brinkibon Ltd v 
Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft GmbH.
436
The court had to 
decide on the time and place of conclusion of the contract, where a fax was 
sent from London to Vienna. The court held that the general rule on 
instantaneous communications was applicable but that the acceptance must 
come to the attention of the offeror or at least constructively come to his 
attention.
437
 The court held that the contract was formed when the offeror 
became aware of the acceptance. 
 
                                                 
430
 Cape Explosives Works op cit note 420 at 266 and at 276.  
431
 Smeiman v Volkerz 1954 (4) SA 170 (C) at 179. 
432
 Levben Products v Alexander Films 1959 (3) SA 208 (SR) at 208 -209. Also see the 
discussion of  Kahn et al op cit note 395 at 142- 144. 
433
 Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation Ltd [1955] 2 QB327.  
434
 Ibid at 332. 
435
 Ibid.
 
 
436
 Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft GmbH All ER 293. 
437
 Ibid at 296. 
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Similar reasoning was used by South African jurisprudence prior to the 
ECT Act coming into effect in respect of when and where a contract is 
concluded in the case where a fax has been used, namely in the case of 
Jamieson v Sabingo
438
 where the court held that:  
 
‗Parties who communicate by telephone, telex or tele-
facsimile transmission are ―to all intents and purposes in 
each other‘s presence‖, the ordinary rules applicable to the 
conclusion of contracts made by parties in each other‘s 
presence apply, viz the contract comes into existence when 
and ―where the offeree‘s acceptance is communicated to and 
received by the offeror‖.‘ 439  
 
Thus, in general, South African law applies the information theory to 
contracts, where there is direct communication between the parties, and the 
expedition theory to ‗pure‘ postal contracts, where there is indirect 
communication between the parties. The Brinkibon decision added a layer of 
complexity to the application of this rule. After the ECT Act took effect, the 
situation became somewhat different for contracts concluded 
electronically.
440
 
 
 
 
                                                 
438
 2002 (4) SA 49 (SCA). 
439
 Ibid at 50. 
440
 Papadopoulus & Snail op cit note 390 at 52. 
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(v) Conclusion 
 
After having examined the common law position in South Africa prior 
to the enactment of the ECT Act one can safely deduce that prior to this Act 
our courts used to recognise electronic transactions in the course of a 
commercial transaction and that the reception theory coupled with the 
information theory would have been the preferred approach to electronic 
transactions rather than the widely accepted postal rule - also known as 
expedition theory. 
 
        Due to a great level of uncertainty still exists as to which rules 
apply for the time and place of contract conclusion. One can also accept that 
the South African law had already developed, in so far as telex and facsimile 
transmission, in that our courts were willing to accept that formalities 
pertaining to writing and signatures would suffice where a facsimile and or 
telex had been sent. 
 
One can only imagine the uncertainty this created on the value of 
electronic signatures and/or electronic writing which would be more 
controversial in current times since electronic commerce is now part and 
parcel of our daily lives.  
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CHAPTER V:  SOUTH AFRICAN  STATUTORY  REGIME  -_THE  ELECTRONIC  
COMMUNICATIONS  AND  TRANSACTIONS ACT,  ACT  25  OF  2002  (ECT ACT)   
 
 
(a) Legislative development regarding the legal recognition of data 
messages 
 
Prior to the enactment of the ECT Act there was legal uncertainty as to 
the use of data messages to communicate messages or to create 
documentation and whether such data messages have legal validity equal to 
messages written on paper.
441
 It raised such questions as: What is the status 
of electronic writing and electronic signatures in South Africa? Is an 
individual or company effectively bound by the correspondence that is 
entered into by means of electronic communication? When and where are 
contractual agreements formed and enforceable? As such, conventional legal 
frameworks governing the offline word were proving to be inadequate in the 
online word. Therefore it became imperative for the national government to 
have in place a clear policy and eventually legislation governing electronic 
communications. 
 
The Minister of Communications commissioned a due diligence 
survey aimed at identifying laws that could constitute barriers to the 
development of electronic commerce.
442
 The due diligence ‗Report on E-
                                                 
441
 For a view affirming the recognition of data messages prior to enactment of the ECT Act 
see the case, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research op cit note 413 which the 
Honorable Judge was of the view that the new means of negotiation, communication and 
correspondence was a valid means of expressing intent in an action for repudiation of an 
employment contract. In terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, the mode of 
repudiation by way of e-mail was regarded as a coherent form of communication of which a 
printout could form sufficient basis for the plaintiff‘s action.  
442
  Department of Communications, Discussion Paper on Electronic Commerce (July 
1999).    
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commerce Legal Issues‘, prepared by a Johannesburg firm of attorneys, led 
to the launch of the Discussion Paper on Electronic Commerce 
443
 The report 
recommended that South Africa should attempt to adopt most of 
UNCITRAL provisions with the view to drafting its own primary legislation 
that would cover e-commerce issues. The report was followed by the Green 
paper on Electronic Commerce in November 2000. The Green paper 
emphasised the development of policy for electronic commerce and stated 
that: 
‗ [I]t is targeted at information and communication technology 
(ICT) experts as well as individuals and enterprises using e-
commerce. It addresses some of the challenges regarding e-
commerce development and implementation. It is divided into 
four main themes: 
 legal and regulatory issues; 
 building trust in the digital economy;  
 enhancing the information communication infrastructure; 
and   
 maximising benefits.‘
444
  
O n  the  2
n d
 o f  A u gus t  20 02 ,  a f ter many years of legal 
uncertainty, the South African Parliament assented to and brought into force 
the ECT Act.
445 
Prior to its enactment, South Africa had no legislation that 
comprehensively defined the terms ‗writing‘, ‗signature‘, ‗electronic agent‘, 
‗automated transaction‘ and ‗originals‘ in their application to electronic 
transacting.
 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                          
443
  Dicussion Paper available at : 
http://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts&regulations/frameworks/e-
commerce/ecomm-paper.pdf released in July 1999 ( accessed 10 Ocotber 2013). 
444
  Green Paper on E-commerce (2000) available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/electronic_commerce_1.pdf  (accesed on the                         
8th October 2013). 
445
  Act 25 of 2002. 
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The preamble to the ECT Act clearly shows that this is a piece of 
pioneering legislation. The objectives in the preamble read as follows: 
 
‗To provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions; to provide for the development 
of a national e-strategy for the republic; to promote universal 
access to electronic communications and transaction and the use of 
electronic transactions by SMMEs; to provide for human resource 
development in electronic transactions; to prevent abuse of 
information systems; to encourage the use of e-government 
services; and to provide for matters connected herewith.‘446 
 
This has managed to fill the lacunae that have been building up for many 
years due to new technological advances that neither the legislature nor the 
common law had catered for. As such, it has brought much needed certainty 
into this specific area of law that for many years has lacked certainty. 
 
As one can note from this preamble, the ECT Act has managed to 
cover extensive areas of South African law. Chapter III of the ECT Act 
addresses these issues in two parts. The first part deals with the legal 
requirements for data messages, and the second parts deals with the 
communication of data messages. This distinction is very important because 
it creates obligatory provisions from Sections 11 to 20 whereas Part 2 of 
Chapter III provides default positions in law that are free to vary.
447
 
 
Owing to the fact that the ECT Act also covers more issues relating to 
electronic communications, its objectives in the preamble are much wider 
than the objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Laws that only seeks to 
facilitate rather than impose rigid regulations for e-commerce transactions. 
                                                 
446
  Preamble to the Electronic Communications & Transaction Act, Act 25 of 2002. 
447
  Papadopoulus & Snail op cit note 390 at 46.  
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(b) Interpretation and sphere of application 
 
When interpreting the provisions of the ECT Act, it must be done in such a 
way that it does not exclude any statutory or common law from being 
applied which recognises or accommodates electronic transactions, data 
messages or any other related matter in the Act.
448
 The ECT Act applies to 
all electronic transactions or data messages.  
 
It is noteworthy that the ECT Act has retained the autonomy principle 
as contained in Article 4 of the Model Law on E-Commerce and Article 3 of 
the UNECIC. It therefore also permits the contracting parties to establish 
requirements that deviate from the suggested prescribed form. 
 
(c) Legal recognition of data messages 
 
The recognition of data messages for the purposes of conducting legally 
relevant acts has now been entrenched into South African law by virtue of 
Section 11 of the ECT Act. Section 11 of the ECT Act similarly follows 
Article 5 and the Model Law on E-commerce as well as Article 8(1) of 
UNECIC. Section 11 states that: 
 
‗(1) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the 
grounds that it is wholly or partly in the form of a data    
 message. 
(2) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the 
grounds that it is, not contained in the data message purporting to 
give rise to such legal force and effect, but is merely referred to in 
such data message.  
 
                                                 
448
 Section 3 of the ECT Act. It is also important to note that the ECT Act applies 
retroactively to current contract see the case of Spring Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry 
(Pty) Ltd TA Ecowash and Another – SCA Case No 72513 . 
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According to Section 1 of the ECT Act, data messages also include 
‗data generated, sent and received or stored by electronic means and 
includes (a) voice, where voice is used in an automated transaction, and (b) a 
stored record. It also provides that ‗data‘ means of ‗electronic representation 
of information in any form‘.  
 
Section 11 is the singular key clause of the ECT Act in that it 
stipulates that information is, ‗not without legal force and effect merely on 
the grounds that it is not in the form of a data message‘. It is important to 
note that the provisions of Section 11 are not intended to override any 
mandatory provisions in South African law relating to electronic data 
messages but, on the contrary, provides that information in the form of a 
data messages may not be denied legal validity or effectiveness. Section 22 
of the ECT Act further confirms that no agreement shall be invalid merely 
because it was concluded in part or wholly by way of data messages.
449
    
 
The use of data messages is at the parties‘ discretion and not 
mandatory. Section 4(2)(a) and (b) of the ECT Act states that the Act does 
not require any person to generate, communicate, produce, process, send, 
receive, record, retain, store or display any information, document or 
signature by or in electronic form or prohibit a person from establishing 
requirements in respect of the manner in which that person will accept data 
messages. This is clearly re-emphasised in Article 8(2) of the UNECIC 
450
  
which indicates that the use of electronic data messages is not mandatory but 
may be done by choice or tacit consent based on the conduct of the 
contracting parties. In these terms, parties may agree to enter into                           
e-commerce agreements using electronic transactions to give effect to their 
contractual obligations.  
 
                                                 
449
 Papadopoulus & S Snail op cit note 390 at 46. 
450
 Article 8(2) of the UNECIC states : ‗Nothing in this Convention requires a party to use 
or accept electronic communications, but a party‘s agreement to do so may be inferred from 
the party‘s conduct‘. 
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Eiselen states that there is no actual definition for electronic 
transactions in the ECT Act. Section 1 of the ECT Act merely provides that 
an electronic transaction means a transaction of either commercial or non-
commercial nature and includes the provision of information and e-
government services.
451
  
 
 
(d) Writing and signature requirements 
 
Section 12(a) and (b) of the ECT Act recognises data as the functional 
equivalent of writing or evidence in writing. It grants data messages the  
legal validity equal to messages written on paper. It states that a requirement 
under law that a document or information be in writing is met if the 
document or information is in the form of a data message and it is accessible 
in a manner usable for subsequent reference to a person who either wants to 
rely on the existence of a particular agreement,
452
 or for record purposes.
453
  
 
In the case of Mafika Sihlali v SABC Ltd
454
 the court had to decide the 
issue as to whether a SMS sent by an employee tendering her resignation 
was valid and in written form. The court, in deciding in the affirmative on 
both issues, held that: 
 
‗Section 37(4)(a) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
requires that notice of termination of a contract of employment 
                                                 
451
 Eiselen  ‗E-commerce‘ in Van der Merwe et al (ed) Information and Communications 
Technology Law (2008) at 183.   
452
  S L Gerda ‘The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act‘  in L Thornton (ed) 
Telecommunications Law (2004) at 270. Also see Papadopoulus & Snail op cit note at 390. 
453
  Section 12 similarly follows Article 6 of the Model Law which states: ‗Where the law 
requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if the 
information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference‘ as 
well as Article 9 (1) & (2) of the UNECIC which states: ‗(1) Nothing in this convention 
requires a communication or a contract to be made or evidenced in any particular form. (2) 
Where the law requires that a communication or a contract should be in writing, or provides 
consequences for the absence of writing, that requirement is met by an electronic 
communication if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference‘. 
454
 [2010] ZALC 1; (2010) 31 ILJ 1477 (LC) ;  
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must be given in writing, except when it is given by an illiterate 
employee, and paragraph 9 of the personnel regulations [in this 
case the SABC personnel regulations], which similarly refer to 
notice of termination in writing.‘
455
 
 
The court also stated that, ‗a communication by SMS is a 
communication in writing‘.456 Section 12 of ECT Act provides: 
 
‗A requirement in law that a document or Information must be in 
writing is met if the document or information is -  
(a)  in the form of a data message; and 
(b) accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference‘ 
 
Section 1 defines a ‗data message‘ to mean ‗data generated, sent, 
received or stored by electronic means‘. The court also referred to the recent 
earlier in Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife.
457
 The court in the Mafika case 
held that the applicant‘s resignation by SMS was therefore a resignation 
submitted in writing. On the other hand, can a SMS constitute acceptance of 
an offer of employment? This was the issue determined in the case of Jafta v 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife.
458
 
 
Jafta responded to an advert for a vacancy at Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
(hereinafter referred to as ‗Wildlife‘) and attended an interview on                      
5 December 2006. At the interview, he was offered the position; however, 
Jafta said he was due to go on leave from 22 December 2006 to 7 January 
2007 and wanted to accept the position after his leave. On 13 December 
2006 Wildlife's Human Resources (HR) Officer e-mailed the offer to Jafta. 
The only issue preventing him from accepting the offer was that his notice 
period was two months and Wildlife wanted him to start on                                   
                                                 
455
 Ibid para 18. 
456
 Ibid. Also see Papadopoulus &Snail op cit note 390 at 46.  
457
 [2008] 10 BLLR 954 (LC)  
458
 Ibid.
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1 February 2007. On 28 December 2006 he received a further e-mail from 
the CEO of Wildlife confirming that the starting date was non-negotiable 
and they insisted that he respond by the end of December. Jafta was on leave 
at this stage and had difficulty e-mailing his acceptance. He finally sent the 
e-mail from an internet café on 29 December 2006. 
 
The HR Officer denied receiving this e-mail. On 29 December 2006 
the HR Officer sent a SMS to Jafta urging him to respond to the offer. Jafta 
then replied to her SMS confirming that he had responded by e-mail in the 
affirmative. The HR Officer admitted receiving the SMS; however, she did 
not recall seeing the word ‗affirmative‘ and argued that it was only a valid 
confirmation if an e-mail had been sent. Jafta made a note of the SMS and 
the cellphone was subsequently stolen.
459
 
 
Wildlife offered the position to the next candidate and Jafta claimed 
breach of contract. The first hurdle was to prove that a contract of 
employment was concluded on 29 December 2006. The onus fell on Jafta to 
show that he had in fact accepted the offer of employment.  
 
The court identified five issues for determination: 
 
‗(i) Was the content of Jafta‘s e-mail an acceptance of Wildlife‘s 
offer of employment? (ii) Was the content of Jafta‘s SMS an 
acceptance of Wildlife‘s offer of employment? (iii) Did Wildlife 
receive Jafta‘s e-mail? (iv) Is an SMS a proper mode of 
communicating acceptance of an offer? (v) If Wildlife did receive 
an acceptance of the offer and a valid contract of employment 
came into existence, what are Jafta‘s damages arising from 
Wildlife‘s repudiation?‗460 
 
                                                 
459
 Ibid. at par 6.  Also case discussion by K Staude (2008 ) ‗Acceptance by SMS‘ available 
at  http://www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/view/wwb/en/page1873?oid=19142&sn=Detail , 
(accessed on 7 January 2011). 
460
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 The court considered the first four issues in the light of the common 
law requirements and stated the common law requirements for acceptance 
are: (a) it must be clear, unequivocal and unambiguous; (b) it must 
correspond with the offer made; (c) it must be made in the mode prescribed 
by the offeror; and (d) the offeree must communicate acceptance of the offer 
to the offeror.
461
 The court found that Jafta's e-mail response was a clear and 
unequivocal acceptance of the offer.
462
  
 
The e-mail confirmed that if Wildlife did not accept his counter-
proposal of a start date of 15 February 2007 he would accept the terms as 
stated. He had requested a copy of the contract by 31 December but this was 
not a condition of acceptance – he merely wanted the security of the written 
contract prior to his resignation. 
 
The only sticking point with regard to the offer was the starting date. 
The CEO had urged Jafta for a response to this issue and the court found that 
his SMS ‗to the affirmative‘ was in direct response to commencing 
employment on 1 February 2007. Accordingly, the SMS was an unequivocal 
acceptance of the offer. 
 
The court further found that the SMS was an appropriate mode of 
acceptance on the basis that it fell within the meaning of an ‗electronic 
communication‘ as defined by the ECT Act.463 The HR Officer had initiated 
the use of SMS and had demanded an urgent response or risk losing the 
position. The judge stated: ‗An SMS is as effective a mode of 
communication as an e-mail or a written document‘.464 
 
The court reasoned that because Wildlife initiated communication by 
an SMS which asked for an immediate response, and that because Jafta 
                                                 
461
 Ibid at 21. 
462
 Jafta v Ezimvelo op cit note 458 at par 101. 
463
 Ibid at par 110. 
464
 Ibid at par 113. 
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reciprocated in the same manner that Wildlife had tacitly agreed the SMS 
was a proper mode of accepting its offer.
465
 The judge found that Wildlife 
had repudiated the contract and awarded general and special damages. The 
damages included the difference between his present salary and the salary he 
would have earned with Wildlife to the date of the judgment plus a further 
three years which was the estimated period of time it would take him to find 
another job. 
 
Wildlife had argued that the HR Officer was not authorized to accept 
the offer and that the SMS was only confirmation that an e-mail had been 
sent; however, this was not accepted by the court. It turned out to be an 
expensive lesson for the employer. It is advisable to avoid the use of SMS 
for important matters such as offers of employment. If one initiates text 
messages with the candidate there is risk that the acceptance may be lost in 
translation.
466
 
 
Eiselen states that the requirements of Section 12 are stricter than the 
common law rules on writing as the data message is required to fulfil a 
formality, the object thereof being to provide legal certainty. There is no 
point in using a data message if it cannot be saved and later referred to.
467
 
 
The intentions of the legislature are clear from the simple wording of 
the above provision. Furthermore, Section 22(1) of the ECT Act as stated in 
Article 11 of the Model Law, guarantees the validity of agreements 
concluded either partly or wholly by a data message.
468
 This is a re-
affirmation of section 11.
469
 In a nutshell, the ECT Act has entrenched in 
South African law the recognition of data messages as a functional 
equivalent to a message written on paper. This would suggest that any 
                                                 
465
 Ibid at par 101. Also see Papadopolous ‗Short messages services and e-contracts‘ (2010) 
1 OBITER at 192.  
466
  Papadopoulus & Snail op cit note 390 at 47.  
467
  Eiselen op cit note 452 at 147.   
468
  Coetzee op cit note 45 at 516.    
469
  Eiselen op cit note 144 at 147.   
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correspondence in any electronic form would be deemed to a written 
communication. 
 
To answer the question of whether a signature created by means of a  
data message is valid, one should look at Section 13 of the ECT Act, which 
ensures that data messages can satisfy the signature requirement when it 
states: 
 
‗(1) Where the signature of a person is required by law, that 
requirement in relation to a data message is met only if an 
advanced electronic signature is used. 
(2) Subject to subsection (1) an electronic data message is not 
without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is in 
electronic form. 
(3) Where an electronic signature is required by the parties to an 
electronic transaction and the parties have not agreed on the type of 
electronic signature to be used, that requirement is met in relation 
to a data message if: (a) a method is used to identify the person and 
indicate the person‘s approval of the information contained; (b) 
and having regard to all relevant circumstances at the time the 
method was used; the method was as reliable as was appropriate 
for the purposes for which the information was communicated. 
(4) Where an advanced electronic signature has been used, such 
signature is regarded as having created a valid electronic signature 
and to have been applied properly, unless the contrary is proved. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not preclude any person from: (a) 
establishing the validity of an advanced electronic signature in any 
other way; or (b) adducing evidence of the non-validity of an 
advanced electronic signature.‘  
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The effect of this section is to give legal recognition to e-signatures. 
However, where legislation or a common law rule requires a signature, only 
an advanced electronic signature shall be used.
470
  
 
One can immediately pick up the fact from the previous discussion on 
international instruments that the functional equivalence and integrity 
requirements as stated in Article 3 and Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on E-Commerce have been adopted in this provision. Section 13(2) 
states that an e-signature shall not be without legal force merely because it is 
in electronic form and does not necessarily preclude signatures that are not 
advanced electronic signatures.
471
  
 
What does this confusing and ambiguous wording mean? It means that 
the principle of technological neutrality has been applied in the form of a 
two-tiered approach in the sense that both simple and technologically 
advanced e-signatures are legally accepted for different types of electronic 
contracts. This is not as per the UNCITRAL Model Laws but has been 
modelled on the EU Directive on Electronic Signatures.
472
 
 
This means that three different contractual situations arise depending 
on the type of e-signature. In the first instance, as prescribed by                     
Section 13(2), any e-signature or a distinct electronic mark could be 
sufficient for the existence of a digital contract.
473
 In the second instance, as 
prescribed by Section 13(1), the e-signature will have to be an advanced 
electronic signature
474
 and it has been noted that in terms of Section 13(1) of 
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then ECT Act being the third instance it would have to be accredited by the 
South African Department of Communications (the identified Accreditation 
Authority as required by Section 13(4) of the ECT Act).
475
  
 
An advanced electronic signature is an e-signature that results from a 
process which has been accredited by the Accreditation Authority.
 476
 The 
ECT Act also prescribes certain criteria that must be met before the 
Accreditation Authority can accredit an electronic signature service or 
product.
477
 These criteria include that: (a) the signature is capable of 
identifying the user; (b) the signature is uniquely linked to the user; (c) it is 
created using means that can be maintained under the sole control of the 
user; and (d) it will be linked to the data or data message to which it relates 
in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data or data message is 
detectable and is based on the face-to-face identification of the user.
478
  
  
The South African Accreditation Authority (SAAA) released 
Accreditation Regulations in 2007
479
 so that applications for advanced 
electronic signature accreditation could commence. According to their 
website LAW - Trusted Third Party Services (Pty) Ltd (‘LAWtrust‘) 
services or products have been accredited
480
 since the 29 March 2012 and it 
is rendering services to its subscribers of advanced electronic signatures. 
The South African Post Office (SAPO), the Post Office Trust Centre has 
also now been accredited as the preferred service provider of advanced 
electronic signatures.
481
 One must mention however that Section 37 of the 
ECT Act states that all electronic signatures must be accredited by SAAA. 
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In terms of the Accreditation Regulations a service provider of 
advanced electronic signatures must comply with the SANS 21188 PKI 
standard.
482
 It means that all prospective applicants who want to be 
accredited must comply with the minimum standards as per SANS 21188 
PKI standard of the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), a public 
key infrastructure for financial services with respect to PKI standards.
483
 
 
All certificates issued by an accredited service provider must comply 
with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standard
484
 X59 
and must contain a certificate serial number to distinguish it from others, a 
signature algorithm identifier, the name of the certification provider, the 
validity period of the certificates, the public key, the name of the subscriber 
of the public key and it must confirm that it is indeed accredited by the 
South African Accreditation Authority and must have a URL link to its 
website.  
 
The service provider would also have to adhere to the 
SABS/ISO17799
485
 quality standard regarding information-security 
management. It is important to note that where the law requires a signature 
that the electronic equivalent will only be fulfilled if an advanced electronic 
signature is used.
486
 This does not, however, preclude parties by agreement 
to use a foreign signature or any other electronic signature technique. 
 
The requirement, as such, has not been in incorporated the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce but has been adopted in the 
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UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Signatures
487
 in Article 2(a)
488
 read together 
with Article 6.
489
  
 
The third and last instance as provided for by section 13(5) is in the 
instance where an e-signature has not been used at all but the intent to be 
 contractually bound has been expressed.
490
 This is akin to the popular click-
wrap and shrink-wrap agreements which allow online users to express their 
intent to contract and allow them to enter into valid purchase and sale 
agreements with vendors from the internet by clicking a mouse on a specific 
area of the screen.  
 
Furthermore, Section 13(5) of the ECT Act stipulates that any other 
expression of intent or statement is not without legal force and effect merely 
on the grounds that: (a) it is in the form of a data message; or (b) it is not 
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evidenced by an electronic signature but is evidenced by other means from 
which such person's intent or other statement can be inferred.
491
 
 
Parties to a contract may thus agree to use a method other than an electronic 
signature, to express intent or consent. Electronic contracts may thus be 
validly concluded through ‗click wrap agreements‘ by clicking on the ‗I 
agree‘ icon, or by expressing intent to be bound through passwords or any 
other method from which such intent can be inferred.
492
 
 
De Andrade suggests that the provisions of Section 13(1) and (4) 
should be read together. This is to avoid any adverse legal consequences in 
the event of dispute about the validity of the said advanced electronic 
signature.
493
 There are various types of electronic signatures that vary 
according to the financial resources of the contractors. Some of the ‗low-
tech‘ solutions are e-signatures with password protection, a picture scan of a 
handwritten signature, a light pen, and so on.
494
 Other more expensive 
solutions better known as ‗biometrics‘. These range from retinal scans, face 
recognition, finger print, hand print, hand and/or finger geometry and voice 
recognition.
495
 
 
It is submitted that such unaccredited electronic signatures would carry 
no weight, ‗where the law requires a signature‘ as it would be ‗void ab 
initio‘ as the wording of Section 37 (which governs the establishment and 
functions of the South African Accreditation Authority (SAAA))
496
 is 
mandatory and specifically refers to a South African accreditation authority 
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having to accredit a service provider before a signature could be called an 
advanced electronic signature.
497
  
 
A foreign service provider is not excluded from the accreditation 
process and may also apply for accreditation. To date, however, no foreign 
electronic signatures have been accredited by the South African 
Accreditation Authority (SAAA). The ECT Act specifically, however, 
excludes four different instances where an electronic writing or signature 
would not be valid.
498
  
 
The four excluded acts are: (a) concluding an agreement for the 
alienation (disposal) of immovable property as provided for in the 
Alienation of Land Act; (b) concluding an agreement for a long-term lease 
of immovable property in excess of twenty years as provided for in the 
Alienation of Land Act;
499
 (c) the execution of a bill of exchange as defined 
in the Bills of Exchange Act
;  
 and (d) the execution, retention and 
presentation of a will or codicil as defined in the Wills Act.
500
 
  
One must however, note the decision of Macdonald v The Master 
501
 
where the court held that a court may condone a ‗draft will‘ in the form of an 
electronically stored document, which was stored on a computer hard-disk 
may be condoned in terms of Section 2(3) of the Wills Act, if not all 
statutory requirements have been satisfied, and admit such as valid proof of 
an existing will.
502
 The court used its power to condone a document intended 
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to be a will in terms of Section 2(3) of the Wills Act by using a computer 
print-out of the electronic document containing the deceased wishes as an 
indication of the deceased last wishes.
503
 
 
Arguably, the Macdonald decision ought to be extended not only to a 
draft will but to a will executed electronically and the ECT Act ought to be 
amended accordingly to make provision for situations that would comply 
with Section 2(3) of the Wills Act. The proposal for the amendment of the 
ECT Act would be that an electronic document that has been electronically 
signed by the testator with an advanced electronic signature be considered to 
be the testator‘s last and final wishes. 
 
The facts in the Macdonald decision were to become the facts similar 
to the case of Hendrik Van der Merwe v Master of the High Court 
504
 where 
the Court had to consider the formalities required in the execution of a will 
are set out in Section 2(1) of the Wills Act where a draft will was not signed 
by the Testator. The relevant parts of Section 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act 
provide that: 
 
‗(a) [N]o will executed on or after the first day of January, 1954, 
shall be valid unless ─ 
(i) the will is signed at the end thereof by the testator or by 
some other person in his presence and by his direction; and 
(ii) such signature is made by the testator or by such other 
person or is acknowledged by the testator and, if made by such 
other person, also by such other person, in the presence of two 
or more competent witnesses present at the same time; and 
(iii) such witnesses attest and sign the will in the presence of the 
testator and of each other and, if the will is signed by such other 
person, in the presence also of such other person; and 
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(iv) if the will consists of more than one page, each page 
other than the page on which it ends, is also so signed by the 
testator or by such other person anywhere on the page.‘ 
 
On the other hand, Section 2(3) of the Wills Act , Act 7 of 53 sets out 
the power of a court in relation to a will or amendment thereof which does 
not comply with the prescribed formalities. It reads as follows: 
 
‗If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a 
document drafted or executed by a person who has died since the 
drafting or execution thereof, was intended to be his will or an 
amendment of his will, the court shall order the Master to accept 
that document, or that document as amended, for the purposes of 
the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), as a will, 
although it does not comply with all the formalities for the 
execution or amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).‘ 
 
 It is clear that the formalities prescribed by Section 2(1) and                  
Section 2(2) of the Wills Act in relation to the execution of a will and 
amendments thereto are to ensure authenticity and to guard against false or 
forged wills. The court, in finding in the case of Hendrik van der            
Merwe
505
 that the draft electronic will was valid, considered the 
following.
506
 
 
By enacting of Section 2(3) of the Wills Act the legislature was intent 
on ensuring that failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by the Act 
should not frustrate or defeat the genuine intention of testators. It has rightly 
and repeatedly been said that once a court is satisfied that the document 
concerned meets the requirements of the subsection a court has no discretion 
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whether or not to grant an order as envisaged therein.
507
 In other words, the 
provisions of Section 2(3) are peremptory once the jurisdictional 
requirements have been satisfied. Turning to the provisions of Section 2(3) 
the first question to be considered is whether the document in question was 
drafted or executed by the deceased. Following on this, is the question 
whether the deceased intended it to be his will which the court answered by 
referring to the case of Letsekga v the Master & Others.
508
   
 
In Letsekga v the Master & Others
509
 the following was stated: 
 
‗The wording of Section 2(3) of the Act is clear: the document, 
whether it purports to be a will or an amendment of a will, must 
have been intended to be the will or the amendment, as the case 
may be, i.e. the testator must have intended the particular 
document to constitute his final instruction with regard to the 
disposal of his estate.‘ 
 
The lack of a signature has never been held to be a complete bar to a 
document being declared to be a will in terms of Section 2(3).
510
 In the court 
case of Letsekga, the lack of a signature was not held to be a bar to an order 
in terms of Section 2(3) of the Act. In the matter of Ex parte Maurice
511
  
which was decided in the same year as Letsekga, was to the same effect. In 
Thirion v Die Meester & andere
512
 an unsigned document drafted by a 
person shortly before he committed suicide was held to be a valid will and 
declared as such in terms of Section 2(3). In that case the deceased had 
executed a prior will that had complied with all the prescribed formalities.  
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The object of Section 2(3), is to ameliorate the situation where 
formalities have not been complied with but where the true intention of the 
drafter of a document is self-evident.  
 
A review of the decided cases
513
 reveals the following regarding 
Section 2(3) of the Act:  
 
‗Section 2 (3) is in the nature of a special exemption from the 
rigours of the requirements of Section 2 (1)‘ and the cases cited 
above indicate that the absence of a signature has not been seen as 
a bar to relief in terms of Section 2 (3). On the other hand, it must 
be emphasised that the greater the non-compliance with the 
prescribed formalities the more it would take to satisfy a court that 
the document in question was intended to be the deceased‘s 
will‘.514 
 
The court, in Hendrik van der Merwe v The Master
515
 then went to 
consider the document in question against the jurisdictional requirements of 
Section 2(3) of the Act. The appellant had provided proof that the document 
had been sent to him by the deceased via e-mail, lending the document an 
aura of authenticity. It was uncontested that the document still existed on the 
deceased‘s computer and was genuine. Thus it was clear that the document 
was drafted by the deceased and that it had not been amended or deleted. In 
explaining its satisfaction with that requirement, the court stated:
 516
 
 
‗The document is boldly entitled ―TESTAMENT‖ in large type 
print (6 mm high), an indicator that the deceased intended the 
document to be his will. Furthermore, the deceased nominated the 
appellant as the sole beneficiary of his pension fund proceeds.‘   
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This was an important and objective fact which is consonant with an 
intention that the appellant be the sole beneficiary in respect of the 
remainder of his estate. It was also of importance that the deceased had no 
immediate family and that the appellant was a long-time friend and 
confidante.
517
 
 
The fact that his previous will nominated the second respondent as his 
sole heir indicates that he had no intention of benefiting remote family 
members. The appellant‘s version of the mutual agreement to benefit each 
other exclusively by way of testamentary disposition is uncontested by the 
second respondent, the sole beneficiary of the prior will, and is supported by 
the fact that after the deceased had sent the document to the appellant, the 
latter executed a will nominating the deceased as his sole beneficiary ─ 
another objective fact. All of this leads to the inexorable conclusion that the 
document was intended by the deceased to be his will.
518
 
 
It is submitted that the legislature ought to consider the law relating to 
the inclusion of the above-stated excluded acts every five years similar to 
German law, as Vogel suggests, to accommodate changing times.
519
 The 
main purpose behind considering the law over such a generally short period 
is to provide equal treatment to the use of the various e-signature techniques 
currently being used or still under development with the purpose of 
replacing the use of hand-written signatures and other kinds of authenticated 
mechanisms used in the traditional paper-based transaction (e.g. seals or 
stamps).
520
 
 
There are two key considerations that would have to be considered 
when dealing with an electronic will, one of the them would be the 
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requirement of the witnesses being in each other‘s presence and that of the 
testator. The second other important requirement is that they (the witnesses)  
sign the will in each other‘s presence. These areas would require some 
further investigation on how they can be overcome in terms of the functional 
equivalence approach. 
 
(e) Time and place that the contract enters into effect 
 
South African law makes provision for different methods of contract 
acceptance as discussed in Chapter IV of this work. Such methods of 
contract acceptance could vary and affect the time and place of contract 
conclusion. The place where a contract is formed is very important in case of 
a contract between parties who are in different jurisdictions, or where one 
party suffers prejudice due to conflicting legal rules.
521
 The determination of 
where the contract comes into existence is also important as the ‗lex loci 
contractus‘ of a particular country may insist on particular formalities that 
must be complied with for an agreement to be valid as well as the ‗lex loci‘ 
solution when having to consider where performance must take the place of 
contractual obligation.
522
 
 
The moment and place of contract conclusion of electronic contracts 
are now being regulated by Section 22(2) of the ECT Act which states: ‗An 
agreement concluded between parties by means of data messages is 
concluded at the time and place where the acceptance of the offer was 
received by the offeror‘.523  
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As one can see, the time and place of contract conclusion are where 
and when the originator receives the addressee‘s 524 message of acceptance, 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
525
 For our purposes, it is only 
important to look at both the information theory and the expedition theory as 
explained in the case of a contract concluded by letter and/or telephone or 
fax – as these are akin to e-mail. The ECT Act has rejected the expedition 
theory and has now introduced the reception theory as a preferred legal rule 
when determining the place where the agreement has been concluded.
526
  
 
     The ECT Act‘s provision is clearly a deviation from our two traditional 
common law theories i.e. the information theory and the expedition theory, 
and is a modified version of the reception theory where the risk of the 
message being lost or not reaching the addressee is placed squarely on the 
sender.
527
 The wording of these sections has also been questioned in light of 
the problems surrounding the malfunction of information systems.
528
 
 
One must also note that the provisions of Section 22(2) are only 
applicable where the parties have not by express agreement varied the rules 
of the ECT Act by means of contractual determination.
529
 Since the 
transmission of data messages usually occurs in the manner of the sender‘s 
computer sending small data packets that eventually arrive at the recipient‘s 
computer to form the original message, it could become technical in certain 
instances when trying to establish the exact time when the messages are 
deemed to have been received. 
530
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The rules pertaining to time of sending and receipt of data messages 
set out in Section 23 of the ECT Act. Section 23 provides for  different 
scenarios
531
 by virtue of Section 23 (a), which deals with the status of 
electronic data messages that are sent, and states: 
 
‗[D]ata message - ( a ) used in the conclusion or performance of an 
agreement must be regarded as having been sent by the originator 
when it enters an information system outside the control of the 
originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same 
information system, when it is capable of being retrieved by the 
addressee.‘ 
 
Furthermore in terms of Section 23(b): 
 
‗A Data message must be regarded as having been received by the 
addressee when the complete data message enters an information 
system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is 
capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee.‘ 
 
In the situation, as stated in Section 23(a) the e-mail is deemed to be 
sent when accessible by the recipient on sending it through the intra-mail or 
when the complete data message enters an information system outside the 
sender‘s control in the case of parties in two different information 
systems.
532
 Eiselen states that the e-mail message or SMS is deemed to have 
been sent when it leaves the originator‘s server.533  
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Section 23(b), on the other hand, states that the e-mail will be deemed 
received when the complete data message enters the designated (or whatever 
is used for that purpose) e-mail address for the recipient‘s information 
system and it is capable of being retrieved.   
 
In the case of Jafta v Ezemvelo Kzn Wildlife 
534
 the judge applied the 
ECT Act law in resolving the dispute that had arisen regarding the use of 
SMS and e-mail for an employment contract,
535
 and the exact time and place 
where the contract was concluded with reference to the common law and 
ECT Act. The court had an opportunity to interpret this provision where 
there was a dispute as to whether an e-mail containing an acceptance of an 
employment contract had indeed been received by the employer.  
 
In rejecting the application of the common law principles the court 
stated that it is clear that: ‗Section 23 supplants the general rule of the 
common law that an acceptance must come to the knowledge of the person it 
has been sent to‘.536 The court went to the extent of doing a comparative 
review of the model law and foreign decisions to confirm the legal position 
that the reception theory applies in cases of electronic contracts. The court 
also confirmed that an electronic employment contract can be formed by 
way of e-mail or SMS. 
 
Section 23(c) attributes the sending of the originator‘s e-mail at his/her 
place of business and the same reasoning is applied to receipt. The ECT Act 
is clearly a deviation from our two traditional common law theories of 
information and acceptance with regard to the use of electronic data 
messages and appears to be a modified version of the reception theory.
537
 
Article 15(1)(2)
538
 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce and 
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Article 10 
539
 of the UNECIC lay down some basic principles regarding the 
dispatch and receipt of data messages and are embodied in Section 23(a) and 
(b) South Africa does not follow the principles of the Model Law to the tee 
as it requires the full data message to have entered the information system. 
The ECT Act also does not address the time of receipt where an information 
system other than the senders designated system is used. 
 
(f) Attribution of data messages 
 
Prior to the ECT Act there was no specific law to deal with attribution of 
data messages. The ECT Act recognises, for example, that a contract may be 
concluded with either party using an electronic agent. Nonetheless, a party 
using an electronic agent to conclude a contract is not bound if the terms of 
the agreement were not capable of being reviewed by a natural person 
representing that party prior to formation of the contract.
540
 Section 25 of the 
ECT Act states that:  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
control of the originator or of the person who sent the data message on behalf of the 
originator.    
     (2) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the time of receipt 
of a data message is determined as follows:  
     (a) if the addressee has designated an information system for the purpose of receiving 
data messages, receipt occurs:  
   (i) at the time when the data message enters the designated information system; or 
(ii)if the data message is sent to an information system of the addressee that is not 
stelznerthe designated information system, at the time when the data message is 
retrieved by the addressee;  
      (b) if the addressee has not designated an information  system, receipt occurs when 
the data message enters an information system of the addressee.‘  
539
 Article 10 reads: ‗(1) The time of dispatch of an electronic communication is the time 
when it leaves an information system under the control of the originator or of the party who 
sent it on behalf of the originator or, if the electronic communication has not left an 
information system under the control of the originator or of the party who sent it on behalf 
of the originator, the time when the electronic communication is received. 
      (2) The time of receipt of an electronic communication is the time when it becomes 
capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an electronic address designated by the 
addressee. The time of receipt of an electronic communication at another electronic address 
of the addressee is the time when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at 
that address and the addressee becomes aware that the electronic communication has been 
sent to that address. An electronic communication is presumed to be capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the addressee‘s electronic address.‘     
540
 Gerda op cit note 453 at 274. 
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‗a data message is that of the originator if it was sent by the 
originator personally, a person who had authority to act on behalf 
of the originator in respect of that data message or an information 
system programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate 
automatically unless it is proved that the information system did 
not properly execute such programming.‗ 
 
This creates a rebuttable presumption that a message is that of an 
originator using any information until he can prove that it was sent in error 
or as a result of unauthorised or fraudulent use.  
 
 
(g) Shrink wrap, click wrap, web wrap agreements  
 
 
Traders and consumers have, through the years, exploited the possibilities of 
e-commerce. Prior to the ECT Act, there was a lot of uncertainty as to the 
validity and the enforceability of shrink wrap, click wrap and web wrap 
agreements. 
 
Fortunately, Section 13(5) of the ECT Act stipulates that any other 
expression of intent or statement is not without legal force and effect merely 
on the grounds that; (a) it is in the form of a data message; or (b) it is not 
evidenced by an electronic signature but is evidenced by other means from 
which such person's intent or other statement can be inferred.
541
 
 
Incorporation by reference, which is discussed below, is a technique 
used widely in commerce to include standard terms and conditions in a 
contract and can be found in, for example: (a) insurance contracts where an 
applicant for insurance can be telephonically informed that the standard 
terms and conditions apply to the contract; (b) an application form which 
contains a reference to the fact that standard terms and conditions apply; or 
(c) notice boards at the entrance to business premises that warn that entrance 
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is at own risk, and that liability is not accepted for any damages sustained 
while on the premises.
542
 
 
Inevitably, in disputes regarding these types of contracts, the question 
arises about whether or not a party is bound by these standard terms and 
conditions that were incorporated into the agreement. This question is 
usually answered with reference to the requirements set out in terms of the 
so-called ‗ticket contracts‘. According to Christie the contracting party will 
be bound to these terms and conditions if the following questions can be 
answered in the affirmative: 
 
‗a) Did the contracting party know that certain words appeared on 
the document/ ticket i.e. did they read it? 
b) Did the contracting party know that these terms and conditions 
referred to a contract/to contract terms and conditions?‘543 
 
If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, the contracting party 
will be bound to the contract terms and conditions. Should the answer, be in 
the negative then a third question is asked: 
 
‗c) Did the party issuing the contract/ ticket do everything in 
his/her power to draw the attention of the other contracting party to 
the fact that the words refer to the terms of the contract would a 
reasonable customer have taken notice of the terms and 
conditions?‘ 
 
If this third question is answered in the affirmative, the contracting party 
will be bound to the terms and conditions as stipulated; if not, then they will 
not be bound by them.
544
 These uncertainties are mainly due to the shift 
from paper-based trading to the practical, paperless conclusion of contracts. 
The law has evolved certain principles concerning the so-called ticket cases 
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to dispense with the requirement of obtaining signatures to signify 
consent.
545
 
 
These contracts are, by nature, defined as contracts of adhesion- 
contract negotiation and are excluded as one simply, unilaterally declares 
his/her acceptance.
546
 A shrink wrap agreement is one form of a contract of 
adhesion. Other terms used for this type of agreement are ‗box top‘, ‗tear me 
open‘ or ‗blister pack‘ agreements.547 The terms of the agreement become 
valid and enforceable when the plastic shrink wrap is broken and/or the 
software package is installed.
548
A retailer‘s failure to draw the buyer‘s 
attention, specifically to the conditions and terms contained in the shrink 
wrap agreement may amount to a misrepresentation by silence,
549
 ‗rendering 
the contract voidable‘.550  
 
Akin to the concept of shrink wrap agreements are the ‗click wrap‘, 
agreements, also known as ‗web wrap‘ agreements that have been developed 
in e-commerce.
551
 If the online consumer
552
 wishes to purchase products 
offered through an e-shop he/she will be instructed to ‗click‘ on certain icons 
indicating his her acceptance to the terms. Courts in the United States have 
ruled on the enforceability of shrink-warp and web-wrap agreements on the 
basis of the facts of each case.
553
  
 
In Hotmail Corporation v Van Money Pie Inc
554
, Judge James Ware of 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the 
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plaintiff‘s motion for an injunction in trademark infringement and breach of 
contract suit involving a click wrap agreement on the basis that the 
defendant had breached one of the ‗Terms of Service‘ namely, ‗not to use 
the Hotmail e-mail account to facilitate the transmission of unsolicited 
commercial email, otherwise known as ―spam‖‗.555 One must note that the 
court‘s approach towards these forms of agreement is extremely cautious. 
The defendants usually raise the ‗did not know‘ or ‗did not see‘ online 
agreement defence.
556
  
  
Although these click-wrap agreements have not yet been tested in our 
South African courts, Pistorius states, ‗there would appear to be no reason as 
to why they should not be enforceable‘.557 Compared to shrink wrap 
agreements, where the contract terms are unread until the purchaser has 
unwrapped the software, with click wrap agreements the customer is aware 
of the contractual terms before a commitment is made to acquire the goods 
or services.  
 
The ECT Act decided to ensure legal certainty in this arena and 
therefore incorporation by reference in electronic transactions is governed 
by the provisions of Section 11 of the ECT Act. To accommodate these 
types of transactions the ECT Act sets down the requirements for 
enforceable incorporation by reference transactions as follows:
558
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
QB 1989 ) where the court hinted at the probability of such contracts being valid and 
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555
 S Nagalingam op cit note 37 at 20. 
556
 Ticket Masters Corporation v Tickets Inc No Cv 99-7654, 2000 WL 525390 (CD Cal 27 
March 2000) and Spreht Netscape Communications Corporation 150 F supp 2d 585 
(SDNY 2001) . For further examples of United States case law were the court refused to 
recognise the validity of the similar shrink-wrap agreements was in the case of Vault Corp.v 
Quid Software Ltd 847 F. 2d 255(5
th
 Cir.1988) and Systems Inc. v. Wyse Tech 939 F 2d 91  
(3
rd
 Cir. 1999).  
557
 Pistorius op cit note 546 at 292. 
558
 Ibid. 
131 
‗ • Information is not without legal force and effect merely 
on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message, but is 
merely referred to in a data message;
559
  
 
• Information is incorporated into an agreement or data message, 
even though it is not in the public domain only if the information 
is: 
 Referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would 
have noticed it and 
 
  Accessible in a form that can be read, stored and 
retrieved by a contracting party, either electronically or 
as a computer printout.‘ 560 
 
This section clearly reflects the common law position as being the 
objective test of incorporation by reference as discussed in the case of 
 Durban's Water Wonder Land v Botha,
561
 which comprises three elements, 
namely: first, would the reasonable person have expected terms and 
conditions of that nature at a resort of that nature? Secondly, were the terms 
and conditions displayed where one would have reasonably expected them 
to be displayed, in various languages and in clear and eligible print? Thirdly, 
were the terms and conditions what may reasonably have been expected, 
given the nature of the activities?
562
  
The translation of these requirements to the online world could be: 
first, would the reasonable user have expected terms and conditions of that 
nature as being applicable to that message? Secondly, were the terms and 
conditions displayed where one would have reasonably expected them to be 
displayed, in various languages and in clear and eligible print? Thirdly, were 
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the terms and conditions what may reasonably have been expected, given the 
nature of the activities?
563
  
 New and different standards for incorporation by reference have been 
created in Section 11(3), which could cause confusion. This section 
embodies the common-law approach but adds the requirement that the 
information to be incorporated needs to be available to the other party 
online. Uniform resource locators (URLs), which direct the reader to the 
referenced document, may, for example, be embedded in a message. Such 
URLs can provide ‘hypertext links‘ allowing the reader to use a pointing 
device (such as a mouse) to select a key word associated with a URL. The 
referenced text would then be displayed.
564
   
In assessing the accessibility of the referenced text, factors to be 
considered may include: (a) availability (the hours of operation of the 
repository and the ease of access); (b) the cost of access; (c) integrity 
(verification of content, authentication of the sender, and a mechanism for 
communication error correction); and (d) the extent to which the referenced 
text is subject to later amendment (notice of updates; notice of policy of 
amendment). It has been noted that Section 11(3) should be abolished, as it 
increases the common law burden of incorporation by reference.
565
  
Due to the possibility of exploitation, Section 11(3) requires the 
website owner, electronic trader or issuer of the terms and conditions 
incorporated by reference to ensure that the terms and conditions can be 
read, printed out, stored electronically and that they are retrievable before 
these terms and conditions will be deemed to have been properly 
incorporated – a slight deviation from the general common law rule. 
                                                 
563
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(h) Automated transactions  
 
An automated transaction is an electronically concluded transaction where 
one or both of the parties make use of automated systems. (i.e. a software 
programme that communicates with or responds to third parties without any 
human intervention.)
566
 When dealing with automated transactions, the 
analysis of offer and acceptance at common law level provides assistance in 
determining whether parties have, objectively speaking, reached consensus 
but may not always be helpful in establishing whether there is subjective 
consensus or whether the agreement was vitiated by mistake.
567
 
 
    In the case of Sonop Petroleum v Papadogianis
568
 the court made it clear 
that sometimes it is necessary to qualify the generally subjective approach to 
consensus by holding a person liable due to their conduct which may instil 
the reasonable belief that a party may have reasonably relied on 
569
 - in this 
case the reliance could be either way, from the e-consumer‘s perspective or 
that of the e-vendor. In the case of Sonop Petroleum v Pappadogianis the 
appeal court unanimously believed that the signatory was misled and that 
the other party was alive to the real possibility of a mistake and that he had a 
duty to speak but chose instead to snatch a bargain.
570  
 
One must immediately note that section 1 of the ECT Act which 
defines a ‗consumer‘ as: 
 
                                                 
566
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‗any natural person who enters into or intends entering into an 
electronic transaction with a supplier as the end user of goods or 
services offered by that supplier. ‗ 
 
A consumer only means ‗natural person‘ and therefore the provisions thereof 
do not apply to transactions between suppliers and companies and other 
juristic persons such as businesses and trusts.
571
 Section 22(1) of the ECT 
Act states that, ‗an agreement is not without legal force and effect merely 
because it was concluded partly or in whole by means of data messages‘.  
 
    Section 24 of the ECT Act provides for the valid expression of intent by 
means of a data message.
572
 This section strengthens the provisions of 
Section 11 and Section 22, and solidifies the legal effectiveness of data 
messages used in transactional communication.
573
 Validity is also provided 
for unilateral ‗statements‘ by means of data messages.574 
 
Fortunately, the ECT Act has now clarified the position regarding the 
conclusion of contracts with electronic agents.
575
 Section 20 has created a 
statutory regime
576
 for the validity and enforceability of automated 
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data message or performances, in whole or in part, in an automated transaction.‘ 
576
  Section 20 of the ECT Act provides that for an automated transaction: 
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transactions. In terms of Section 20(a) and 20(b) of the ECT Act, a party as 
well as the party on whose behalf a computer or electronic agent has been 
programmed, will be bound to the pre-programmed actions of the automated 
message system. Section 20(c) provides that a party using an electronic 
agent to form an agreement is, subject to the provision of paragraph (d), 
which state that a person is presumed to be bound by the terms of that 
agreement irrespective of whether that person reviewed the actions of the 
electronic agent or the terms of the agreement.
577
 Section 20(c) is in line 
with South African common law.
578
 
 
Section 20(d) has new important consequences, in that it gives the 
party contracting with an electronic agent the right to review the transaction 
failing which the party will not be bound to the terms as stated.
579
              
Section 20 (e) also specifies the procedure to be followed in the case where a 
party makes a material error and wishes to cancel the contract.
580
 Eiselen is 
of the view that it is similar to the common law position on mistake and 
states that the provisions of section 20(e) are cumulative and that all 
requirements must have been fulfilled to escape contractual liability.
581
   
 
The person making use of an electronic agent is saddled with a heavy 
burden in that it must not only provide the natural person with an 
opportunity to correct the error, it must also provide that person with the 
opportunity to prevent the error. To be entitled to this protection, it is 
                                                 
577
 T Pistorius op cit note 233 at 9. 
578
 Ibid. 
579
 Eiselen op cit note 452 at154.   
580
 Section 20(e) provides that  ‗no agreement is formed where a natural person interacts 
direct with the electronic agent of another person and has made a material error during the 
creation of a data message and - 
 (i) the electronic agent did not provide that person with an opportunity to prevent or correct 
the error: 
     (ii) that person notifies the other person of the error as soon as practicable after that 
person has learned of it; 
     (iii) that person takes reasonable steps, including steps that conform to the other person‗s 
instructions to return  
     any performance received or if instructed to do so to destroy that performance: and 
     (iv) that person has not used or received any material benefit or value from any 
performance received from the other  person‘. 
581
 Eiselen op cit note 452 at 159. 
136 
required that a natural person must notify the other party of any mistakes as 
soon as such mistake is noticed.
582
 It is clear that automated transactions are 
now part of our South African law of contract and certain principles have 
derived from some of our old common law principles. 
 
  (i) Jurisdiction in cases of e-contracts and transborder contracts 
 
Cyberspace holds many opportunities for e-commerce but unfortunately, 
cyberspace is not ‗Eden‘. Instead, the internet is driven and frequented by 
people and wherever you find people you are bound to find disputes.
583
 
Electronic commerce, however, by its very nature is transborder. It doesn‘t 
acknowledge geographical borders or jurisdictional principles that recognise 
state, unions and trade areas but only networks, domains, servers and  
clouds.  
 
   This leaves the courts in a predicament as to which laws to apply to certain 
disputes and in which forum. The place a contract is formed or breached is 
mainly of interest in international transactions where the parties have not 
agreed to a specific jurisdiction or where there is no applicable international 
convention that determines jurisdiction.
584
  
 
While the recognition of electronic data messages and electronic 
signatures as functional equivalents to writing and signing have been 
internationally recognised and much international uniformity exists, one of 
the most vexatious legal problems in the regulation of electronic commerce,  
relates to the issue of jurisdiction. When concluding a contract in the online 
environment it becomes a legal problem to establish which court has 
jurisdiction and which laws may apply to disputes that may arise out of the 
contract. There are different views on how jurisdiction of an online contract 
should be established.  
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Cyber-libertarians favour a separate cyberspace jurisdiction, 
maintaining that online activities should be regulated entirely separately 
without recourse to national courts and laws.
585
 Traditionalists maintain that 
the existing paradigms of location and activity are capable of determining 
the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate upon an online contract.
586
 
 
Jurisdiction is the legal term used to describe the power or competency 
of a court to hear a dispute and decide disputes.
587
 Sibanda states that the 
classic definition of the term ‘jurisdiction‘, which has been incorporated  
into its traditional understanding, was given by the court in Ewing 
McDonald & Co v M & M Products Co.
588
 The court defined ‘jurisdiction‘ 
as the ‗power vested in a court to adjudicate upon, determine and dispose of 
a matter‘.589 Thus, for the court to exercise jurisdiction, such court must 
satisfy two requirements. Firstly, the court must have the authority to hear 
the matter, and secondly, it must have the power to enforce its judgment. 
 
 The first requirement is satisfied when there is a jurisdictional 
connecting factor, which means that there is a link between the court and the 
parties to the action or the cause of action. The second requirement is 
derived from the principle of effectiveness in terms of which the court 
should not exercise jurisdiction unless compliance with its judgment can be 
expected.
590
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Generally speaking, the public international law principle of territorial 
sovereignty provides that the courts of any given country only have 
jurisdiction over the individuals or companies who reside within that 
country, or over the activities (including transmissions) that occur within the 
borders of that country.
591
 A contract is concluded at the time and place 
where the last act necessary to constitute the agreement, was performed. In 
terms of Section 22(2) of the ECT Act, the place and time of contract 
conclusion would be at the place and time where the originator receives the 
addressee‘s message of acceptance - this would be the last legally relevant 
act. 
592
 But does this mean that a party may approach a South African court 
in the case of a dispute? The matter becomes even more complex where one 
or more parties to the agreement are in different jurisdictions. 
 
Eiselen states that Section 19(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act
593
 
empowers any Provincial or Local Division of the South African High 
Court‘s jurisdiction in South Africa over all persons or all legally 
recognisable causes of action arising within its area.
594
 The courts interpret 
this as simply meaning that the common law principle must be applied when 
establishing jurisdiction. 
595
 A party will have to satisfy one of the following 
four common law requirements to be heard, granted relief and to be able to 
take execution steps in a South African court. The South African business or 
person being sued must conduct business or be domiciled within a specific 
court‗s jurisdiction,596 the cause of action must have arisen within the court‘s 
area of jurisdiction,
597
 or the foreign party must have expressly, by way of 
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submission,
598
 or implied consent to jurisdiction of a particular court or the 
foreigners assets must be attached to confirm jurisdiction.
599
 
 
South African companies that provide international access to their 
websites and transact electronically with citizens from around the world 
should ensure that all their website terms and conditions and all other cross-
border electronic contracts should include a ‗Choice of Court‘ clause and a 
‗Submission to Jurisdiction clause‘.600 Jurisdiction however still remains a 
legal chameleon and a party cannot be completely sure as to which court 
will have or accept jurisdiction in the case of a dispute that arise from a 
transnational electronic transaction. 
 
It is quite clear that jurisdiction will remain a worldwide legal 
uncertainty as courts will not easily bow down to court orders from courts 
from other jurisdictions which may, in certain instances, hinder or may make 
litigation expensive and unaffordable for a plaintiff. It would be in the 
interest of all states in the world to draft another model law that specifically 
deals with disputes arising from contracts concluded or delicts committed on 
the internet.
601
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(j) Conclusion  
 
In short, the ECT Act has now entrenched the law reorganising electronic 
data messages for the purpose of executing valid legal acts such as the legal 
formalities of writing and signatures. It appears as if the principles contained 
in the UNCITRAL Model Laws for E-Commerce and E-Signatures have 
been entrenched in our South African law. The ECT Act follows a similar 
legal regime to that of the Singapore,
602
 Germany and the United States.. It 
is noteworthy to mention that the ECT Act also provides for electronically 
giving power of attorney and commissioning of electronic documents. The 
law, ought to be regularly revisited as some important current commercial 
legal acts have been excluded and new technologies being developed could 
give sufficient reason to reform the law to incorporate them in the scope of 
the ECT Act. The validity of the electronic Will should also be revisited and 
research in the area must be taken further. 
 
The ECT Act has also now adopted the reception theory as a legal rule 
regulating the time and place where a contract enters into effect, which is in 
line with international best practice. There is no longer any legal uncertainty 
as to whether click wrap, web wrap agreements and online automated 
transactions are valid in South Africa. The question of whether a South 
African court has jurisdiction is generally governed by common law 
principles and principles of private International law.   
 
The ECT Act only regulates jurisdiction in the case where a criminal 
matter comes before a South African court and perhaps this aspect should be 
revisited to create clarity at least from a South African perspective. It would 
be step in the right direction if the recently proposed amendments to the 
                                                 
   
602
 Phang & Seng op cit note 116. Also see section 4(1) of  the Electronic  Transactions Act 
1998. 
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ECT Act could also encompass the proposed measures as contained in 
UNECIC and the AU Convention on Cyber Security. 
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CHAPTER VI: REGULATION OF E-CONTRACTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
(a) Overview of chapter 
 
The technological evolution and development of the internet took the United 
States and the whole world by storm. It was clear that the United States 
government would have to give a clear legislative response to its legal 
ramifications. In July 1997, the Clinton administration remarked that, ‗we 
are on the verge of another revolution . . . the internet [is] changing the way 
we work, learn and communicate with each other . . . the internet 
dramatically lowers costs and facilitation of commercial transactions.‘603  
    As previously mentioned, United States e-commerce law is now regulated 
by the UCITA,
604
 UETA,
605
 and Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act (E-Sign).
606
 The UCITA was passed in 1999 and in 
the same year the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws endorsed the UETA and soon thereafter the E-sign Act was passed 
amid concerns that the UETA might be adopted too slowly.  
 
(b) Sources of law in the United States  
 
In the early 1990s the United States government recognised that                  
e-commerce legislation was becoming a national priority. This chapter will 
show that only a few legislative interventions have been made in the United 
States despite the priority it has had. In the United States, there is a true 
federal system
607
 with 52 jurisdictions imposing laws, and operating separate 
                                                 
603
 Presidential Directive on Electronic Commerce, 1 July 1997. 
604
Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, 1999. 
605
 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 1999. 
606
 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. 30 June 2000. 
607
 In a federal system, national government holds significant centralised powers , however 
the smaller political subdivisions hold significant power. Examples of this can be found in 
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court systems. These are the 50 states, the District of Columbia and the 
Federal Government.  
 
In the United States federal system, there is a division of power between the 
states and the central government so that, at least in theory, states may adopt 
their own legal regime to regulate e-commerce on a state level.
608
 This was 
also confirmed in the case US v Butler
609
 where the Court held that: 
 
‗Our government is a dual form of government, in every state there 
are two governments – the state government and the United States. 
Each State has all governmental powers save such as the people, by 
the Constitution, have conferred upon the United States, denied to 
the States, or reserved to themselves.‗610 
 
The effect thereof is that intrastate commerce may be regulated 
internally within a state and interstate commerce is regulated by federal law. 
The United States Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, provides 
that federal law supersedes any state law and that conduct or laws 
inconsistent with it are unconstitutional and therefore unlawful.
611
 The 
United States law follows a doctrine of pre-emption under the Supremacy 
clause.
612
 This means that any constitutionally-valid federal law and 
regulation issued by federal agency pursuant to an express delegation of 
regulatory power to such agency by the United States Congress trumps any 
state law that may be inconsistent with federal law.
613
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Brazil , Canada, Australia  and Germany. Also see J S Rainey, United States, (2004) at 309 
on this issue.  
608
 Ibid. 
609
 297 U.S 1 (1936). 
610
 Ibid at 97 U.S. 63. 
611
 US Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 reads: ‗This constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of  the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and Judges in 
every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Law of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding‘. 
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 J S Rainey op cit 608 at 310. 
613
 Shaw v Delta Air Lines Inc 463 US 85, 95-96 (1983).  
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Just as in South African law, United States law comprises the common 
law which is contained in the decisions of court as well as statutes. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) will be of 
importance because it contains the most common law rules in codified 
forms. The Restatement (second) of Contracts is also an important source, 
but its principles have not been adopted on a uniform basis. Therefore, any 
search for uniform contract law will ultimately lead to the UCC.
614
   
 
In addition to the UCC, the United States government came up with 
three different codes to deal with the advent of the computer and its impact 
on commerce as a whole, namely: UCITA,
615
 the UETA and the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
616
 (hereafter referred to as 
the ‗E-sign Act‘).  
 
(i) Overview of the law prior to enactment of electronic contracts 
legislation 
 
Before considering the transacting of business via the internet or other 
online methods, one must first understand the US law of contract formation 
in the off-line world.
617
 As stated previously in this treatment, while a 
statute enacted by congress will supersede the common law (in other words, 
judge-made law) most of the statutes are based upon the general principles 
as laid down by the common law.
618
 Due to this bizarre contradiction, the 
courts have chosen to apply existing common law principles to current legal 
disputes relating to e-contracts and therefore the study of the common law 
before the application of statute is most important as it is of high persuasive 
value to the courts.
619
 
 
                                                 
614
 H K Towle ‗Legal Developments in Electronic Contracting‘ in PLI Fourth Annual Internet 
Law Institute (2000) at 93-94. 
615
 §§ 101 – 905 (2002). 
616
 15 USCA §§7001 – (2005).  
617
 J S Rainey op cit note 608 at319. 
618
 W H Thurlow op cit note 112. 
619
 Ibid.  
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(ii) The valid offer 
 
An offer is an expression by a person or legal entity regarding their 
intent as the offeror to be bound to an agreement. An offer is an act or 
promise where one person (the offeror) confers upon another (the offeree) 
the power to create contractual relations. Certain additional formalities may 
be required to form a valid contract.
620
  
 
The said offer must refer to an act that must be performed or refrained 
from doing and must be done seriously and the offeror must be able to 
perform and must have the contractual capacity to do so.
621
 As in the South 
African common law, an advertisement does not constitute an offer to do 
business but merely an invitation to do business. More than a hundred years 
ago, in the New Hampshire‘s highest court, in language as applicable to 
electronic data messages as to telegraph transmittal, held that an offer and 
subsequent acceptance by telegraph satisfied the Statute of Frauds
622– that 
places minimum requirements for written agreements in the US
623
. The 
honourable court in its ‗ratio dicidendi‘ (reason for decision) stated that: 
 
‗It makes no difference whether the operator writes the offer 
or the  acceptance … with a steel pen an inch long attached 
to an ordinary penholder, or whether his pen be a copper 
wire a thousand miles long. In either case, the thought is 
communicated to the paper by the use of the finger resting 
upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one 
case common red ink is used, while in the other case a more 
                                                 
620
 See Kent D. Stuckey
 
Internet and Online Law (2004) (14) at 1.10-2 wherein he also refer 
to the Second Restatement of Contracts § 22 (1974). 
621
 J S Rainey op cit note 608 at 320.  
622
 Isaac Bowman , The History of Electronic Signatures  
      at  http://www.isaacbowman.com/the-history-of-electronic-signature-laws ( accessed on 
the 16 May 2014) .  
623
 Marianne Menna, ‗From Jamestown to the Silicon Valley, Pioneering A Lawless 
Frontier: The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act‘ in Virginia 
Journal of Law and Technology Association (2001)(6)  at 12.  
at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue2/v6i2-a12-Menna.html (accessed on the 14 May 2014). 
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subtle fluid, known as electricity, performs the same 
office.‘624 
 
This reasoning should apply readily to electronic data messages, which 
are transmitted over long telephone lines 
625
 and satellite links where the 
user enters a data message by pressing his fingers on the keys of the 
keyboard. Zanger, in explaining the validity of an electronic offer, argues 
that an offer may be made in writing, orally or by conduct.
626
 He further 
argues that there is no reason as to why an electronic offer should not be 
recognised as a valid offer based on the premise of what has been said in the 
preceding sentence.
627
 
 
In LLan Systems Inc v Netscout Service Level Corp
628
 it was held that UCC 
2- 204 authorises the uses of electronic means for offer and acceptance by 
confirming the validity of a click-wrap agreement. 
 
(iii) The acceptance 
 
Acceptance is ‘an agreement, either by an express act or by implication from 
conduct, to the terms of an offer so that a binding agreement is formed‘.629 
Once a party receives an offer, it and only it, may accept or reject it. If an 
offer specifically specifies the mode of acceptance that will be the mode of 
acceptance that will be applicable, save for silence.
630
 Zanger explains that 
                                                 
624
 Howley v Whipple, 48 N.H.487at 488 (1869). 
625
 This also relates to GPRS links as well as 3G and fibre optical connections as used in the 
modern telecommunications world.  
626
 L M Zanger ‗Electronic contracts – some of the basics‘ (2000) p.2 from www.mbc.com 
(accessed on the 6
th
 October 2006). 
627
 Ibid. 
628
 LLan Systems Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002) 
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 Hines v Davidowitz , 312U.S. 52, 67 (1941) and Michigan Canners & Freezers Assoc 
Inc v Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining bd , 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984).  
630
 J S Rainey op cit note 608 at321. 
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an acceptance may be accepted in ‗any manner and by any medium 
reasonable in the circumstances‘631.  
 
In LLan Systems Inc v Netscout Service Level Corp 
632
 the Court held that 
such acceptance could be done by electronic means. Such a reasonable 
method may include that acceptance be performed by phone, fax or even e-
mail.
633
 
 
(iv) Writing and signature requirements 
 
Notwithstanding the above approval of the e-mail being an acceptable 
mode of offer and acceptance, the concern that generated most legal is 
whether electronically written and signed documents meet the writing and 
signature requirement as stipulated by the Statute of Frauds
634
 and thousands 
of Federal and State statutes and regulations.
635
  
 
Statute and regulations that require transactions to be ‗in writing‘ and 
to be ‗signed‘ were generally perceived to constitute barriers to e-commerce 
– barriers that had to be removed in order for e-commerce to flourish.636 It 
must be noted that the writing requirement serves many functions. The most 
significant being: (a) evidence of the transaction; (b) confirmation of the 
parties‘ intent to be contractually bound; (c) ability to reproduce the 
document for record purposes; and (d) allowing authentication of the data 
contained in the document by means of a party‘s signature.637  
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 L M Zanger op cit note 627 at 2. 
632
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633
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634
 Section 2 – 201 (1) provides that, ‗[a contract] for the sale and of goods for a price of $ 
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148 
 
 Once again the dictum of Howley v Whipple
638
 finds its application to 
this legal scenario. Douglas Morrison even went to the extent of saying in 
his commentary that, ‗the Whipple opinion was a bit eccentric in its 
metaphors, to be sure, but was not maverick in its results‘.639 Courts in the 
US have also found telexes, 
640
Western Union Mailgrams
641
 and even tape 
recordings
642
 to be writing under the Statute of Frauds. 
643
 
 
The UCC defines a ‗signature‘ as ‗any symbol executed or adopted by a 
party with present intention to authenticate a writing‘.644 ‗Writing‘ is defined 
in the UCC as including ‗printing, typewriting, or any other intentional 
reduction to tangible form‘.645 Smendinghoff and Hill thus submit that the 
key requirement is not ink on paper, but rather the presence of a symbol 
coupled with the party‘s intention to be bound.  
 
Courts in the US have also accepted that the use of a symbol on various 
media may be recognised as valid signatures. For instance, names on a 
telegram,
646
 names on telexes,
647
 typewritten names,
648
 faxed signatures
649
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and also names on a letterhead
650
 and e-mails 
651
 were held to be the 
functional equivalence of a writing and signature. As a result many symbols 
may constitute a signature in terms of United States Law. Benjamin Wright 
goes further to state, ‗even [a] name typed at the end of an e-mail should 
qualify as a signature, so long as it was created with the proper intent‘.652 
Yet concerns have lingered not only because some courts have not agreed 
with the approach as suggested by Wright but also because of lack of 
statutory authorization. This gave rise to a legal movement which argued in 
favour of legislation that clearly and unambiguously states that electronic 
signatures and writing satisfy the paper-based equivalent.
653
 
 
The court had to interpret the meaning of an electronic signature in the 
matter of Corporation v Hasbro, Inc 
654
 where the Court had to decide as to 
whether correspondence that was exchanged between parties without a 
express electronic signature, with simply names at the bottom of the e-mail, 
could fulfil the signature requirement of the Statue of Frauds. The court 
noted that the intention of the Statute of Frauds was to create certainty of the 
contract and no additional formality pertaining to hand written signatures 
had been included or affected. The court, in answering the question in the 
affirmative, stated that neither the common law or nor the UCC required a 
hand-written signature. 
655
  
                                                 
650
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651
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(v) Time and place that the contract enters into effect  
 
Time and place of acceptance, as in South African law, is important to 
determine where and when a contract was concluded for the purpose of 
establishing the parties obligations as well as the applicable jurisdiction 
should a dispute arise at a later stage. An offer can generally be revoked, if it 
has not yet been accepted.
656
 Similar to South African law, the United States 
law follows the theories on contract formation such as the ‗information 
theory‘ and, most interestingly, the ‗mailbox rule‘ which recognises that 
contractual obligations commence when the letter of acceptance enters the 
mailbox of the offeror 
657
  
 
United States jurisprudence recognises the application of the 
mailbox rule to telegraph, 
658
 telephone
659
 and telex. 
660
 Without going into 
details of the United States common law position, it is clear that the United 
States also had legal uncertainty before the enactment of its legislation and 
no specific cases could point to the correct legal position 
661
 and whether it 
would be correct to apply the mailbox rule.  
                                                 
656
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                   (c) Electronic contracts legislation in the United States 
 
 
 
(i) Interpretation and sphere of application of electronic contracts   
legislation 
 
There are three (3) sources of United States legislation on e-commerce; the 
UCITA, UETA and E-Sign Acts which all govern federal law.  
 
(i) The UCITA  
The UCITA was an attempt to introduce a Uniform Act for US States to 
follow. As a model law, it only specifies a set of guidelines, and each of the 
states should decide if to pass it or not, separately. The UCITA has been 
drafted by National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL).
662
 
 
UCITA has been designed to clarify issues which were not addressed by the 
existing UCC.
663
 The UCITA deals with contracts or transaction in 
‗computer information‘.664 A contract involving computer information (for 
example a software licence) may be concluded electronically or may be 
concluded in person or by other means.
665
 Although the UCITA deals with 
information technology, it does not solely deal with electronic 
contracting.
666
 It was intended as an amendment to the UCC but eventually 
                                                 
662
 James S. Huggins  ‗UCITA: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act‘ (2002) 
Available at .http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita.html (accessed on 14 May 2014) . 
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introduced as a document to be considered independent of the Code.
667
 To 
date, the 280 page UCITA has proved to be tough to sell, having been 
adopted only in Maryland and Virginia.
668
 Some of its provisions have been 
replicated in the UETA and E-sign Act therefore, its exclusion                
from this discussion of United States law would be a ‗faux pas’ (translation 
‗mistake‘).669 
  
 
(ii) The UETA  
 
     The UETA is one of the several United States Uniform Acts 
proposed by the NCCUSL. Since then 47 States, such as the  District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted it into their 
own laws.
670
 Its overarching purpose is to bring into line the differing state 
laws over such areas as retention of paper records (cheques in particular), 
and the validity of electronic signatures, thereby supporting the validity of 
electronic contracts as a viable medium of agreement. 
 
  The UETA is a statute with broader reach than the UCITA, focusing 
on all types of electronic transactions.
671
 The UETA is also a product of the 
NCCUSL. Unlike the UCITA, it was never intended to be part of the UCC.  
The purpose of the Act is stated in its preamble: 
 
‗The purpose of the UETA is to remove barriers to electronic 
commerce by validating and effectuating electronic records 
and signatures. It is NOT a general contracting statute - the 
substantive rules of contracts remain unaffected by UETA. 
                                                 
667
 J M Norwood (2006) ‗Summary of statutory and case law associated with contracting in 
the electronic universe‘ De  Paul Business & Commercial Law Journal (4), pp. 415-416   
668
 S Rainey supra op cit note 608 at 335. 
669
 Ibid. 
670) ‗Uniform Electronic Transactions Act‘op cit note 598.  
671
 See S M Kierkegaard op cit note 658  and Virginia (passed 2000)   
     access http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+ful+SB372ER  
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Nor is it a digital signature statute, To the extent that a State 
has a Digital Signature Law, the UETA is designed to support 
and compliment statute.‘ 
 
The UETA compared to the UCITA is a modest project which is less 
than 60 pages. The UETA has also proven to be more popular among states 
and has been adopted in 40 states (by 2006) including the District of 
Columbia.
672
Section 3 gives the scope of the Act which states: 
 
‗The Scope of this Act is inherently limited by the fact that it 
only applies to transactions related to business, commercial 
(including consumer) and governmental matters. 
Consequently, transactions with no relation to business, 
commercial or governmental transactions would not be 
subject to this Act. Unilaterally generated electronic records‘ 
and signatures which are not part of a transaction also are 
not covered by this Act. 
 
Section 3(a) of the Act indicates that it applies to ‗electronic records 
and electronic signatures relating to a transaction‘. Section 3(b) also clearly 
stipulates that certain transaction are excluded – the most noteworthy being 
wills, codicils, the UCC (save for Section 1-107 and Section 1-206, Article 2 
and Article 2A) and any other laws, if identified by a state.  
 
Section 4 of the UETA goes on to state that the Act ‗applies to any 
electronic record or electronic signature created, generated, sent, 
communicated, received, or stored. Furthermore, Section 5(a) of the UETA 
states that transactions are not required to be in electronic form and 5(b) 
states that: 
 
                                                 
672
 J M Norwood supra op cit note 660 at 429-430.  
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‗This [Act] applies only to transactions between parties each 
of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic 
means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by 
electronic means is determined from the context and 
surrounding circumstances, including the parties' conduct.‘ 
 
The above provision seems to be consistent with the ‗party 
autonomy‘ principle as stated in the UNCITRAL Model Laws as discussed 
earlier in this work. Section 4 of the UETA makes it clear that the Act is not 
applied retrospectively and that in terms of Section 5(a) and 5(b), party 
autonomy is still effective and that it is in the parties‘ discretion to decide 
whether electronic communications can be used and be of legal effect.
673
 In 
order to establish if the Act must apply that the court will look at all 
surrounding circumstances, such as the context, and the conduct of the 
parties, to establish whether the Act applies or not. 
674
 
 
 Other excluded acts include court orders, briefs, pleadings and other 
documents required to be executed in connection with judicial proceedings, 
notices regarding the termination or cancellation of utility services, notices 
regarding default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, 
notices relating to personal and health insurance.
675
 
 
The UETA was passed to make it clear on a national level, that a 
record does not fail to become an enforceable agreement solely because it 
was concluded, or part thereof concluded by electronic means. 
676
 
                                                 
673
 R A Lord (2008) ‘Electronic Signatures and transactions under the UETA‘ in Williston 
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674
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676
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155 
 
(iii)  The E-Sign Act 
 
The E-Sign Act,
677
 generally known as E-sign, was passed less than a 
year after the endorsement of the UETA and took effect on                       1
 
October 2000.
678
 E-Sign is a United States federal law passed by the US 
Congress to facilitate the use of electronic records and electronic signatures 
in interstate and foreign commerce by ensuring the validity and legal effect 
of contracts entered into electronically.  
 
Although every state has at least one law pertaining to electronic 
signatures, it is the federal law that lays out the guidelines for interstate 
commerce. The general intent of the E-Sign Act is spelt out in the very first 
Section 101(a) states that a contract or signature ‗may not be denied legal 
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form‘. 
This simple statement provides that electronic signatures and records are 
just as good as their paper equivalents, and therefore subject to the same 
legal scrutiny of authenticity that applies to paper documents.  
    
E-sign has no effect on many substantive rights of contracting 
parties
679
. For example, it does not purport to alter any requirement under a 
statute, regulation or law, state or federal, except for any requirement that to 
be enforceable the contract must be in writing, manually or mechanically 
signed or in the non-electronic form.
680
  
 
Similarly, E-sign re-echoes the principle of party autonomy and the 
use of data messages or electronic signatures is not compulsory on anyone. 
It has now created legal certainty for online users regarding the legal 
                                                 
677
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678
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679
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680
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enforceability of agreements concluded online.
681
 It is also made clear that 
the Act has no retrospective effect.
682
  
 
(ii) Legal recognition of electronic writing and signatures 
 
(i) The UCITA 
 
Legal recognition of electronic writing and signatures it is said was an 
area of uncertainty until Congress enacted the various e-commerce laws to 
deal with the deficiency in the law.
683
 Section 107 (a) of the UCITA states 
that, ‗a record or authentication may not be denied legal effect or 
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. 
 
In the case of Richard S Berger v Piranha Inc Civil Action 
684
 the 
Court held that Section 107(a) of the UCITA was to be applied to an 
electronic signature in giving validity to it and also held that Section 109(a) 
of the UCITA provides that ‗an electronic signatures is attributable to a 
person if it was the act of a person. The Court also cited Section 109(b) 
which also states that attribution under subsection (a) was to be determined 
from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of creation, 
execution or adoption including the agreement of the parties, if any, and 
otherwise provided by law. 
 
Norwood states that it is clear from the wording of the UCITA that 
‗signatures‘ include things such as one‘s voice on an answering machine, 
one‘s name on the bottom of an e-mail, a firm‘s name on a facsimile 
document, a mouse click on a web page or digital signature.
685
 
                                                 
                            
681
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682
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683
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In Section 102, the term ‗authenticate‘ is defined as:  
 
‗(a) to sign or (b) with the intent to sign a record, otherwise 
to execute or adopt an electronic symbol, sound message, or 
process referring to, attached to, included in or logically 
associated or linked with that record‘. 
 
It is clear that the term ‗authenticate‘ in this context means sign as per 
Section 1-201 of the UCC.
686
  
 
The term authentication is an alternative to the traditional word 
signature and fulfills the purpose of a signature. An authentication may not 
necessarily comply with all the requirements of a traditional signature. It is 
interesting to note that the word ‗signature‘ reappears in the UETA.687 The 
UCITA has imported the rule that a document must be reduced to physical 
copy or printout. The ‗writing‘ requirement is fulfilled by ‗a record which 
includes any information that is stored in an electronic or other medium and 
is retrievable in perceivable form‘.688 Kidd and Daughtery argue that the 
UCITA‘s Section 201 presents the new and improved Statute of Frauds 
using the concept of writing.
689
 
 
 
(ii)  The UETA  
Looking at the UETA, it is immediately evident that they have the 
same limited objective, namely to facilitate electronic transactions by 
removing barriers to electronic commerce.
690
  
                                                 
686
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Section 7 of the UETA expresses the underlying theme of the Act, 
namely to validate electronic transactions and electronic signatures. Its 
provides that, ‗a record or signature is not to be denied legal effect or 
enforceability because of its electronic form‘. Section 7 also provides that a 
contract shall not be denied validity solely on the grounds that it was 
concluded in electronic form‘.691  Moreover, when a law requires a writing 
or signature, an electronic record or electronic signature is deemed to 
suffice.
692
  
 
It is important to note that Section 8 of the UETA is a saving provision 
designed to ensure that other laws affecting the nature of writings, their 
format or the manner in which they are to be sent or received are not 
overridden except to the extent that those laws permit. 
693
 Thus as long as 
the parties have agreed to the use of electronic records for the purpose of 
contract conclusion and the message can be retrieved at a later stage, it 
meets the requirement of writing. 
 
One must not neglect the mandatory tone of section 8 which states that the 
sender of the message may not inhibit the recipient from storing and or 
printing the message as the said actions will make the agreement non-
enforceable.
694
 Party autonomy is once again retained and parties may 
decide on the method and type of electronic signature that they will deem 
acceptable.
695
  
 
Additionally, the so-called ‗click through‘ transactions, concluded 
over the internet by which a patron agrees to a transaction without 
specifically signing its name, by mere clicking ‗OK‘ or the like, will be 
                                                                                                                                                    
must be construed and applied to facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other 
law.‘ 
691
 R A Lord op cit note 674 at 3. 
692
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693
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694
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695
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attributable to that person who clicked it subject to sufficient proof that the 
said action was authorized. Security procedures or measures to identify a 
party were used in the transaction.
696
  
 
(iii)  The E-Sign Act  
 
The E-Sign Act provides a general rule of validity for electronic records and 
signatures for transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
697
 
 
The E-Sign Act allows the use of electronic records to satisfy any 
statute, regulation, or rule of law requiring that such information be provided 
in writing, if the consumer has affirmatively consented to such use and has 
not withdrawn such consent.
698
 
 
The E-Sign Act makes it clear that online agreements are considered to be 
‗in writing‘ whenever a law, such as the Statute of Frauds requires that the 
contracts between parties be in writing to be enforceable.
699
 The E-Sign Act 
contains a mirror definition of electronic signature as contained in the UETA 
and states that an electronic signature is, ‗an electronic sound, symbol, or 
process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or 
adapted by a person with the intent to sign the record‘.700  
 
                                                 
696
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697
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Murray and Flechtner note that E-Sign Act is silent on the issue of 
attribution but are of the view that this is sufficiently addressed in the UETA 
and that the omission is not material to United States law.
701
 
 
(iii) Time and place the contract enters into effect 
 
(i) The UCITA 
 
Section 203 of the UCITA establishes the basic rule of when an acceptance 
results in contract formation between the parties. The famous mailbox rule is 
rejected by this provision in favour of the ‗time of receipt‘ rule. Norwood702 
is of the view that the most interesting aspect of this section is in the 
statement that:  
 
‗If an offer in an electronic message evokes an electronic 
message accepting the offer, a contract is formed: 
a) when an electronic acceptance is received703; or 
b) if the response consists of beginning performance, full 
performance, or giving access to information when the 
performance is received or the access is enabled and 
necessary access materials are received‘704 
 
                                                 
701
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702
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Section 203(4) provides that a contracts is formed when an electronic 
acceptance is received by the offeror. Norwood points out that this is akin to 
the traditional common law reception rule also known as mail box rule in 
terms of which arrival at an appropriate post office box is deemed to be 
receipt even if the addressee is not aware of the message.
705
  
 
Zanger notes that in terms of Section 214 of the UCITA an electronic 
message will be deemed effective when received even if no individual is 
aware of its receipt, which is the same as the rule with paper-based mail that 
does not require the person to be aware of the postal or mail to be opened.
706
 
Regrettably, the UCITA does not lead to clarity on the issues of when 
receipt takes place; it only gives certainty regarding the place of receipt . 
  
As previously stated, it has only been adopted by a few states. This is not 
similar to the Model Law which provides a rule for e-receipt but is silent on 
time of contract formation. 
  
(ii) The UETA   
 
Section 15 of the UETA outlines specific rules as to when an 
electronic message is considered to be ‗sent‘ and ‗received‘. It has 
significance to contract formation, enforcement and breach of contract for it 
specifies when it is deemed to have been sent or received.
707
 However, 
Norwood is of the view that this section does not take a position on whether 
an acceptance is considered to be valid when mailed (the mail box rule).
708
  
 
Section 15(a) deals first with the question of when is a message 
deemed to have been sent and lays down a three-pronged test. First, the 
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message must have been addressed properly or otherwise directed properly 
to an information processing system that the recipient has designated or uses 
for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information of the type 
sent, from which the recipient is able to retrieve the information.  
 
Secondly, the sent information must be capable of being accessed on the 
receiving information system. Thirdly and lastly, the said sent message must 
have entered an information processing system outside the control of the 
sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on behalf of the sender, 
or enters a region of the information processing system designated or used 
by the recipient which is under the control of the recipient.  
 
It is tempting to suggest that Section 15(a) codifies what might be 
called the mailbox rule. However, the drafters clearly did not intend that to 
be the case if one reads the early drafts of the UETA which specifically 
abolish the mailbox rule.
709
 Section 15 (a) essentially only deals with the 
aspect of when a message has been sent and it does not in any way give 
certainty as to whether a message has constituted a valid acceptance of an 
offer made.
710
  
 
Section 15 (b) addresses the second question that specifically deals with 
when a data message is deemed to have been received. The test is a dual one 
which requires first, that the data message must enter an information system 
from which the recipient is able to retrieve the record or an information 
system customarily used for the receipt of similar electronic records; and 
secondly the recipient is able to retrieve the record that has been sent.
711
 
Norwood notes that the provision makes it clear that receipt is not dependent 
on a person having noticed that the record is in the person‘s system. 
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Reception occurs as soon as it enters a used or designated information 
system, whether or not it has been retrieved.
712
  
 
To sum up the legal position Lord states that:  
 
‗Section 15 (b) does not establish any substantive rules 
concerning the effect that receipt of particular information 
or information in general  . . .  It solely concerns itself 
with determining whether information has been received, 
leaving to the other law the question of the effect of that 
receipt … . Nevertheless . . . two important substantive 
effects [can be noted ] . . . It will trigger and mesh with 
other rules of law that are dependent for their applicability 
on ―receipt‖ . . . whether the recipient can manipulate the 
timing of receipt by his failure to open his mail.‘713 
 
Lord concludes that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that 
the agreement is concluded at the time and place where the recipient 
receives the information such as in true paper-based transactions.
714
 The said 
approach is akin to the reception theory. Although some writers are of the 
view that the United States may have adopted the reception theory,
715
 other 
more cautious writers are of the view that the mailbox theory stands,
716
 
especially in the light of the fact that the UCITA has limited application in 
the United States legal milieu.
717
 
 
An electronic record is deemed to be sent from where the sender has its 
place of business. In the case of multiple places of business, the closest 
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place that has a relation to the transaction will be deemed as such a place of 
business.
718
Accordingly, where there is an issue regarding the place of 
sending or receipt, the location of the information system should not be 
regarded as the location, but the location of the place of business is of 
importance.
719
 In the instance when the party is aware that a message that 
was purportedly sent or received was actually not sent or received, the legal 
effect of the sending and/or the receipt is regulated by other applicable 
law.
720
 
 
(iv) Automated transactions 
 
Both the UCITA and the UETA deal with the issue of automated 
transactions that have wholly or partially been concluded by electronic 
agents. Section 206 of the UCITA recognises this means of contracting as an 
enforceable contract but gives an interpretation as an option
721
 where there 
is proof that the said agreement was a result of ‗fraud , electronic mistake or 
the like‘722 to decide otherwise. Section 14(1) of the UETA deals with the 
increasing methods of automated contracting.
723
 It provides that :  
 
‗a contract may be formed by the interaction of 
electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual 
was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents‘ 
actions or the resulting terms of the agreement.‘ 
 
Norwood adds that machines can represent parties in a legally binding 
agreement and that the defence of lack of human interaction or intent cannot 
                                                 
718
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be used as a valid defence.
724
 A similar provision is contained in Section 
101(h) of the E-sign Act.
725
 
 
(v) Interesting cases dealing with click-wrap, web wrap agreements  
 
The majority of cases involving electronic contracting mostly relate to 
assent to contractual terms and the jurisdiction of courts. The provisions of 
the UCITA, UETA or E-Sign Act have not been subjected to judicial 
scrutiny. It is interesting to illustrate (for comparative purposes) the court‘s 
rulings towards click-wrap, browse-wrap and web-wrap agreements in the 
United States. 
 
 Click-wrap and  web wrap agreements 
 
The first decision is of Llan Systems v Netscout Service Level 
Corporation
726
 in which the court had to decide whether a party is bound to 
contractual terms that appear on screen of a computer whilst installing a 
software programme by clicking the ‗I agree‘ option. In answering the legal 
question in the affirmative, the court reasoned that a click-wrap agreement 
could be analysed as forming a contract under UCC Section 2-204 
(formation in general) in that the buyer assents to the click-wrap agreement 
when clinking the box ‗I agree‘.727  
  
Norwood also explains that the court referred to the famous decision of Pro 
Cd v Zeidenberg & Siken Mtn. Web Services
728
 in which the Court was of 
the view that the final failure to reject the terms of a shrink-wrap agreement 
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was sufficient to show assent to contract terms and that the doctrine of 
‗money now, terms later‘ has application in the United States law.729 
 
In the second case of DeJohn v The TV Corporation International 
730
 
the vexed legal issue of jurisdiction came under the spotlight with specific 
reference to a forum selection clause. The court held for a party to evade 
being bound to a forum selection clause it must prove the following:  
 
‗It was the result of fraud or overreaching; the party 
will be deprived of his day in Court due to grave 
inconvenienced and unfair selection of the selected 
forum; the clause is against public policy of the forum 
state and the party may be deprived of legal remedy 
due to the unfairness of the chosen legal regime.‘731 
 
None of the factors could be proved and the clause was upheld.
732
 In 
the case of Sprecht v Netscape Communications Corporation
733
 attention 
was drawn to the effect of what the court referred to as an internet 
agreement which was contained far down at the bottom of the web-page 
under the download option for free software. The court refused to enforce an 
arbitration clause and stated, ‗[the offeree] is not bound by inconspicuous 
contractual provisions of which he was unaware‘.734  
 
The court further held that, ‗downloading is hardly an unambiguous 
indication of assent‘.735 The primary purpose of the download is to get the 
product. If the party intended to be bound he surely would have clicked ‗I 
assent‘. 
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(vi) E-jurisdiction in e-related disputes  
 
Another vexed legal issue is e-jurisdiction. Dennis Rice explains that 
jurisdiction in the United States is influenced by the 3rd Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
736
 It is divided into ‗jurisdiction 
to prescribe‘, ‗jurisdiction to adjudicate‘ and ‗jurisdiction to enforce‘.737 For 
the purposes of this discussion, it is important to look at jurisdiction to 
adjudicate.
738
  
 
In this realm of internet-based e-jurisdiction, a realm in which the courts 
have created new jurisdictional principles for analysing electronic contacts 
mediated through cyberspace that depart from the traditional jurisdictional 
principles articulated in cases involving contacts made in real space.
739
  
 
New considerations such as web site internet activity and target 
audience are essential concepts that United States courts use to determine 
whether to treat virtual contacts as ‗minimum contacts‘. The United States 
courts have come up with various tests to establish jurisdiction or to give it 
grounds to refuse to hear a matter which will be discussed below in detail.   
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed an alternative test that assists in 
establishing jurisdiction in case of doubt called the ‗effects test‘ or 
‗minimum contact test‘ based on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Calder v 
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Jones.
740
 In terms of this alternatives test state courts may exercise 
jurisdiction when a defendant intentionally harms forum residents. In the 
said matter, a California resident brought a suit in the California Superior 
Court against a Florida resident who allegedly wrote libelous matters about 
her in a prominent national publication. In holding that jurisdiction was 
proper, the court found ‗the brunt of the harm, in terms of the respondent‘s 
emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation was suffered 
in California‘.741  
 
In the case of World-wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson
742
 the concept of 
‗minimum contacts‘, in turn, can be seen to perform two related but 
distinguishable functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient ‗forum’. It also acts to ensure that 
states through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
743
 The court 
in this case also added the requirement of plaintiff having to purposefully 
affiliate the defendant with the forum.
744
  
 
In the case of Burger King v Rudzewicz,
745
 the United States court further 
developed what it called the ‗minimum contact test‘ to found jurisdiction on 
a defendant on the basis of the entire dealings, including ‗prior negotiation 
and contemplated future consequences‘ establishing that ‗the defendant 
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum‘ and may foresee 
being hauled before a court in another party‘s jurisdiction.746 
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In the case of Zippo Mfg. co. v Zippo Dot 
747
 the court expanded on the 
minimum contact test by stating that personal jurisdiction for e-commerce 
companies should be dealt with on a sliding scale
748
 to analyse the contacts 
necessary to establish jurisdiction in what this study will now the call the 
‗Zippo test‘.749 In determining the constitutionality of exercising 
jurisdiction, the court in the Zippo case focused on ‗the nature and quality of 
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the internet‘.750 The sliding 
scale approach can be divided into three categories. First, active websites: 
for example, where a defendant enters into contracts with residents of a 
foreign jurisdiction that involve the repeated transmission of computer files 
over the internet, their conduct will fall into the active category. This is a 
ground for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
751
  
 
Secondly, passive websites: namely, those websites which merely 
provide information to a person visiting the site. They may be accessed by 
internet browsers, but do not allow interaction between the host of the 
website and a visitor to the site. Passive websites do not conduct business, 
offer goods for sale, or enable a person visiting the website to order 
merchandise, services, or files.
752
 The court reasoned that passive websites 
do not meet the standard of purposeful availment established under the 
traditional personal jurisdiction framework.
753
 The defendant has simply 
posted information on a passive internet website which is accessible to users 
in foreign jurisdictions. This is not a ground for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.
754
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Thirdly, are the interactive websites that make up the middle of the 
sliding scale where a user can exchange information with the host computer. 
In this middle scale, jurisdiction should be determined by the ‗level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that 
occurs on their web site‘.755  
 
Factors such as online contracting (found on most e-commerce sites) can 
show a high level of interaction leading to the exercise of jurisdiction. This 
is the crucial point of the sliding scale analysis. If the activities occurring on 
a defendant`s website lean more towards the passive side of the scale, 
personal jurisdiction will not be applied. If, the activity slides toward the 
active side of the scale, personal jurisdiction will most likely be upheld.
756
   
 
Lastly, the courts in applying the ‗Zippo‘ and effects tests have focused 
on whether there was ‗something more‘ that was required to exercise 
jurisdiction and developed the ‗targeting test‘.757The targeting test states that 
a court will have jurisdiction if, ‗the defendant specifically engaged in 
wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff with the knowledge that the 
defendant is a resident of a forum state‘.758 The targeting test is argued to be 
a better test as it deals more with the intention of the parties in determining 
jurisdiction and is seen as a fairer approach in establishing whether a 
defendant could have foreseen being hauled before a court outside his/her 
normal jurisdiction. 
 
The most famous decision dealing with a court‘s jurisdiction regarding 
the conduct of owners of a website is the case of Yahoo! Inc, a Delaware 
Corporation v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'antisemitisme a French 
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Association; L'union Des Etudiants Juifs De France, a French 
Association
759
. In this matter Yahoo!, an American internet service provider, 
brought suit in federal district court in diversity against ‗La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme‘ (LICRA) and ‗L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de 
France‘ (UEJF) seeking a declaratory judgment that two interim orders by a 
French court are unrecognisable and unenforceable. The court order 
pertained to the court ban imposed on Yahoo!! on its French website 
www.yahoo.fr  prohibiting it from selling Nazi material, Nazi memorabilia 
or any Nazi article within the French jurisdiction. The exact wording of the 
Court order read: 
‗Yahoo! take all necessary measures to dissuade and render 
impossible any access [from French territory] via 
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service and to any 
other site or service that may be construed as constituting an 
apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi crimes.‘760 
 
The court, in its reasoning, applied the effects test (also known as the 
‗purposeful direction‘ test) as formulated in the Calder v Jones761 decision 
and the ‗minimum contacts‘ test as set out in Zippo Mfg. Co v Zippo Dot.762   
 
Furthermore, the court recognised that, ‗the risk of a large monetary 
penalty would have to inevitably weigh heavily in Yahoo!'s assessment of its 
options‘, the majority tries to neutralise the risk creating a protective shield 
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provided in the record. Counsel for LICRA and UEJF contended at oral argument that the 
words "all necessary measures"   (underlined and italicized above) are a mistranslation of 
the French text. The original French for the entire phrase (italicized above) is "prendre 
toutes les mesures de nature à dissuader et à rendre impossible." Counsel contended that the 
words "toutes les mesures de nature à" are more accurately translated as "all reasonable (or 
available) measures."  
761
 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). 
762
 F.Supp 1119 (W.D.pa 1997).  
172 
by invoking the doctrine that United States courts will not enforce the penal 
judgments of other countries. It thus assures Yahoo! that, ‘even if the French 
court were to impose a monetary penalty against Yahoo!, it is exceedingly 
unlikely that any court in California or indeed elsewhere in the United States 
would enforce it‘ because it is a penal judgment.763 
 
In the most recent case in the appeal of MacDermind Inc v Jackie Deiter 
764
 the United States Court of Appeal held that a foreign defendant‘s remote 
use (at the time from Canada) of a computer within the jurisdiction of 
Connecticut satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of both the Connecticut 
Long-arm Statute and due process. In finding that the district court (the court 
‗a quo’) had erred by dismissing the action on lack of jurisdiction held that 
the district court indeed had jurisdiction to hear the dispute and it concluded 
that the defendant actually did ‗use‘ the computer services in the 
Connecticut state as she had accessed an information system within 
Connecticut as contained in the Connecticut Long–arm Statute.765 
 
Secondly, the appeal court held due proceeds was followed because that 
the defendant had ‗‘minimum contacts‘ with the State of Connecticut Court 
as the previous decisions of Calder v Jones
766
 and World-wide Volkswagen 
Corp v Woodson
767
 The court further referred to the case of Burger King v 
Rudzewicz
768
 and held that she had ‗purposefully directed her conduct‘ at the 
information system in Connecticut.
769
 
 
 In holding that the jurisdiction was reasonable the court referred to the 
case of Asashi Metal Industries Company v Superior Court, 
770
based on the 
following five factors: namely, (a) the burden on the defendant; (b) the 
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interest if the forum state; (c) the plaintiff‘s interest in obtaining relief; (d) 
interest of the interstate judicial system and shared interests of the two 
states. 
 
(d) Conclusion  
 
United States legislation primarily deals with the functional equivalence of 
electronic data to the old traditional paper-based methods. The UCITA has 
proven not to be as effective and has not been widely adopted by states. This 
is partly due to the fact that it does not only cover e-commerce issues, but 
other IT related problems. The UETA has in its scope excluded a number of 
legal acts that one may perform using data messages. This approach is 
contrary to the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
 
The UETA is deemed to be a facilitating Act, that does not require any 
one to perform any act relating to electronic transactions.
771
 Section 7 of the 
UETA gives effect to Articles 5 and 6 of the Model Law on E-commerce on 
the aspect of validity and recognition of electronic data messages.
772
 Section 
7 also gives a wide recognition to electronic signatures and shows a shift 
closer to the UNCITRAL Model Law of E-signatures. 
 
The UCITA seems to follow the model law with regard to time and 
receipt as contained by Article 15. The .UETA, which is more widely 
accepted, is silent on the issue and legal writers also do not have general 
consensus on the issue. The United States common law seems to be a leader 
in establishing jurisdictions and it appears that many jurisdictions seek for 
answers from the United States law in formulating their own tests when 
dealing with cross-border issues of the internet. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation shows clearly that the South African ECT Act adequately 
caters for paperless contracts or better said, electronic contracts (e-
contracts). In this conclusion, the most important provisions in the ECT Act 
will be compared to the UNECIC, UNCITRAL Model Laws, the AU 
Convention on Cyber Security and United States law with a view to making 
recommendations regarding the current South African legal position on e-
contracts. 
 
(a) Formation and validity of e-contracts 
 
The South African law of contract allows contracts to be formed in any 
manner, i.e. orally, telephonically, by written documentation, fax or through 
the conduct of the parties. This is consistent with the party autonomy 
principle as envisaged by the UNICITRAL Model Law and as is contained 
therein. An offer and an acceptance can be made on a website, in e-mail 
messages, and in a chat-room or any other new social media platform. 
 
Section 11(1) and Section 22(1) of the South African ECT Act 
reiterate the principles allowing for contracts to be negotiated and concluded 
in different electronic ways by providing respectively that, ‗information is 
not without legal force merely on the grounds that it is wholly or partly in a 
data message‘. The above provisions follow the principles as laid down by 
Article 5 and Article 6 of the Model Law, Section 107 of the UCITA, and 
section 7 of the UETA and reconfirmed in Article 8 of the UNECIC. Section 
21 of the ECT Act on the other hand, guarantees and re-affirms that, ‗an 
agreement may be formed where an electronic agent performs an action 
required by law for the agreement formation‘.   
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There might be only one ambiguous issue regarding whether an 
electronic message or a website is an invitation to treat or it is a valid offer. 
It has been argued in this dissertation that this will fall under one of the 
instances where an advertisement may constitute an offer from the common 
law perspective. In this regard, businesses can avoid ambiguity by making 
clear in their e-mail pricelist or website catalogue that it is either an 
invitation to treat or to make a firm offer.  
 
(b) Time and place of formation of contract  
 
Section 22 and 23 of the ECT Act provide clarity as to the existing South 
African contract law in determining the exact time and place of dispatch and 
the receipt of data messages. In summary, an offer or acceptance made in the 
form of a data message is deemed to have been sent when it enters an 
information system outside the control of the originator in terms of Section 
22 of the ECT Act. It is deemed to have been sent at the place of business of 
the originator and is deemed to have been received when the complete data 
message enters an information system of the addressee and it is capable of 
being retrieved. It is submitted that the ECT Act could be amended to follow 
the UCITA rule that an e-mail must be sent to the correct address. It should 
be noted this also addresses the uncertainty that occurs when a data message 
is sent to a non-designated information system. 
 
Section 23 of the ECT Act and Section 203(4) of the UCITA, unlike 
the Section 8 of the UETA or E-Sign law, actually specify when a contract is 
concluded which is seen as a progressive step in the ECT Act. These 
provisions are partially in line with the Model Law‘s Article 15 and confirm 
that the contract is concluded on receipt of the message by the addressee but 
go a step further by also confirming as to when the contract is concluded, 
unlike the Model Law and Article 10 of the UNECIC. It must be noted that 
in Section 23 of the ECT Act is more stringent in that it requires that the 
complete data message must have entered the information system of the 
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recipient. This additional requirement is not included in the Model Law, the 
UNECIC, or the UCITA. It is submitted that, although stringent, it creates 
more legal certainty in the event where the full data message has not been 
received by the addressee. 
 
  (c) Automated transactions 
 
Section 20(a)–(c) of the ECT Act relates to automated transaction which 
extends to web-wrap and click-wrap agreements. This section re-states the 
common law position to some extent and instead of using the subjective 
actual consensus criterion when looking at validity of agreements, a more 
objective criterion, namely, reliance is applied to automated contracts.  
 
Section 20 confirms the validity of automated transactions as 
previously stated by Pistorius.
773
 Although the Model Law on E-commerce 
by way of implication confirms the validity of automated agreements, the 
UNECIC provides that these are now an acceptable form of contract 
negotiation in Article 12. Section 20(d) of the ECT Act has new important 
consequences in that it gives the party contracting with an electronic agent 
the right to review the transaction, failing which the party will not be bound. 
Section 20 (e) also specifies the procedure to be followed in the case where a 
party has made a material error and wishes not to be bound to the agreement. 
This provision although pre-dating the UNECIC is very similar to the 
provision of the UNECIC on this legal issue and shows that the drafters on 
the ECT Act had a very progressive intention while drafting it. 
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(d) Writing and signature requirement 
 
South African law allows most contracts to be concluded informally, but in 
the case where writing and signatures are required by the parties, our courts 
have adopted a very lenient and progressive approach. In this regard, Section 
12 and Section 13 of the ECT Act recognise data messages as the functional 
equivalent of a written document and signature.  
 
    Section 12 of the ECT Act unlike the Model Law, the UNECIC, UETA, 
UCITA and E-sign laws add an additional dimension which requires that the 
data messages must be accessible and usable for subsequent use. It is 
interesting to note that Section 8 of the UETA specifically states that an 
originator may not inhibit the printing or the subsequent use of the data 
message, which seems to be fulfilling a similar function as the additional 
requirement in Section 12 of the ECT Act although the non-inhibiting 
provision goes beyond the functional equivalence principle. The above 
provision, save were deviation has been noted, seems to follow both the 
international and United States trends.   
 
Section 13 of the ECT Act also recognises the use of electronic 
signatures. It should also be noted that in the instance where the law requires 
such a signature, such a requirement will only be satisfied if one uses an 
advanced electronic signature.
774
 There is a shift from technologically 
neutral electronic signatures as contained in Article 7 of the Model law as 
well as Article 6 of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures. A more 
stringent standardised security level has been adopted in South Africa which 
is seen as a two-tiered approach. Some electronic signatures are valid 
without advanced levels of security and for others the law requires a 
signature to follow a more prescriptive approach. The UCITA and E-sign 
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law seem to follow a technologically neutral regime but some states have 
adopted stringent regimes such as that of South Africa. 
 
It is submitted that the two-tier approach, as envisaged in Section 13, 
is ideal in that it does not unnecessarily place any specific requirements or 
formalities in the course of normal business contracting so making the 
minimalist approach the ideal approach. 
 
The face-to-face registration required for the prescriptive                  
advanced e-signature can have many benefits, and the said signature can also 
be used for other functions as it is linked and verified by the Department of 
Home Affairs. 
 
 
(e) Jurisdiction in e-contracts  
 
In this researcher‘s opinion, the ECT Act should be reviewed every second 
year in order to cater for new technological advances as per the technology 
neutrality principle. Most electronic contracts usually contain clauses 
stipulating that the transaction in question will be governed by a particular 
law; the Model laws, the ECT Act and United States pieces of legislation 
appear to be silent on this important international law issue. It is suggested 
here that a jurisdiction clause can create certainty in the event of a dispute 
arising as to the conclusion and performance of the contract. 
 
 A jurisdiction clause, although not absolute, can deal with any uncertainty 
in the agreement as to which forum will have jurisdiction and what law may 
apply in the case of pre-litigation and litigation.  
 
The UNECIC also has affirmed the recognition of international cross-
border electronic contracts and attempts to curb all the common law legal 
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problems created by the principle of jurisdiction and the implication of the 
conflict of laws as per Article 10 of the UNECIC. 
 
(f) Recommendations 
 
As discussed earlier, the South African ECT Act is mainly based upon 
the UNCITRAL Model Laws on E-Commerce. It is disturbing that the 
principles of technological neutrality with regard to electronic signatures 
have not been followed, but perhaps this was done as a cautionary measure. 
The slow uptake of advanced electronic signatures is a factor inhibiting the 
growth of e-commerce in South Africa. 
 
 It is also suggested that the SAAA follow a technological method 
when accrediting both foreign and local electronic signatures in order to 
relax the stringent requirement of an advanced e-signature. Section 13 of the 
ECT Act may be seen as inhibiting electronic commerce by not fully 
observing the media neutrality of electronic signatures but it could be 
relaxed by the implementation of less stringent rules on accreditation of 
advanced e-signatures since the two-tier approach has shown this to be 
useful. Should this not be possible, the legislature will have to look at 
amending Section 13 to follow the international trend of technological 
neutrality as envisaged by the Model law on Electronic Signatures. 
 
It is also suggested that Section 23 of the ECT Act be amended to add that 
an e-mail must have been sent to the correct e-mail address as contained in 
the United States provisions in Section 15 of the UETA. The sending to a 
non-designated information system should also be addressed. 
 
It is also submitted that the ECT Act requirement that a full data 
message must enter the information system of the addressee could also be 
relaxed as an interruption in a data connection may result in an incomplete 
data message being received by an addressee and may prejudice the sender 
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despite him/her having sent the data message. Perhaps the reception theory 
may not be the most appropriate theory regulating when a message is 
deemed received it has, unlike the United States Law, created some legal 
certainty.  
 
 
The alignment of the South African law with international and 
regional law instruments such as the UNECIC and the African Union 
convention will also ensure regional and global legal compliance. The 
adoption of useful legal principles from other jurisdictions such as the 
United States and the EU (to some extent) which have a wide body of 
jurisprudence of cyber law related matters may be the way forward. Lessons 
learned from the US case law studies show that the old rigid approach to 
jurisdiction must evolve with the advent of the internet and will need to be 
further address by our courts. Legislative amendments are deemed 
appropriate. 
 
South Africa in its current ICT Review and review of the ECT Act in 
the Amendment Bill of 2014 needs to take cognizance of development in 
technology and observe international best practice in order to fully address 
any current legal issues that may inhibit or create uncertainty when 
contracting electronically. 
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